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Abstract 
Authentication  mechanisms  provide  the  cornerstone  for  security  for  many  distributed 
systems, especially for increasingly popular online applications. For decades, widely used, 
traditional authentication methods included passwords and PINs that are now inadequate to 
protect online users and organizations from ever more sophisticated attacks.  
This  study  proposes  an  improvement  to  traditional  authentication  mechanisms.  The 
solution introduced here includes a one-time-password (OTP) and incorporates the concept 
of multiple levels and multiple channels – features that are much more successful than 
traditional  authentication  mechanisms  in  protecting  users'  online  accounts  from  being 
compromised. 
This research study reviews and evaluates current authentication classes and mechanisms 
and proposes an authentication mechanism that uses a variety of techniques, including 
multiple  channels,  to  resist  attacks  more  effectively  than  most  commonly  used 
mechanisms. Three aspects of the mechanism were evaluated: 
1.  The security of multi-channel authentication (MCA) was evaluated in theoretical terms, 
using a widely accepted methodology. 
2.  The usability was evaluated by carrying out a user study. 
3.  Finally, the acceptability thereof was evaluated by asking the participants in study (2) 
specific questions which aligned with the technology acceptance model (TAM). 
The study’s analysis of the data, gathered from online questionnaires and application log 
tables,  showed  that  most  participants  found  the  MCA  mechanism  superior  to  other 
available authentication mechanisms and clearly supported the proposed MCA mechanism 
and the benefits that it provides. 
The research presents guidelines on how to implement the proposed mechanism, provides 
a detailed analysis of its effectiveness in protecting users' online accounts against specific, 
commonly deployed attacks, and reports on its usability and acceptability. It represents a 
significant step forward in the evolution of authentication mechanisms meeting the security 
needs of online users while maintaining usability.  
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Chapter 1   
Introduction 
Advances in Internet technologies have created many opportunities for offering consumers 
different  electronic  services  online.  Some  of  these  services  support  communication 
between people while others offer online market places where people can choose products 
and services while they remain at home. The Web, as one service provided by the Internet, 
is  a  remarkable  network  with  huge  potentialities  that  can  be  accessed  from  almost  all 
countries  around  the  globe  [1].    This  network  offers  online  business  players  a  wider 
domain  of  consumers  that  is  not  restricted  by  geographical  areas  and  a  new  arena  of 
competition. On the other hand, it offers customers a virtual market place with a variety of 
products and services from different businesses around the world that are, otherwise, hard 
to bring together in one physical place. 
Banks, as one of the fast growing online businesses, utilize the Web as a marketing and 
delivery medium, which offers them an open market with equal opportunities to compete 
with other banking players. For online banking customers, the Web offers an online market 
place with a wide range of services that are just a click away [2].    However, there is a 
huge volume of communication traffic between banks and customers, full of threats and 
anonymous users with financial gain or subversive goals in mind. It is important to prevent 
such  users  from  gaining  unauthorized  access  to  other  users’  online  accounts.  This  is 
especially  important  for  financial  firms,  such  as  banks,  that  need  to  identify  and 
authenticate their customers reliably before granting them access to their services. 
Most of the online businesses that maintain users’ accounts today make use of passwords 
to authorize their customers to permit access their online accounts. This authentication 
mechanism, however, is most effective when used as an access credential for accessing 
standalone  computers,  not  connected  to  any  network.  Today,  almost  all  computers  are 
Internet-ready machines and many of them are already connected to at least one network, 
whether that is a home network, an office network, and/or the Web. This technological 
advancement has brought many electronic services to users’ computers and mobile phones. 
Many of these services require passwords for authentication. Users often reuse the same  
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password,  write  passwords  down,  or  ask  the  browser  to  remember  them  [3].  Such 
behaviours put the users’ accounts in danger. Even if we trust the user, the fact that these 
computers connect to a global network is, in itself, a reason for not relying on passwords as 
a sole authentication factor for authorizing critical transactions. As a consequence, many 
alternative authentication mechanisms were proposed in the past few years in order to 
provide stronger alternatives to the traditional password. 
This study focuses upon Sultanate of Oman, a developing country where online banking is 
less widely adopted and used by bank customers than in developed countries such as UK. 
There  are  few  published  studies  [4,  5]  exploring  online  banking  adoption  and 
authentication techniques to date. Until May 2009, only four out of a total of 7 local banks 
in  Oman  offered  online  banking  services  to  their  customers  [6].  Some  of  the  current 
existing online banking systems implemented by banks, including the major leading bank 
[7], offer only limited functionality such as account statements and payment history with 
payment  transfers  between  customer  accounts  and  bill  payments.  This  made  Oman  an 
interesting  place  to  explore  in  the  context  of  online  banking  adoption  using  novel 
authentication techniques.  
This  study  proposes  a  solution  that  offers  online  banking  users  a  more  secure 
authentication  mechanism  while  maintaining  usability.  The  solution  is  based  on  a 
multilevel  authentication  approach  where  services  are  classified  into  informational  and 
transactional services. Each level must be independent from the other and the user must 
always  be  authenticated  when  moving  to  a  higher  level.  To  obtain  maximum  benefit, 
secrets  or  keys  used  to  authorize  transactional  services  must  be  delivered  via  an 
independent  channel  other  than  the  primary  channel  used  to  authorize  users  to  access 
informational services. This authentication mechanism is based on previous research [8] 
and extends the study by means of theoretical and practical evaluations. The study first 
evaluates  the  security  of  the  proposed  solution  theoretically,  using  threat-modelling 
techniques, and then uses an online experiment to evaluate, in practical terms, usability and 
acceptability of the proposed solution. 
1.1 Research Objectives 
Objective 1.  Review  the  most  commonly  used  authentication  classes,  authentication 
mechanisms, and authentication attacks (Chapter 2).  
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Objective 2.  Review the usability and acceptability aspects of authentication mechanisms 
and  the  evaluation  techniques  used  to  assess  them  for  new  information 
technologies. 
Objective 3.  With  respect  to  online  banking,  discuss  some  of  the  currently  used 
authentication  mechanisms  and  identify  their  weaknesses,  showing  how 
they fail to protect customers’ accounts against different attacks identified 
in objective 1 (Chapter 4).  
Objective 4.  Propose an authentication mechanism solution that addresses the security 
and usability problems identified and listed in objective 2. Theoretically 
evaluate the security of this solution and identify all features needed for 
implementation (Chapter 5).  
Objective 5.  Empirically evaluate the new proposed mechanism with respect to usability 
and acceptability (Chapter 7).    
1.2 Hypothesis and Thesis Statement 
The thesis statement is: 
It is possible to design an authentication mechanism that uses multiple channels to 
resist attacks more effectively than most commonly used mechanisms. Furthermore, 
such a mechanism will also be both usable and acceptable to users in Oman. 
The  first  part  of  the  thesis  statement  is  addressed  theoretically  using  threat-modelling 
analysis in Chapter 5. The second part of the statement is practically evaluated in Chapter 7 
where  usability  and  acceptability  aspects  are  thoroughly  addressed.    The  practical 
evaluation  of  usability  and  acceptability  in  this  study  involved  testing  the  following 
hypotheses in order to support the second part of the thesis statement: 
H1a.  Gender significantly influences customers’ usage of online banking 
H1b.  Marital status significantly influences customers’ usage of online banking 
H1c.  Education level significantly influences customers’ usage of online banking 
H1d.  Age significantly influences customers’ usage of online banking 
H1e.  Income significantly influences customers’ usage of online banking 
H1f.  Trust & relationship has a positive effect on Perceived Ease of Use (PEU) 
H1g.  Ease of access has a positive effect on Perceived Ease of Use (PEU) 
H1h.  Security has a positive effect on Perceived Ease of Use of OB  
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H2a.  Multi-channel authentication is effective 
H2b.  Multi-channel authentication is efficient 
H2c.  Multi-channel authentication is satisfactory 
H2d.  Multi-channel authentication is acceptable to users 
 
The hypotheses are split into two categories: H1 and H2 hypotheses.  The H1 hypotheses 
are concerned with the factors influencing the adoption (acceptance) of online banking in 
Oman.  H2 hypotheses, however, address the usability and acceptability of multi-channel 
authentication, proposed in Chapter 5, to Omani users. 
1.3 Thesis Structure 
The dissertation is organized into the following chapters: 
Chapter 2  Background  and  Related  Work:    this  chapter  presents  a  thorough  literature 
review on authentication, its types, and implementation mechanisms found in 
the  literature.  The  chapter  also  covers  attack  methods  used  to  target  these 
authentication mechanisms. 
Chapter 3  Usability and Acceptability:  this chapter reviews usability and acceptability of 
authentication  mechanisms.  It  also  discusses  the  importance  of  evaluating 
usability  and  acceptability  of  new  information  technologies  in  information 
system and how they can be evaluated in practical terms. 
Chapter 4  Online  Banking  and  Mobile  Communication:    this  chapter  discusses 
authentication mechanisms implemented in online banking applications. It also 
covers  the  important  role  of  mobile  communication  as  a  usable  and  secure 
complementary authentication channel. 
Chapter 5  Proposed  Solution:  this  chapter  proposes  the  multi-channel  authentication 
(MCA) mechanism and discusses how it overcomes the security and usability 
issues of other alternatives. It also presents a widely accepted threat evaluation 
technique, suggested by Microsoft, to test the security level offered by MCA 
against most known forms of attack. 
Chapter 6  Design  and  Implementation:    this  chapter  covers  MCA  design  options  and 
implementation. It reviews the prototype application and explains how users 
will go about testing it in the data-gathering phase.  
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Chapter 7  Evaluation:    this  chapter  presents  the  results  of  the  evaluation  of  the  data 
gathered from users who tested the prototype application. The study bases its 
evaluation on questionnaire results and data gathered from log tables.  
Chapter 8  Conclusion:  this final chapter concludes the study by giving an overview of all 
chapters discussed in this thesis. It also summarizes the main results and lists 
future research paths.  
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Chapter 2   
Background and Related Work 
2.1 Introduction 
When personal home computers started to appear in the 1970s, they were mainly used for 
basic computational tasks or to store data. The most powerful selling tool at that time was 
entertainment software. However, after the development of electronic mail (e-mail) a few 
years later and the introduction of the Web service in the 1980s, there was a shift of users’ 
interests towards using personal computers mainly for communications [9].  This change 
led to interconnected computers in a network, the Internet, replacing the previous era when 
computers were solely standalone machines. According to [10], there were almost 1.73 
billion Internet users worldwide in September 2009, with an increase of 18% since the 
previous year. The e-mail users (81% of the total Internet users) sent around 90 trillion e-
mails in 2009 alone.  
From a business perspective, the Internet (which offers e-mail and Web services) has also 
become  the  most  convenient  and  cost-effective  environment  for  businesses  around  the 
globe [1].  It is a place where people with different cultural backgrounds and from different 
geographical  places  connect  as  if  they  are  in  one  physical  place,  sharing  and 
communicating with each other in different electronic forms. For business organizations, 
the web offers an open market with equal opportunities to compete regardless of business 
size or geographical location. For consumers, it offers an online market place with a wide 
variety of products from different suppliers with different prices [2].  Thus, anyone can 
start  a  business  online  and  compete  with  other  business  players.  Statistics  show  e-
commerce or online retailing is one of the fastest growing markets in Europe with online 
sales totalling approximately 4.7% of retail marketplace sales in 2009 (expected to increase 
to 5.5% in 2010) [11]. 
The afore-mentioned trends have made personal computers an integral part of our lives. 
However, this change soon led to security problems. From the users’ side, such problems 
appear  in  the  form  of  malicious  programs,  loss  of  privacy,  and  floods  of  unwanted 
advertisement  and  spam  [9].    From  the  businesses’  side,  it  is  less  important  to  know  
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whether you can do business than to know how to deploy this business in the online market 
[12] and how to maintain the business presence [1] in such an open, networked market full 
of threats and ambiguous users who are connected, along the way, with subversive goals in 
mind. 
According to CERT statistics, the total vulnerabilities reported jumped from 171 to 2,437 
to 7,236 in 1995, 2001, and 2008 respectively [13].  This increase requires that close 
attention be given to security, which itself progresses in parallel with the technological 
advances of computers and the Internet. Before the development of computers, security 
meant a means to secure assets physically, with traditional access controls such as keys, 
guards,  walls,  and  fences.  However,  after  the  invention  of  computers,  the  science  of 
encryption and cryptography offered practical controls for information assets. These have 
improved very quickly over time.   Nevertheless, since the introduction of the Internet and 
the  tremendous  growth  of  Internet  users  and  e-commerce  web  applications,  user 
identification and authentication have become major research areas charged with keeping 
pace and withstanding networking changes and increasing numbers of information security 
threats  and  attacks,  evolving  over  time.  These  attacks  use  various  technologies  and 
techniques, and exploit various vulnerabilities; they have the potential to damage any of 
the  three  key  elements  involved  in  an  online  communication  model.  These  three  key 
elements  are:  the  source,  the  transmission  system,  and  the  destination  [14].    In  this 
research,  source  and  destination  are  referred  to  as  end  user  (EU)  and  online  service 
provider (OSP), respectively. The transmission system is referred to as the communication 
channel (CC). 
Figure 2-1 shows the applicable known attacks on each of the key elements of the online 
communication model. These attacks are discussed in more detail later in section 2.4 of 
this chapter.  
In  this  chapter,  section  2.2  defines  authentication  and  lists  the  major  classes  of 
authentication commonly used by information technology systems. Section 2.3 explains 
how these authentication classes are being implemented and discusses the different types 
of  authentication  mechanisms  that  are  proposed  in  the  literature  or  that  are  currently 
implemented  in  different  online  applications.  Following  the  authentication  classes  and 
implementation  mechanisms,  section  2.4  pinpoints  the  various  attacks  on  these 
mechanisms. This section covers most known attacks that target each of the three core  
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communication elements: end user (EU), communication channel (CC), and online service 
provider (OSP). 
 
Figure 2-1:  Applicable attacks on the main three communication elements 
2.2 The Need for Authentication 
With the rapid progress of technologies related to networking facilities, more computers 
than ever before are now connected with each other. Unlike local limited networks, most 
computers are now connected to a larger global network to communicate and exchange 
resources  electronically  [15].    With  this  networking  progress,  there  is  a  need  to  offer 
security that will help protect connected users’ resources and services from other users. 
Yang  and  Shieh  [15]  described  network  security  in  terms  of  two  basic  requirements: 
secrecy and authentication. The former protects sensitive data against eavesdropping and 
modification, ensuring privacy and integrity of the electronic data available or exchanged 
within the network. The latter prevents forgery and unauthorized access to the network’s 
resources, ensuring the authenticity of the user. The authentication process was described 
by Renaud’s model as three phases: identification, authentication, and authorization [16].  
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1.  User identification is the process in which users are identified to a system in terms of 
who they are. The user supplies an identification code or name to the system, which 
accordingly, looks into the database for a matching record. Online user identification is 
insufficient by itself and it is typically necessary to proceed to the user authentication 
phase to verify the identity [17]. 
2.  User authentication is the process of confirming the user identification supplied in the 
previous phase. Usually the user must supply a secret factor in this phase, which should 
match the one assigned to the user’s record identified in the previous phase. Like user 
identification, user authentication is insufficient by itself and is a prerequisite for the 
user authorization phase. 
3.  If both user identification and authentication phases are successful, user authorization 
follows. This phase specifies the user’s access and usage privileges on the system. This 
phase usually is maintained and it remains live as long as the user session is active. 
This is to ensure that the user is accessing only information he/she is authenticated to 
access. 
Computer systems and online applications use different authentication mechanisms. Some 
choose  to  use  basic  authentication  mechanisms  such  as  username  and  password  while 
others invest resources to implement suitable authentication mechanisms such as biometric 
recognition hardware and software to protect their reputations and enhance their presence 
in the (online) market. While it is difficult to pin down how much an attack costs an 
organization in terms of damage and recovery, some security and research organizations 
have been running surveys to estimate the costs of attacks and computer security breaches. 
In 2003, viruses (i.e., considered as malware that attack computers) alone cost businesses 
$55 billion, almost double the damage they inflicted in 2002 [18].   
Sometimes, security breaches come from the employees within the organization and not 
from  outsiders.  In  a  2009  survey  of  American  companies  and  government  agencies 
conducted by the Computer Security Institute, 25% of respondents indicated that more than 
60% of financial losses came from accidental breaches by insiders, not external hacks, and 
16.1% said 81 to 100% of all losses came from accidental breaches [19]. One should also 
note that many organizations, especially financial firms, are very reluctant to report hacker-
related  break-ins  as  this  could  affect  customers’  and  stakeholders’  impression  of  their 
security [18] and might, therefore, affect the organization stocks in the stock market [20]. 
Authentication is not only implemented in information technology, but rather is seen and 
dealt with everywhere. The amount of proof a user is required to provide increases or  
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decreases based on the amount of risk associated with the services or resources delivered. 
This is referred to as risk-based authentication [21]. 
A restaurant receptionist requests a customer’s name to verify which table is booked for 
that  customer,  for  example.  A  college  student  is  asked  by  the  registration  office  for 
information regarding full name, date of birth, and student identification number (ID) to 
receive a transcript. A bank customer calling a credit card department by phone is asked 
for full name, full address, date of birth, and maybe details of recent transactions on the 
account  or  a  special  online  personal  identification  number  (PIN)  to  verify  his  or  her 
identity.   
The verification process in our daily life is related to the risk associated with the service or 
resources to be acquired. In the restaurant case, for example, there is very little or no risk at 
all if the customer who just entered the restaurant has impersonated another customer who 
booked a table by phone. If the legitimate customer shows up anytime, he or she can be 
offered another table or, in the worst case, the restaurant manager can request that the other 
customer leave the place in favour of the legitimate customer who booked that table by 
phone. 
In the college student case, transcript details are usually confidential and only a legitimate 
student can request a copy from the registration office. However, the risk associated with 
the student grades being compromised is very low. Students sometimes share their grade 
scores with each other and a copy of the transcript is often attached to every job application 
made after graduation. Therefore, the verification process implemented by the registration 
office is limited only to information that could easily be known by other students like the 
student’s name, date of birth, and student ID. 
Unlike the restaurant customer and the college student, the bank customer has to provide 
more details that identify him or her more clearly (e.g., date of birth, full address) as well 
as information that is treated as confidential and is not known to anyone else (e.g., last 
transaction  details,  PIN).  This  is  important  due  to  the  high  risk  associated  with  the 
customer’s bank account. If someone were able to impersonate a bank customer when 
phoning  the  credit  card  department,  he  or  she  could  request  payment  transactions  that 
might be of a criminal nature, affecting the bank and the customer at the same time. 
Hastings  and  Dodson  [22]  described  the  authentication  process  in  terms  of  claimants, 
relying parties, and verifiers.  A claimant is the individual claiming to be a legitimate user  
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to  receive  services  and  resources.  A  relying  party  is  the  provider  of  the  services  and 
resources the user needs. A verifier is another individual or an automated system, which 
verifies the claimant’s legitimacy to authorize delivery of services and resources provided 
by the relying party. The verification process is usually based on authentication factors like 
facts, characteristics, behaviours, or knowledge known only to both the claimant and the 
verifier.  Based  on  these  authentication  factors,  the  researchers  have  classified 
authentication  in  information  technology  into  three  classes:  knowledge-based  (KBA), 
token-based (TBA), and biometrics based (BBA). 
This section discusses these three classes and the possible implementation strengths and 
weaknesses of each in detail. Examples of some implementations of these classes proposed 
in the literature are also presented. 
2.2.1  Knowledge-based Authentication (KBA) 
KBA is also called something the user knows and it refers to the method of verifying a 
user’s identity by matching one or more pieces of “secret” information supplied by an 
individual (claimant) against information sources associated with the claimant [23].  KBA 
is the most common authentication approach used in most distributed systems today [24].  
This  is  due  to  many  factors  including  simple  implementation  requirements,  low 
implementation and administration costs [25], and a high level of user acceptance. 
The authentication method used in KBA usually involves two factors: shared knowledge 
and secret knowledge. Shared knowledge is a piece of information that describes the user 
and people who interact with the user sometimes know the information. Examples of such 
shared factors include the user date of birth, living address, social security number, city of 
birth, and the name of a best friend. Secret knowledge, on the other hand, is considered 
secret and only the user usually knows it. This includes fixed passwords, passphrases, and 
PINs.   
A fixed password (see Figure 2-2) as an authentication factor is the most widely used KBA 
mechanism [15, 16, 25]; it acts as the first line of defence against unauthorized access [26].  
Most of the time, a user is requested to enter a username as well as an identification name. 
Following that, the user enters a secure password. The system will then consult a database 
or a data file to locate a matching record. If it finds one, then the password entered by the 
user will be compared against the password in the record. If they match, then the user  
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receives access permission. Sometimes passwords are encrypted in the database so the 
comparison process is only done after the entered password is encrypted using the same 
encryption algorithms. This encryption sometimes uses a one-way function. A one-way 
encryption function is a computational process that encrypts a given string (password) so it 
is computationally infeasible to decrypt it afterwards [27].  This function is used to protect 
users’  passwords  from  being  compromised  if  an  attacker  were  to  gain  access  to  the 
database file.  
 
Figure 2-2: Username and password are common shared and secret knowledge factors used in KBA 
Despite the fact that passwords are the most commonly used KBA, it is clear that they still 
have several weaknesses and are vulnerable to different attacks, especially if their database 
is available offline [28, 29] or is attacked by an insider.  Passwords in most systems are 
user defined and users tend to use memorable weak passwords. Such passwords are highly 
susceptible to observation and guessing [30] and can be intercepted and replayed [25] if 
communication channels are not properly encrypted and secured.  Statistics show that there 
is a significant growth of Internet services offered to online users [31] and users are now 
required  to  manage  many  different  accounts  online.    Accordingly,  the  number  of 
passwords needed to secure these accounts per person has increased. However, users tend 
to reuse their passwords across these accounts, which makes the case even worse because 
compromising one account allows the attacker to take over several accounts [3]. 
In order to overcome these weaknesses, some organizations have made use of system-
generated  passwords.  This  could  be  counter-productive  as  system  generated  passwords 
tend to be very complex, and therefore, hard to remember. Consequently, users might write 
these passwords down and degrade the overall security of the system. The same goes for 
organizations that set password policies that include rules requiring user-defined passwords 
to be very complex (i.e., force the use of special characters, combination of small and  
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capital letters, and numbers).  As a result, passwords become more secure, yet hard to 
remember, and therefore, the whole system may be compromised by the written records. 
Thus, a very long password is actually as bad as a weak one. 
One of the most common security mechanisms applied to password authentication is to 
restrict the allowed number of invalid retries. This usually locks down the account for a 
period  of  time  if  invalid  passwords  are  submitted  several  times  (i.e.,  usually  three). 
Another common mechanism is to force the user to change the password regularly. Online 
organizations, especially financial firms, do this to ensure that their customers do not use 
the same password among their other accounts that they may access frequently, such as e-
mails,  social  networking,  and  instant  messaging  accounts.  All  these  mechanisms 
apparently help protect the users’ accounts in some ways but there is always a usability 
cost. For example, modern browsers and Internet applications keep users logged in and 
request them to verify their passwords only to re-login to their accounts. However, users 
sometimes forget to disable the caps-lock key or use multi-language keyboards and define 
their passwords in languages other than the language they used when they created them. 
When they enter their passwords in the wrong case or language, they find it difficult to 
understand the reason for the authentication failure due to routine password obfuscation. 
For these reasons, an account could accidently be locked and access denied to a legitimate 
user for a period of time. 
Making passwords complex, and therefore, hard to guess does not prevent other types of 
attacks like Trojans and sniffing (discussed in more detail in section 2.4). Even a strong 
password can easily be captured if a key-logger is used. Key-loggers usually come in 
different techniques. Some are software that are installed into the system (Spector Pro, 
eBlaster,  SpyAgent,  SpyBuddy)  and  some  are    used  to  reprogram  the  BIOS  memory 
(memory  responsible  for  the  computer  firmware,  which  controls  devices  like  the 
keyboard).  Other types of key-loggers come as hardware such as a circuit with an internal 
memory,  which  is  attached  somewhere  between  the  I/O  port  and  the  keyboard.  Other 
hardware  key-loggers  do  not  need  to  be  connected,  having  wireless  sniffing  ability  to 
capture  wireless  keyboards’  signals/waves.  All  these  types  of  key-loggers  (software  or 
hardware) have the ability to capture the keystrokes, which sometimes represent the user 
identification and secret factors of the user.  
Despite  the  security  and  usability  issues  related  to  the  use  of  passwords  as  an 
authentication factor, most systems today are still using passwords as the only secret for  
14 
 
user authentication. Even systems that implement a high level of security and utilize other 
forms  of  authentication  are  still  using  password  authentication  as  a  complementary 
authentication at some point.  
2.2.2  Token-based Authentication (TBA) 
Token-based authentication (TBA), sometimes referred to as something you hold, is an 
authentication class based on tokens possessed by the user. The authentication principle 
does not rely on user’s memory but rather on the ability of the user to prove the ownership 
of a token. In real life, these tokens are usually used to identify the user who carries them 
(e.g., ID card, hospital card, social security card) while in information technology, these 
tokens  are  used  and  processed  as  part  of  the  authentication  mechanism.  Such  tokens 
include an ATM card, smart card, and the one-time hash calculator.   
Several technologies have been used for authentication based on tokens. These include 
magnetic strip card, proximity card, and smart cards. 
 
Figure 2-3: Magnetic strip cards 
A magnetic strip card (see Figure 2-3) is a token card with a magnetic band capable of 
storing data (e.g., ATM card, credit card, and transport card). They are widely used as a 
substitute for cash by financial firms as well as to carry out financial transactions. Other  
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companies  also  use  this  type  of  token  as  a  substitute  for  physical  access  keys  (i.e., 
accessing a hotel room), while others use them to control access and payment of time 
controlled services such as car parking area. A set of standards such as ISO 7810, 7811, 
7813 [32-34] and ISO 4909 [35] have been issued to define the physical characteristics and 
the magnetic track data structure of these cards. 
Magnetic strip cards are easy to carry and cheap to replace. However, they are also cheap 
to duplicate. There are commercial devices that are capable of reading the magnetic strip to 
duplicate its contents onto another template card. Thus, some authentication mechanisms 
implemented by organizations like banks also request their customers to provide another 
authentication factor on top of the token. If a token has been stolen or duplicated, they 
should be useless without the other authentication factor associated with the token; a PIN is 
commonly used as a second authentication factor. 
A proximity card (see Figure 2-4a), also known as a contactless smart card, is another form 
of token used for authentication. Unlike a magnetic strip card, a proximity card does not 
require physical contact with a reading device to read its contents. It transmits its data to a 
monitoring  device  wirelessly,  which  makes  it  more  practical  than  the  magnetic  strip. 
However, the use of proximity cards introduces another major security issue as the signals 
sent by this type of token can be read by a remote receiver located within the transmission 
range of the proximity card [36].  For this reason, the implementation of this type of token 
focuses mainly on access control and identification systems rather than on serving as an 
authentication token. 
 
Figure 2-4: (a) Proximity card, (b) Smart card 
The smart cards (see Figure 2-4b), also known as challenge/response cards, are cards with 
a built-in chip used as memory and/or as a microprocessor. The development of smart  
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cards dates back to the 1970s when patents were filed by France, Germany, and Japan [37].  
They are capable of performing computational algorithms and are able to store passwords 
and  certificates.  There  are  many  applications  where  smart  cards  are  used,  either  as 
identification tokens of their owners or as authentication factors. In computer systems, 
smart cards are used to allow single sign-ons and as an encryption factor to encrypt the file 
system. In financial firms, smart cards are used as ATM cards, credit/debit cards, fuel 
cards,  SIM  cards,  and  electronic  wallets.  Electronic  wallets  can  be  loaded  with  cash 
(electronically) that can later be transferred or used to pay for products. 
The smart cards are governed by ISO 7816 (parts 1, 2, & 3) [38], which defines their 
physical/communication characteristics and application identifiers.  In terms of security, 
smart cards use public key infrastructure (PKI) where the private key is stored in the card 
and cannot be copied. Usually it utilizes a two-factor authentication protocol where the 
token itself is considered one factor and a PIN the other. It limits the number of invalid 
trials  before  the  card  becomes  inactive.  Nevertheless,  as  for  other  token-based 
authentication,  smart  cards  are  prone  to  theft,  and  therefore,  can  be  compromised, 
especially if the PIN number is written down on the card itself or is captured by covert user 
surveillance,  such  as  over-shoulder  sniffing  or  surveillance  spy  cameras.  It  has  been 
estimated that around 25% of ATM card owners write down their PIN numbers on their 
cards [39]. 
 
Figure 2-5:  Different types of tokens used to generate one-time pin (OTP) numbers 
Other types of tokens also exist (see Figure 2-5). These include USB drives, key fobs, and 
one-time pin (OTP) calculators. Overall, token-based authentication offers better security 
than  the  traditional  knowledge-based  authentication  and  protects  online  users  from 
guessing, interception, social engineering, and brute-force attacks. However, the tokens  
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used to authenticate users can be shared or duplicated [40], and therefore, can be used 
illegally by people other than the legitimate user.  Token-based authentication is more 
expensive to deploy and maintain than knowledge-based authentication, especially when 
implemented on a large-scale. Moreover, some token-based technologies suffer from the 
same  problems  as  traditional  KBA  because  they  still  rely  on  memory  in  addition  to 
remembering to carry the token. 
2.2.3  Biometric-based Authentication (BBA) 
Biometric authentication refers to the use of physiological and behavioural biometrics to 
authenticate  users  [41].    No  secrets  are  used  to  authenticate  a  user.  This  type  of 
authentication relies on matching patterns of user characteristics or behaviours that are 
unique  and  distinguished  [42]  and  assumes  that  similarities  of  these  characteristics  or 
behaviours cannot be found in two or more users (see Figure 2-6). 
 
Figure 2-6:  Biometrics: A) ear, B) face, C) facial themogram, D) hand thermogram, E) hand vein, 
F) hand geometry, G) fingerprint, H) iris, I) retina, J) signature, and K) voice 
Photo source: http://www.instrumentalanalysis.com/images/biometrics.jpg 
Biometric authentication overcomes the drawbacks of other authentication classes (i.e., 
users  tend  to  forget  passwords  and  lose  tokens).  Unlike  conventional  passwords  and 
tokens, biometrics cannot easily be shared or duplicated. They always accompany the user 
and they cannot be forgotten. However, not all people are willing to put part of their body 
in a machine or to accept a laser beam directed into their eye for retinal scans. In addition, 
some  people  are  disabled  (e.g.,  lost  fingers  or  eyes)  and  cannot  utilize  the  biometrics 
authentication class due to the nature of their limited abilities. 
Biometric  authentication’s  underlying  technology  is  even  more  expensive  than 
authentication technology involving tokens due to the high tech infrastructure required to  
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process authentication data, especially if implemented on a large scale [43].  Furthermore, 
there are accuracy issues related to what is known as false negative and false positive rates. 
False negatives occur when the biometric recognition device denies access to an authentic 
user while false positive errors happen when it allows access to an unauthorized user. This 
usually happens because matching captured patterns against stored templates will never 
result in an exact match, unlike other authentication classes where authentication is only 
processed if there is a 100% match between the stored factor and the entered value by the 
user.  Exact  matches  in  biometrics  authentication  cannot  be  achieved  due  to  the  noise 
usually associated with the biometrics sensors [44] such as sensing device, humidity and 
biometric position.   
Despite the high security offered by biometrics, they are not impossible to break. Contact 
lenses and sticky residue can be used to capture iris data and fingerprints, respectively [43].  
A behavioural pattern can be captured in the browser or by manipulating the scanner [45] 
before it’s sent online. Besides, biometrics are very hard to change or replace; therefore, if 
an attacker intercepts a biometric pattern, the pattern will often match that of the user and it 
can then be replayed to compromise the user’s account [46]. 
2.2.4  Others 
The three afore-mentioned authentication classes are considered the core authentication 
techniques  that  have  formed  the  basis  for  most  of  the  authentication  mechanisms 
implemented  in  the  industry.  However,  new  authentication  technologies  have  been 
introduced  recently  to  form  extra  authentication  classes:  relationship-based,  process-
based, and location-based authentication technologies. 
2.2.4.1  Relationship-based authentication (RBA) 
Relationship-based authentication (referred to as social network authentication by [47]) or 
the  somebody  you  know  authentication  class  was  first  introduced  by  [48].    It  is  an 
authentication protocol based on the classic human social relationship. The study classifies 
authentication into two categories: primary and emergency. The primary authentication 
occurs where a user is usually authenticated to a system using token-based authentication 
(TBA) (i.e., the study takes RSA SecureID as an example of TBA). The latter occurs when 
the  primary  authentication  factor  (the  token)  is  not  available,  and  therefore,  other 
alternative  means  should  be  available  to  authenticate  the  user.  The  RSA  Security  Inc.  
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SecureID is a one-time code calculator/generator that usually comes in forms like cards or 
key fobs. These generate what is called a tokencode or a passcode every given period (i.e. 
usually 60 seconds). This time-based tokencode is calculated based on time and other user 
details like PIN. This setup assumes that the account owner must provide a username, PIN, 
and the tokencode generated by the SecureID to authenticate into a system successfully. 
The fourth authentication factor comes when the SecureID is not in working order or is not 
available for some reason (i.e., lost, stolen, or maybe the user has forgotten the device at 
home or work). RSA [48] illustrates how the proposed fourth authentication factor should 
work  in  the  following  scenario.    The  authentication  is  done  collectively  between  two 
people; one of them is the account owner (identified as asker) and the other one is a trusted 
party (identified as helper) who was enrolled in the system to help authenticate the asker. 
The helper has no other roles or privileges to access the asker account and the only role 
assigned is to request a vouch code - a server generated code that substitutes the tokencode 
usually generated by the RSA SecureID - from the server. The helper then passes the code 
on to the asker. This is illustrated by Figure 2-7. 
 
Figure 2-7: Vouching authentication mechanism [48] 
When the asker’s token is not available, it is not possible to acquire a tokencode to initiate 
an  authentication  procedure.  Therefore,  the  asker  contacts  the  associated  helper  (this 
association is first identified at the enrolment time based on certain policies defined by the 
online service provider) in a way that the helper would be able to confirm the identity of 
the asker (i.e., by a phone call or a direct face-to-face contact). Once the helper confirms 
the identity of the asker, and after the user requests help, the helper connects to the service 
provider’s  server  and  through  a  specific  vouching  system  page  where  a  two-factor 
authentication mechanism is implemented, the helper is able to login. Once successfully 
logged-in, the helper has to specify the person’s identity and the system will check if there  
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is a valid association between the helper and the given asker in the database. If a record is 
found, the system will generate a vouchcode and a session that are both valid for a given 
period (i.e., defined by the service provider’s policies). The helper then passes the system-
generated  vouchcode  to  the  user  using  a  secure  channel.  The  study  suggests  that  the 
exchange of vouchcodes must not be carried out by e-mail and only exchanged by other 
more secure means like phone or face-to-face. 
The asker, at this point, has a time-based (i.e., something between 1 to 2 days) vouchcode 
which can be used along with the username and PIN number, known to the asker, as 
authentication factors to access a given page on the service provider’s system to generate a 
time-based  password  of  the  asker’s  choice.  This  step  is  important,  as  the  user-defined 
passwords are easier to remember than the system-generated vouchcodes. The username, 
PIN, and the newly created password can then be used to authenticate the asker to the 
system for a restricted period. The process can be repeated for as long as the token used to 
generate the tokencode is out of order. 
This authentication method is unsuitable for day-to-day authentication tasks and can only 
be  used  in  situations  when  a  password  reset  is  needed  by  the  account  owner.  The 
implementation proposed by Brainard has usability issues.  For instance, the helper must 
have an Internet connection when the account owner requests a vouchcode.  Without an 
Internet connection, the helper will not be able to request a vouchcode for the asker.  This 
could also affect the relationship between the helper and the asker if the helper is usually 
unable to offer the asker a vouchcode.    
Nevertheless, the potential of this authentication technology as a secondary authentication 
method is very high. It is a cost-effective alternative option to call centres and help-desk 
services when a password reset is needed. A better implementation design (discussed in 
Chapter 7) can overcome all the usability issues discussed above. 
2.2.4.2  Process-based authentication (PBA) 
Also known as something you process class of authentication. This type of authentication 
method is based on human ability to process things. That is, instead of requesting the user 
to  enter  a  password  into  a  machine,  the  system  will  rather  ask  the  user  to  perform 
mathematical  or  logical  operations  based  on  secrets  known  to  the  user  combined  with 
variable  inputs  provided  by  the  system.  The  output  of  such  a  process  should  form  an  
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authentication pass that will construct an authenticated session between the user and the 
system.   
An  example  of  this  authentication  methodology  was  presented  by  [49].    The  user  is 
requested to do a mathematical operation (+, -, *) based on a formula (password) and 
numbers assigned to letters randomly that appear on the screen (see Figure 2-8). Here, the 
user is not asked to enter the password for authentication, the system will rather ask the 
user to recall the formula, which is actually the password, and process it based on a given 
set of letters/numbers. The result of the calculations should form a one-time password that 
allows the user to login to the system successfully.  
 
Figure 2-8:  PBA class by [49] 
This  system  involves  more  than  one  activity:  recalling  the  formula  and  performing 
mathematical calculations at the primary level of the authentication process. The main 
reason  behind  introducing  this  type  of  authentication  method  is  to  protect  users  from 
attacks  like  shoulder  surfing,  brute-force,  guessing,  dictionary,  and  social  engineering 
attacks. It actually further helps users from more sophisticated attacks like man-in-the-
middle  and  phishing.  A  user  never  needs  to  enter  the  password  into  a  machine,  and 
therefore, capturing the password on the fly or while it is being entered into the system is 
not possible. The answer or authentication factor entered by the user, which is the result of 
the computational process, changes every time the system requests the user to enter a 
password. This is because the formula the user uses to process the answer depends mainly 
on the random figures appearing on the screen, which change every time the user needs to 
login. 
This system, however, is time consuming and cognitively demanding, far more than other 
conventional KBA mechanisms. As mentioned above, the primary phase of authentication  
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is split into two phases: recalling and processing. The latter will take extra time and users 
might consider using pen and note to do the calculations if their formula is somehow 
complex or long. This poses a severe security issue, as these notes are prone to theft. 
2.2.4.3  Location-based authentication (LBA) 
Location-based authentication is about authenticating a user based on his or her presence at 
a distinct location. Implementation of location-based authentication is currently limited in 
online  systems,  unlike  the  wide  range  of  its  implementation  in  the  physical  world. 
Applications like buildings’ automatic doors are common systems that use LBA to operate. 
In the literature, Denning and MacDoran [46] were the first to propose location-based 
authentication for computer systems.  They claimed that LBA was a new authentication 
class by itself and formed a new dimension to user authentication and access control. They 
proposed the use of a location signature (LS), which defines the unique physical location 
of  a  particular  user  or  network  terminal  at  a  given  time,  and  is  created  by  a  location 
signature sensor (LSS). The implementation of this proposal is based on the microwave 
signals transmitted by satellites that are part of the global positioning system (GPS). An 
independent device can be used to determine the geodetric location - latitude, longitude, 
and height in a precisely defined geocentric coordinate reference system.   
A patent was recently registered by [50] which utilizes the location-based authentication 
approach for online banking and other financial firms’ transactions using mobile devices.  
The invention suggests the use of a location-based system to check if a mobile device, such 
as a cellular telephone, is proximate to the computer being used by the customer in the 
transaction. Based on the result, the system can decide whether to accept or reject the 
requested transaction. An assessment risk should define the level at which this proposal 
should be implemented. For example, systems that present information of low-risk after the 
user logs in can implement this approach at the transactional level only, while systems 
posing  high-risk  information  after  the  user  log-in  should  implement  it  right  at  the 
beginning. 
The implementation of location-based authentication in general offers many advantages 
over  other  authentication  classes.  The  use  of  open  proxy  servers  has  become  a  major 
source for launching online attacks [51].  IBM reported in 2009 that the number of online 
proxies have tripled in the past two years [52].  The main reason for using proxy servers is 
the  anonymity  they  offer  for  the  attackers  to  hide  their  online  behaviours.  It  becomes 
infeasible for a victim to trace the original source of such attacks. Therefore, restricting  
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online account access to specific locations defined by the user (e.g., office, home, and 
mobile  device)  could  be  the  best  possible  solution  to  protect  user  accounts  against 
anonymous attacks. 
LBA also offers a solution to session hijacking attacks. Sometimes users leave their session 
open  without  logging  out  on  a  terminal  they  are  using  to  connect  to  different  online 
accounts.  Any  other  user  who  uses  that  terminal  can  utilize  the  opened  sessions  to 
impersonate the legitimate user. This is most common on online applications that allow a 
long  period  before  an  idle  session  is  automatically  destroyed.  LBA  can  solve  this  by 
authenticating the user’s mobile device location continuously. If the user connects to the 
account  from  a  terminal,  a  session  can  be  built  based  on  the  location  of  devices,  the 
terminal used, and the user’s mobile device. This session should remain active as long as 
the user did not logout and both locations are identical (with enough location error margin 
based on the accuracy of the geodetric location system). If either of these two conditions 
changes, the application should automatically destroy the session. This feature makes LBA 
a good authentication method to implement in conjunction with single sign-ons [46]. 
Despite the advantages of LBA mentioned above, there are a few limitations. Since GPS 
signals are used to authenticate users based on their locations, its performance in certain 
environments and for some applications can be quite limited [53].  This is mainly due to 
the GPS signal that cannot penetrate water, soil, walls, and other obstacles. In addition, the 
accuracy of the location has an error rate of a few meters sometimes and cannot guarantee 
the exact location point. Moreover, there are privacy concerns about LBA. The system 
could be used to track an individual’s location, especially when continuous authentication 
is active. Therefore, access to, and dissemination of, users’ location information that has 
been collected for authentication purposes should be strictly limited [46]. 
2.2.5  Summary 
Table 2-1 presents a summary of different authentication classes covered in the literature 
along with some examples currently implemented in the market. 
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Class  Examples  Advantages  Disadvantages 
Knowledge-based 
(KBA) 
• Secret questions 
• User ID and password 
• PIN 
• High user-acceptance 
• Easy to implement and 
administer 
• Cheap to deploy and 
maintain 
• Can be shared 
• Users tend to re-use 
• Subject to guessing 
and reply attacks 
• Prone to 
eavesdropping 
• Can be forgotten 
Token-based (TBA)  • Magnetic stripe cards 
• Contactless cards 
• Smart cards 
• Badges 
• USB drives 
• Mobile software 
• Keys 
• Ease of use and 
management 
• Cheap to implement 
• Better accountability 
as tokens are tangible 
• Matured and 
widespread 
• High user acceptance 
• Can be shared 
• Can be duplicated 
• Susceptible to loss and 
damage 
• Can be stolen and re-
used 
• Requires hardware to 
replace 
• Limited lifetime 
Biometrics based 
(BBA) 
• Fingerprint 
• Face Iris 
• Voice print 
• Difficult to share or 
duplicate 
• Repudiation unlikely 
• Forging difficult 
• Cannot be lost or 
stolen 
• Expensive on wide-
scale 
• Availability issues 
• Low user-acceptance 
• Accuracy issues 
• Reliability issues 
under abnormal 
conditions 
• Patterns can be 
captured and replayed 
 
Relationship-based 
(RBA) 
• Vouchcode  • Cost-effective  • Social relationship 
issues 
• Availability 
Process-based (PBA)  • Mathematical 
calculation 
• Secret in not involved 
in authentication 
process 
• One-time factor 
 
 
• Time consumption 
• Limited audience 
 
 
 
 
Location-based (LBA)  • Location signature via 
GPS 
• Cannot spoof 
• Easy to trace attacks 
• Continuous 
authentication 
• Protect against session 
hijacking 
• No secret to store or 
manipulate 
• Users privacy 
• Location accuracy 
error rate 
• GPS limited signal 
coverage 
Table 2-1: Summary table of different authentication classes  
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2.3 Authentication Implementation 
The previous section reviewed and discussed different authentication classes proposed in 
the literature. Many arguments, however, also exist in the literature and in industry about 
how  these  classes  should  be  implemented  in  real  applications.  This  section  discusses 
different authentication mechanisms based on the classes covered by the previous section. 
These  mechanisms  are  single-factor,  multi-factor,  multilevel,  and  multi-channel 
authentication mechanisms. 
2.3.1  Single-factor Authentication 
This is the most basic and widely implemented authentication mechanism in information 
technology. Knowledge-based factors (e.g., password, passphrase, and PIN) are the most 
commonly used factors (discussed in section 2.2.1) and users accept this authentication 
mechanism as the most usable. 
 
Figure 2-9:  Single-factor authentication mechanism 
Single-factor, in terms of security, is the weakest authentication mechanism among all 
other  mechanisms.  The  fact  that  this  mechanism  utilizes  only  a  single  factor  (e.g., 
password), which is passed to the other end using a single channel, makes it prone to many 
different attacks covered in section 2.4 (see Figure 2-9).   
2.3.2  Multi-factor Authentication 
Some  organizations  propose  the  use  of  multi-factor  authentication  to  counter  the 
weaknesses  of  the  single-factor  mechanism.  This  is  implemented  by  adding  extra 
authentication factors to the process of authenticating a user into a system (see Figure 
2-10). For instance, an online banking application requests the customer to enter the bank  
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card  number.  After  the  application  verifies  the  card  number  (i.e.,  a  unique  number 
identifies the customer record in the bank database), the customer is asked to enter a secret 
answer to one of the questions this customer has previously answered at enrolment time. If 
the customer answers correctly, the application finally requests a password to allow the 
customer access to his or her account (a similar real case is discussed in detail in section 
4.1.3.3). 
In  terms  of  security,  multi-factor  authentication  offers  better  protection  against  several 
attacks such as guessing, brute-force, and phishing (discussed in section 2.4). However, the 
one  channel  used  in  this  mechanism  is  the  weakest  part  because,  if  the  channel  is 
compromised, all factors exchanged between the end-user and the system can be captured 
accordingly. 
 
Figure 2-10:  Multi-factor authentication mechanism 
2.3.3  Multilevel Authentication 
Some businesses have implemented multilevel authentication mechanisms [26].  This can 
be achieved by allowing users limited access to the system resources after their initial 
login. The user is requested to submit a secondary secret factor (e.g., password, passphrase, 
or PIN) to access other restricted resources (see Figure 2-11). The main reason behind this 
upgrade was to secure the critical transactions within the system from attacks such as 
eavesdropping, social engineering, phishing, and others if the first authentication factor 
was compromised. A good example of such a mechanism can be found in most of the 
current online banking applications (OBAs). These OBAs allow bank customers to login to 
their online banking account using a password. However, to pay utility bills, or to transfer 
money,  the  customer  has  to  provide  another  password  or  passphrase  to  authorize  the 
transaction (i.e., known as multilevel authentication).  
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Figure 2-11:  Multilevel authentication mechanism 
2.3.4  Multilevel, Multi-channel Authentication 
Although the multilevel authentication mechanism has improved overall security, it has not 
eliminated the fear of the kinds of attacks that could compromise all security levels (e.g., 
real-time  phishing/pharming  (RTP/P),  and  malware  [27]).    An  attack  like  man-in-the-
browser  (MITB)  can  simply  alter  transaction  details  before  they  are  sent  to  the  OBA 
without the user knowing that such an alteration has occurred. The customer, therefore, 
authorizes  the  transaction  (e.g.,  payment  or  money  transfer)  by  entering  the  second 
authentication factor whenever the OBA requests it for final check.  
 
Figure 2-12:  Multilevel, multi-channel authentication mechanism  
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To overcome such multilevel weaknesses, some organizations, especially financial firms, 
which  comprise  the  sector  most  affected  by  online  attacks  (see  section  2.4.3.5),  have 
improved  the  way  multilevel  authentication  is  implemented  in  online  banking  by 
integrating the multi-channel authentication (MCA) approach (Figure 2-12). MCA works 
just  like  multilevel  authentication  but  uses  independent  channels  (e.g.,  web  channel 
combined with mobile network channel). For instance, the primary authentication factor is 
delivered using the web channel while the secondary authentication factor is delivered to 
the customer via an SMS using the mobile network infrastructure (see Figure 2-13).  
 
Figure 2-13: Multilevel, single channel approach vs. multilevel, multi-channel approach 
Figure 2-13 illustrates the difference between multilevel, single channel and multilevel, 
multi-channel  authentication  mechanisms.  In  multilevel,  single  channel  authentication, 
only one channel is used to deliver and receive authentication factors for different OBA 
levels.  If  that  channel  is  compromised,  all  exchanged  factors  can  be  compromised 
accordingly, whether the communication channel is encrypted or not. Attacks, such as 
MITB, are able to capture exchanged factors at end-user’s browser level even before these 
factors are encrypted and sent to the other side (MITB attacks are covered in Section 
2.4.3.8). 
Multilevel,  multi-channel  authentication  (referred  to  as  multi-channel  authentication  or 
MCA  in  this  thesis),  as  a  protocol,  has  been  implemented  by  different  systems  for 
increased security. The most commonly used channels for authentication along with the 
Internet channel are the telephone and cellular networks. For instance, a patent filed by 
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Goldthawite [54] suggests the use of mobile devices to authorize card payments.  Another 
by Yates [55] also suggests the use of mobile devices to authorize payments for vending 
machines. The proposed scenario suggests that the user enters the transaction details as 
well as the mobile phone number into the vending machine. The machine establishes a 
connection with a service provider, which in turn, contacts the user through the mobile 
network and requests a one-time pin number as an answer to an automated call or by 
entering them directly into the vending machine along with a PIN number known only to 
the user [55]. 
There are also many commercial products and services, such as Identrica [56], SAINTlogin 
[57]  and  Lloyds  TSB  [58],  which  offer  multi-channel  authentication  services  using 
telephone and mobile networks.  Identrica requests the user to enter the access login details 
along with the mobile number into a login page. Then, to complete the login process, the 
user has to call a given number of the company. The company’s system does not answer 
the call but checks the caller number to verify if it matches the customer’s phone number 
who just submitted login credentials. If it matches, the user is allowed full access to the 
system. 
SAINTlogin  offers  the  same  multi-factor,  multi-channel  authentication  mechanism. 
However, here the system provides the user a random phone number, which will only be 
allocated for single login sessions. The user has to call that number to be granted access to 
the system. 
Lloyds TSB, on the other hand, offers the same multi-factor, multi-channel authentication 
mechanism but the bank is the caller in this case. The customer initially must register 
different  phone  numbers  with  the  bank.  After  registration,  the  user  can  create  new 
beneficiary accounts or standing orders online that cannot be activated without answering a 
phone call from the bank and entering a one-time pin number shown in the screen. 
MCA is currently offered by different commercial applications in a number of different 
ways. It is vital for any business to carry out a risk analysis and verify the need for MCA 
before implementing it. The following section discusses the flexibility of MCA in meeting 
the different requirements of many types of online applications while maintaining security 
and usability.   
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2.4 Authentication Attack Methods 
Improving security and hardening authentication protocols is the ultimate need for every 
organization around the world. This ranges from physical access controls to biometrics 
authentication. To some extent, everyone in this chain requires security to thwart possible 
illegal break-ins or attacks to their systems. Security measures have evolved over time and 
there is a great deal of work being done in this area. However, no matter how secure the 
system is, there will always be a chance for someone to break it [59].  So hardening 
authentication  tokens  provides  only  limited  and  temporary  security  until  an  attacker 
discovers a new way to break the encryption. 
This section presents a discussion of attack methods, categorizing attacks based on each of 
the following core Internet communication elements: online service provider (OSP), the 
communication channel (CC), and the end user (EU). 
2.4.1  Attacks on Online Service Provider (OSP) 
An Online Service Provider (OSP) is any organization that provides an electronic service 
for  users  via  the  Internet.  This  includes  online  banking  services  provided  by  banks, 
electronic mail services provided by companies like Microsoft, Google, and Yahoo!, and 
other  online  services  that  are  owned  and  managed  by  individuals  and  are  hosted  by 
different data centres around the world (e.g., Internet relay chat (IRC), social community 
forums, hosting services, online file sharing, blogging, and online gaming). 
There are many reasons why attackers target OSPs. Some aim to utilize the OSP resources 
for illicit materials [60]; they might store hacking tools and pornography and set the server 
to be part of a DDoS attack (more information about DDoS is available in section 2.4.1.1).  
Others  attack  OSPs  to  steal  services  or  valuable  files,  to  spy  on  friends  and  family 
members,  or  to  build  reputations,  especially  if  attacking  well-known  high  profile  or 
secured organizations where there are clashes of interests related to politics and religion 
(e.g., [61, 62]). 
The following sub-sections discuss the types of attacks that target OSPs. 
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2.4.1.1  Denial-of-Service Attack (DoS) 
This type of attack aims at making the OSP’s online services unavailable or unreachable to 
users, turning services down. Denial-of-Service (DoS) is about involving only one source 
(i.e., a single person or a group of people) to exhaust OSP resources, such as network 
bandwidth, computing power, or operating system data structures, and to limit or stop 
completely the delivery of services to end users. However, the DoS has been improved to a 
distributed denial-of-service (DDoS). DDoS involves many different sources on the net 
(known as zombies or bots after they are successfully compromised by the attacker [63]) to 
form botnets (see Figure 2-14a).  Botnets are usually controlled by one attacker and aim at 
initiating DDoS attacks or spreading spam and phishing e-mails [64].   
DDoS  attacks  one  target,  usually  by  overloading  the  server  offering  the  services  with 
heavy traffic initiated by zombies (infected computers) so it becomes slow and unable to 
process further requests by legitimate users.   
 
Figure 2-14:  Botnets: a) DDoS, b) DRDoS attacks
 [65] 
Another sophisticated version of DDoS has more recently been introduced. This improved 
version is called the distributed reflection denial-of-service attack (DRDoS). Unlike DDoS, 
the DRDoS involves another layer of computers in the attack. These computers are not 
actually infected or compromised (not zombies) and their users do not really know that 
they are involved in a DRDoS attack. This usually happens when an attacker compromises 
different computers on the Internet, which in turn, try to infect other uninfected computers.  
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However, the source address of these connections is altered to reflect the victim's OSP IP 
address. The uninfected computers think that the OSP is trying to establish a connection 
with them and they cumulatively send heavy traffic back to the OSP server as replies to the 
fake requests received by zombie machines (see Figure 2-14b). 
The first known attack using DoS was recorded when Panix, the New York area's oldest 
and largest Online service provider, was attacked from unknown sources on September 6
th, 
1996 [66].  However, Spanish police caught the biggest DDoS attack ever known in 2010 
when three people were controlling nearly 13 million zombie personal computers from 190 
different countries [67].  This included computers inside more than 1000 companies and 40 
major banks around the world. 
2.4.1.2  Website/application Manipulation 
Website/application attacks are considered the most common attacks targeting OSPs with 
49% of total known OSP attacks [52].  Unlike DDoS, which normally causes temporary 
denial of service, manipulation of website site contents or the web application database can 
be very harmful and destructive in nature if recovery plans are not properly set by the OSP 
management.  For  example,  an  SQL  injection  type  of  attack,  where  database  SQL 
statements are injected into the URL as a query string because of poorly designed web 
application, can allow the attacker to gain administrative privileges for a security-policy 
maintained web application. The attacker can also wipe all database records, and if there 
were  no  proper  frequent  backup  rules  set  in  place,  especially  for  an  interactive  web 
application,  updated  frequently  by  the  OSP  and  customers,  this  can  cause  severe 
implications for the OSP’s reputation and its online business.  
There are many types of website/application manipulation attacks; the most common ones 
are the SQL injection and cross-site scripting (XSS). The latter is usually used to hijack 
users’ cookies or sessions. XSS comes in two forms: non-persistent and persistent. Non-
persistent attacks cannot be carried out unless the attacker is able to contact the victim user 
by e-mail or other means to pass a crafted link with a malicious code. Once the user clicks 
on the link, it opens a legitimate website the user visits that may have an account that is 
authenticated by a cookie stored in the user’s machine. The malicious code injected in the 
link will be executed by the user’s browser after it is rendered by the website the user 
visits. Depending on the code functions, it can copy the user’s cookie or session and pass it 
on to the attacker (see Figure 2-15a).  
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Figure 2-15:  (a) Non-persistent XSS attack; (b) Persistent XSS attack 
Persistent XSS attacks are more dangerous and can affect more than one user at a time. 
This  usually  happens  on  web  applications  like  message  boards  and  blogs  where  the 
attacker can inject the malicious code in the page itself and then access all users’ sessions 
(see Figure 2-15b).  
 
Figure 2-16:  Web-application vulnerability disclosures by attack categories 2004 – 2009 (adapted 
from [52])  
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SQL and XSS injections as well as other website/applications manipulations usually attack 
web  applications  with  poorly  written  validation  controls.  Figure  2-16  presents  web-
application vulnerability disclosures by attack categories between 2008 and 2009.  It also 
shows how the number of Cross-Site Scripting surpassed SQL Injection disclosures in 
2009, putting it back as the web-application top vulnerability for the year 2009 [52]. 
2.4.1.3  Brute-force Attack 
This type of attack aims at compromising users' accounts at the server level by randomly 
checking  the  validity  of  usernames  and  passwords  with  infected  zombie  personal 
computers. Usually this happens in a distributed manner as discussed in DoS attacks. The 
response of the OSP is recorded and passed back to the original attacker. This can be either 
an invalid username and password or a valid session establishment, which normally means 
a valid username and password. 
2.4.1.4  OSP Security Policy Violation 
The study [68] identified security policy (SP) violation as one of the factors that could 
result in a successful online banking attack. An employee may cause an internal security 
incident and expose customers’ information if violating the OSP’s security policies while 
there  are  weak  access  controls  and  logging  mechanisms.  This  also  could  lead  to 
unauthorized access to the OSP’s servers. 
Unauthorized access showed a dramatic increase and replaced denial of service as 
the second most significant contributor to computer crime losses, accounting for 24 
percent of overall reported losses and showing a significant increase in average 
dollar loss. 
10th CSI/FBI survey (2005) [69] 
In the digital world, improper definition of a web application’s SP or violations to SPs 
could result in an attacker being able to acquire administrative privileges by attacking an 
employee’s machine. This usually happens when an employee, who has administrative 
privileges to access the OSP’s servers, is accessing the OSP local network while, at the 
same  time,  is  connected  to  other  public  web  services  like  e-mail,  chatting,  and  social 
networking sites from the same machine. The computer here is the weakest link because 
personal computers are usually prone to attacks like viruses, worms, Trojans, and other 
common  malware  (see  Figure  2-17).  A  good  security  policy  would  strictly  disallow  
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employees to connect one machine to the local network and to the Internet at the same 
time. 
 
Figure 2-17:  Security policy violation 
2.4.2  Attacks on Communication Channels (CC) 
This type of attack focuses on communication channels between the EU and OSPs. It could 
be limited to a local area network LAN (e.g., home or office networks) but could have a 
more far-reaching effect if an attacker is able to attack wide area networks (WAN) (e.g., 
telecommunication  companies  that  provide  Internet  services  to  others).  This  section 
discusses three common attacks targeting CC: sniffing, man-in-the-middle (MITM), and 
session hijacking. 
2.4.2.1  Sniffing 
Sniffing is a type of attack that compromises the communication channel between the end-
user and the OSP. The attacker uses sniffing to listen to and interpret the data exchanged 
between  the  parties,  and  therefore,  is  able  to  capture  factors  sent  by  the  user  for 
authentication and authorization. This kind of attacks is passive and does not alter the data 
exchanged between the communicating parties. 
2.4.2.2  Man-in-the-middle attacks (MITM) 
This type of attack allows an attacker to intercept the data exchanged between the EU and 
the OSP. Unlike a sniffing attack, man-in-the-middle is a real-time attack and has the  
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ability to alter captured packets and to capture sensitive information about other websites 
directly from the user’s machine (see Figure 2-18). 
 
Figure 2-18:  Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack 
A  whitepaper  by  IBM  [52]  categorizes  MITM  attacks  into  passive  and  active  attacks. 
Passive MITMs are those attacks that only listen, capture, and/or modify data transmitted 
between the EU and the OSP. However, active MITMs are more dangerous and are able to 
compromise the user’s access credentials to websites that the user did not visit. This can be 
achieved by [70]: 
1.  Stealing the victim's session cookies for any other site. 
2.  Overriding Same Origin Policy for any other site, (this has the same impact as XSS). 
3.  Stealing the browser's saved passwords for any other site. 
4.  Poisoning the browser cache for any other site, (this will make the attack persistent). 
Usually an active MITM depends first on the passive attack. They rely on HTML elements 
such as inline frame, also known as IFRAME.  An IFRAME allows web authors to display 
multiple documents in one window [71]. This allows designers to keep one document 
visible while scrolling or replacing another. Among the many attributes an IFRAME has is 
the  “src”  attribute  that  allows  the  designer  to  include  any  web-document,  internal  or 
external, in an IFRAME. The HTML codes in Figure 2-19 show how an IFRAME can be 
used to include an external web-document/file into an existing web-document. 
 
  
37 
 
<HTML> 
<HEAD> 
<TITLE>IFRAME Element</TITLE> 
</HEAD> 
<BODY> 
This is the main document body.  Next an inline frame displays an 
external document from example.com<br /> 
  <IFRAME src="http://www.example.com/foo.html" width="40" height="50" 
             scrolling="auto" frameborder="1"> 
  Here is the external IFRAME document’s body 
  </IFRAME> 
</BODY> 
</HTML> 
Figure 2-19: IFRAME element within HTML web-document 
A user could be browsing a news website. The attacker injects a hidden IFRAME element 
in the contents coming from the OSP as a reply to a user request. This IFRAME will load 
another website of interest to the attacker where the user has an online account that can be 
accessed using a stored cookie file in the user’s machine. The attacker will then use a 
passive  attack  again  to  capture  the  cookie’s  sessions  that  are  loaded  in  the  injected 
IFRAME, and therefore, will initiate a session hijack attack to impersonate the user and get 
access to the user account. 
The  success  or  failure  of  MITM  attacks  is  not  based  on  bugs  or  un-patched  software 
residing on the EU’s machine nor does it depend on what users are browsing at the time 
when  the  attack  is  launched.  It  is  solely  a  matter  of  whether  the  network  the  user  is 
connected to is secured and trusted or not. Public networks (especially those which provide 
a Wifi connection feature) are always unsafe networks, no matter what website the user is 
intending to visit [70]. 
2.4.2.3  Session hijacking 
Session hijacking is usually a result of other attacks like sniffing, phishing and pharming 
(see Section 2.4.3), and MITM attacks; it utilizes the user’s connection session ID to spoof 
the user's identity. 
2.4.3  Attacks on End Users (EU) 
Users  remain  the  weakest  link  in  security  [72].  Online  businesses’  current  attention  is 
focused on the advances of attacks targeting OSPs and CCs [73] while neglecting the end 
users who are the only element that cannot be technically controlled [74, 75]. Schneier said  
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in [76]: “Security is only as good as it’s weakest link, and people are the weakest link in 
the chain”. 
Some studies (e.g., [77, 78]) refer the weaknesses of users to the fact that people receive 
conflicting demands or do not receive proper support and training.  Others (e.g., [64, 79, 
80])  claim  that  users  behaviour  often  appears  to  be  the  main  factor  behind  security 
breaches, and therefore, users are considered an essential part of prevention and reduction 
of security incidents. 
In this section, attacks that target end users to compromise their systems or online accounts 
are discussed in more details. In terms of methods used, these attacks by far outnumber the 
other, previously discussed attacks used to target other Internet communication parts (e.g., 
OSP and CC). 
2.4.3.1  User surveillance 
User  surveillance  is  the  use  of  hardware  devices  to  monitor  or  record  users'  input  to 
computers or teller machines (ATMs). It is electronic, over-shoulder surfing. This attack 
can capture user passwords/PINs used in the authentication process. 
2.4.3.2  Token/notes theft 
We  mentioned  earlier  in  section  2.2.1  that  some  OSPs  implement  system-generated 
passwords to overcome password guessing. On the other hand, making passwords hard to 
guess  makes  them  hard  to  remember  for  legitimate  users.  Users  tend  to  write  their 
passwords down in a note when they cannot remember them [81].  Sometimes this also 
happens when a bank sets complex password polices to achieve hard-to-guess passwords 
and forces the user to select one that matches all the rules. 
Token theft is another type of attack where users’ tokens, like ATM bank cards, smart 
cards,  mobile  phones,  OTP  calculators,  and  other  authentication  tokens,  are  stolen. 
Although some of these tokens will not fully authenticate the attacker unless another form 
of  authentication  (e.g.,  PIN  for  ATM  cards)  is  used,  others  do  not  need  further 
authentication to be of benefit to the attacker. Examples of the latter tokens include those 
used for access control (i.e., key fob or contactless card used for accessing a building or a 
car park area) and older versions of ATM cards, which are still used by some banks in 
different countries, that allow swiping the card into a card reader without the need to verify 
further by PIN number.  
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2.4.3.3  Malware infection 
This is considered the most common type of attack that targets users. A recent survey by 
CSI Computer Crime and Security [19] found that 64.3% of respondents cited malware 
infection as an incident they encountered in 2009.  This was the highest rate among other 
attacks examined in the survey. 
Malware could be a virus, a worm, a mobile code, a backdoor, a Trojan, or a rootkit. The 
installation of any such malware/malicious software can be used for different purposes 
(e.g., files corruption, controlling, storage, and turning to act as a zombie). However, all 
have  the  ability  to  capture  authentication  factors  once  they  are  installed  in  a  victim’s 
machine. Depending on how the malware is designed, it can pass these credentials to the 
attacker via e-mail or in an online form or it can allow the attacker to connect to the user’s 
machine to collect these details. Other types of malware are programmed to carry out 
changes to the details transferred from/to the user machine where no further interaction by 
the attacker is required, (some examples of this type of malware are described in detail in 
section 2.4.3.8). 
2.4.3.4  Social engineering 
Social engineering attacks usually aim at stealing authentication factors by fooling the 
access  credential  holders.  This  type  of  attacks  takes  two  forms:  technical  and  non-
technical. The credential holders may be the customers who are the account holders or 
even the support help desk people who have administrative privileges to access and reset 
customer credentials. 
Non-technical social engineering attacks aim at deceiving users by means of convincing 
and trust building. For example, an attacker introduces himself/herself to the user as a 
banker or a technician and requests the user’s credentials for help and support purposes. 
Another  attacker  calls  the  help  centre,  impersonates  a  legitimate  user,  and  requests  a 
password reset to the account. This kind of conversation takes place through a call or e-
mail most of the time, as it is very hard or dangerous for the attacker to impersonate 
someone else and deceive a user or a help desk face-to-face. 
Technical social engineering, on the other hand, involves other types of attacks such as 
phishing  (see  section  2.4.3.5)  and  pharming  (see  section  2.4.3.6).  These  require  the  
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attacker to have technical or web development skills, usually to masquerade the OSP’s web 
presence to capture users’ access credentials. 
2.4.3.5  Phishing 
Phishing is an example of technical, social engineering where the attacker designs and 
hosts a fake page or website, which has the same look and feel of a legitimate website. 
Then  the  attacker  invites  people  to  submit  log-in  credentials  using  e-mails  or  instant 
messaging (IM) that claim to be from a legitimate source but contain links to the fake 
spoofed page or website. Figure 2-20 displays an example phishing e-mail message which 
introduces itself as if it comes from a legitimate HSBC source and asking the client to 
identify him/herself to the bank website using a misleading web link.  That link displays a 
real valid link to hsbc.co.uk but the source (which is usually hidden) directs the client to a 
fake website hosted by another domain name. 
 
Figure 2-20: Phishing attack via e-mail 
According to an Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG), financial and payment services 
are the industry sectors most targeted by phishing attacks with almost 72% of total attacks 
in the 4
th quarter of the year 2009 [82]. A Gartner consulting firm study [83] recorded an 
increase  in  phishing  attacks  by  40%  in  2008,  where  only  56%    of  the  victims    have 
recovered their losses (i.e., 56% of 5 million who lost money in the US as of September 
2008). 
 
 
xx  
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2.4.3.6  Pharming 
Pharming is yet another social engineering attack that targets end-users. Pharming and 
phishing  implement  the  same  techniques  to  capture  end-users’  access  credentials. 
However, they use different strategies to complete this task. Unlike phishing, pharming 
attacks  first  compromise  the  user’s  machine  to  alter  the  host’s  file  before  the  user  is 
deceived  and  taken  to  a  fake  website.  The  host’s  file  is  a  file  residing  in  personal 
computers and used to speed up domain name resolution. When a user tries to access a 
domain name, if that domain name is not defined in the host’s file, the machine will try to 
contact a domain name server (DNS) to resolve the IP address associated with the domain 
name. If it is defined in the local machine host’s file, then there is no need to contact a 
DNS server.  
This is more sophisticated than phishing techniques as it involves the altering of a file in 
the user’s machine. It has a better impact than phishing as users will probably not notice 
that they are visiting a counterfeit website; the user is not required to click on a misleading 
link received by e-mail or found in a website because, whenever the user tries to access the 
actual  website  using  its  domain,  the  local  hosts  file  will  redirect  the  user  to  the  fake 
website automatically. 
 
Figure 2-21: DNS spoofing attack [84]  
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More sophisticated and dangerous pharming techniques exist at network or communication 
channel (CC) levels. This happens when DNS tables of routers and servers are attacked 
and altered so they will redirect DNS resolution requests on a mass scale. This is known as 
DNS spoofing and is illustrated in Figure 2-21. 
In the above figure, the attacker first attacks a DNS server and alters or adds an entry for 
www.mybank.com website so it will point to the different IP address of the attacker’s fake 
website.  Any  customer  requests  for  DNS  resolution  of  www.mybank.com  from  the 
attacked  DNS  server  will  be  redirected  to  the  fake  website  rather  than  to  the  actual 
www.mybank.com site. 
2.4.3.7  Clickjacking 
Clickjacking, also known as user-interface (UI) redressing, is an attack technique based on 
HTML  codes  being  used  to  hide  a  layer  on  top  of  the  displayed  contents  to  perform 
unexpected actions after the user clicks on it. This exploit was officially released to the 
public in 2008 but it has existed for many years [85].  It can be used in different ways. For 
example, an attacker can send an e-mail to a victim with an embedded video clip. The 
video clip has a play button, which, if clicked, installs malicious software into the user’s 
machine (i.e., malware infection attack). This is achieved by placing an invisible layer on 
top of that button to run such an unexpected action. 
A clickjacking attack has the ability to allow an attacker to completely control the victim’s 
desktop; thus, it hijacks the victim’s active sessions or captures the authentication factors 
exchanged with other sites. 
2.4.3.8  Man-in-the-browser attacks (MITB) 
A man-in-the-browser attack is one of the recently developed attacks that target users’ 
machines (specifically users’ browser software). It is a malware type of attack that installs 
itself in the user browser and has the ability to intercept and modify transmitted details 
before they are sent out to the OSP (see Figure 2-22). It also intercepts replied details from 
the OSP and is able to modify them before they are displayed in the user’s browser. All of 
these alterations are performed in real-time and the user will find it difficult to identify the 
changes carried out by the MITB.  
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Figure 2-22:  Man-in-the-browser (MITB) attack 
MTIB is one of the most advanced attacks affecting organizations from around the world 
today [86].  It is considered a global threat and it mainly targets users for economic gain. 
According to RSA [86], one of the financial institutions in the UK reported a loss of 
£600,000 because of MTIB attacks. 
2.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter covered the importance of authentication in distributed systems. It discussed 
different authentication classes found in literature and defined how they compare to each 
other.  It  then  categorized  the  implementation  of  these  authentication  classes  into  four 
mechanisms:  single-factor,  multi-factor,  multilevel,  and  multilevel  multi-factor 
authentication  mechanism.  Finally,  the  chapter  presented  the  most  known  attacks  that 
target  these  authentication  mechanisms.  These  attacks  were  classified,  based  on  the 
communication node they target, into three categories: attacks on Online Service Providers 
(OSP), attacks on Communication Channels (CC), and attacks on End Users (EU).   
The next chapter discusses usability and acceptability of information technologies. These 
two topics are vital to evaluate, in practical terms, whether any new technology proposed 
for implementation is usable and acceptable by customers or not. The next chapter forms 
the basis for the formulation of the hypotheses that will be tested and evaluated later in 
Chapter 7.  
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Chapter 3   
Usability and Acceptability 
3.1 Introduction 
The increasing amount of interaction between users and Internet services, such as the Web, 
instant  messaging  and  social  networks,  poses  new  and  emerging  security  issues  [87]. 
Despite the advanced new security solutions proposed by practitioners and academics, user 
perceptions of these new technologies are often ignored. These security technologies are 
designed to protect the users, but users are not usually consulted about their needs [88], or 
their perspectives of imposed usage considered. 
End users of distributed systems perceive security and usability differently depending on 
context.  For  example,  people’s perception  of  security  is  more  positive  in  the  financial 
domain while more negative in other areas [89]. People tend to perceive usability more 
than security until they realize the importance of security after falling victim to an online 
attack  that  compromises  their  privacy  or  assets.  Ignoring  user  perceptions  of  new 
technologies might result in dissatisfaction, leading users to abandon the service and look 
for alternative service providers. On average, one dissatisfied user will tell 13 other people 
about his or her experiences with the system [90]. Even worse, for every 30 users having 
problems with a system, only one user, on average, will call customer support. According 
to the same source, usually users do not complain to the company about usability issues 
and do not report them to the service provider.  They usually prefer to abandon the service 
when they are disatisified. 
Because of this, online organizations, especially banks and other financial sectors, must 
take care when implementing new security technologies.  These particular technologies can 
affect users’ overall acceptance if the organization does not research their attitudes as well 
as the technology’s usability [91, 92]. 
In  this  chapter,  section  3.2  defines  usability  history  and  its  relationship  with  software 
quality.  Within this section,  subsections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 cover usability attributes and  
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usability of authentication mechanisms. Next, section 3.3 pinpoints the various metrics 
used  to  evaluate  usability  in  general  and  in  online  banking  in  particular.  Section  3.4 
discusses  acceptability  and  its  application  to  the  adoption  of  information  technology 
acceptance. Finally, section 3.5 lists the important variables from literature that are used to 
evaluate  acceptability  and  information  technology  acceptance  in  the  context  of  online 
banking. 
3.2 Usability 
The term “usability” first appeared in the 1960s [93] to define the ease with which people, 
other than software designers, can use a program. It was later introduced in early 1980s as 
a replacement for the term ‘user-friendly’ [94] and was defined as “the user’s view of 
software  quality”.  The  quality  itself  is  a  multifaceted  concept  [95]  and  includes  five 
different views (based on Garvin [96]): the transcendental-based view, the product-based 
view, the manufacturing-based view, the economics-based view, and the user-based view. 
These views are also relevant to usability and have helped to shape a standard definition of 
usability with multiple attributes, as discussed in the following section. 
3.2.1  Usability Attributes 
Different researchers define usability based on a list of attributes or dimensions. It is not a 
single concept but rather a multi-dimensional property of a user interface that has multiple 
components [97]. For example, Nielsen identifies the following five usability attributes 
[98]: 
•  Learnability: measured by how easy the system can be learned so the users can start 
using it at minimum time expected. 
•  Efficiency: another usability attribute that measures the time users need to accomplish 
tasks after they have learned how to utilize the system. 
•  Memorability: measures how easy to remember the system if the user used it again 
after he or she has to leave it for a period of time. 
•  Errors: an attribute that measures the rate of errors that the users make during their use 
of the system. These errors, if exist, have to be minimal and easy to recover from. They 
must not be of a catastrophic nature. 
•  Satisfaction: measures the users’ satisfaction how much did they like using the system.  
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Whitney Quesenbery [99] also defined usability based on five dimensions (called the 5Es): 
•  Effective: how complete and accurate the work is to accomplish. 
•  Efficient: how quickly the work can be completed. 
•  Engaging: how pleasant and satisfying the product interface is to use. 
•  Error tolerant: how good the product is in preventing errors and how it can help the 
user to recover from mistakes. 
•  Easy to learn: how well the product supports learning throughout its lifetime of use. 
A  more  formal  and  widely  accepted  definition  of  usability  [100]  is  the  one  by  The 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO). Their definition reduced the number 
of the usability dimensions to three: effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction. The ISO 
defines usability of a product or service as “the extent to which the product can be used by 
specified users to achieve specified goals with effectiveness, efficiency, and satisfaction in 
a specified context of use [101].” 
The following bullet points explain the three usability attributes identified by the ISO: 
•  Effectiveness: means that the users can do the tasks without making mistakes. This 
suggests that the user is not likely to request help. 
•  Efficiency: this attribute suggests that the users can complete the tasks in a reasonable 
time and effort. 
•  Satisfaction: the most important attribute which reflects the desirability of a product. It 
determines the extent to which the user finds the product to be effective and efficient.  
Table 3-1 provides an overview of usability definitions by Nielsen, Quesenbery and other 
usability metrics by Schneiderman and matches their usability dimensions to these of the 
ISO. 
ISO 9241-11 [101]  Schneiderman [102]   Nielsen [98]  Quenesbery [99] 
Efficiency 
Speed of performance  Efficiency  Efficient 
Time to learn  Learnability  Ease to learn 
Effectiveness 
Retention over time 
Rate of errors by users 
Memorability 
Errors/Safety 
Effective 
Error tolerant 
Satisfaction  Subjective satisfaction  Satisfaction  Engaging 
Table 3-1: Overview of Usability dimensions (adapted from [103])  
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3.2.2  Usability of Authentication Mechanisms 
More  people  now  need  to  utilize  networked  devices,  especially  to  connect  to  online 
resources and communicate with others using the Internet. The variety of online services 
offered has attracted people from different backgrounds (e.g. cultures, education levels, 
age, geographical areas) to communicate and utilize them. Along with other factors, such 
as availability of Internet and communication services, even the average citizen who is 
barely computer literate is now communicating and interacting, on daily basis, with many 
online services. 
Online users are also encouraged to carry out critical online transactions, such as money 
transfer.  Such  online  services  are  crucial  and  pose  greater  damage  to  customers  and 
organizations  than  do  other  online  services.  That  is  why  companies  that  offer  online 
services,  especially  financial  firms,  allocate  more  money  every  year  for  security 
technologies  and  products  in  order  to  protect  their  assets  against  security  breaches. 
According to Forrester Research, IT security spending has increased dramatically from 
8.2% in 2007 to 14% in 2010 out of the total IT spending in North America and European 
enterprises [104]. 
Despite this increase in security spending, the number of security breaches still show rapid 
increase over time [105] and usually affect not only the organization’s image and services, 
but also its customers as a whole. In October 2011, Sony had to shut down almost 93,000 
users’ accounts after a security breach to its online gaming and entertainment networks 
[106]. According to Liebowitz [107], the first 6 months of year 2011 have been the worst 
in  terms  of  the  number  of  security  breaches  in  a  decade.  He  listed  different  major 
companies that were victims of security breaches in 2011.  Among these companies were 
Sony, RSA, Lockhead Martin, Epsilon, the Fox broadcast network, NASA, FBS, FBI, 
Citigroup and French treasuries. 
Unfortunately, hardening computer systems by implementing firewall rules and hard-to-
compromise authentication mechanisms does not always lead to more secure systems and 
therefore lessen the security breaches. The problem, as suggested by many studies [77, 
108-111],  is  that  these  security  techniques  and  authentication  mechanisms  are  only 
effective  when  used  correctly.  Many  of  the  implemented  security  controls  are  either 
inconvenient or hard to use. Therefore, online users sometimes turn them off or try to  
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circumvent them [109]. It was found that users tend to circumvent security controls that 
they find cumbersome [92]. 
Authentication mechanisms, in particular, such as strong passwords, multi-level systems, 
graphical and multi-factor authentication cannot protect assets if users do not use them 
properly. For example, forcing users to use complex and hard to remember passwords 
might will encourage them to write these passwords down or store them electronically in 
plain text so they can copy and paste them every time they login. Also they could include 
an incrementing digit if the system forces them to change their passwords regularly. For 
example, a user could use the password “john6(usa” as a replacement for his old password 
“john5(usa” after the system forces him to change it. Such behaviours render the best 
technical security controls ineffective. 
Although security awareness is among the solutions that online service providers provide 
to users to ensure proper use of the newly implemented authentication mechanisms, it is 
only  effective  to  a  minimal  extent  and  does  not  fill  the  gap  between  security  and  the 
mentioned  users’  behaviours  [112].  Customers  usually  do  not  like  to  be  trained  or 
instructed on how to use online services and reject security advices. This is not because 
they are not intelligent, but because security advice is rather a daily burden that offers users 
a poor cost-benefit tradeoff. They prefer to look for alternative service providers who have 
minimal requirements and instructions [112]. Cost, time and support are factors associated 
with every new security mechanism the end-users have to use. These factors could, in the 
end, overcome the expected benefits of any new technological solution [113]. 
Overall, these conflicts exist because of the unbalanced attention given to security and 
usability in the authentication technologies. In literature, among many success factors for 
authentication technology identified by researchers, security and usability appear at the top 
of the list [1, 114-116]. However, Braz [115] stated that most of the primary research done 
on usable security did not cover user authentication. Therefore, most of these systems 
neglect usability and focus on security. The relationship between security and usability 
does not always have to be negative or inversely proportional as has been viewed in the 
past, it also can be positive [95]. Authentication, in particular, is only successful when 
security and usability are aligned. Authentication is the most important goal when security 
is implemented [117] and the most challenging part of any application’s usability.  
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To overcome these conflicts, the usability of authentication mechanisms can be considered 
to be as important as their security and among the main drivers for final acceptance of an 
online system by end-users. 
“Usability becomes a strategic issue in the establishment of user authentication 
methods” [115] 
“Security only works if the secure way also happens to be the easy way” [118] 
There is a growing need for secured yet usable online systems. Security experts demand 
secured  applications  while  usability  experts  demand  easy-to-access  and  user  friendly 
applications.  With  proper  implementation,  a  secured  and  usable  application  can  be 
achieved [119]. To achieve this, it is important to evaluate usability while implementing 
security technologies. The next section covers usability evaluation in more detail. 
3.3 Usability Evaluation 
The usability of given software cannot be measured in isolation because usability is an 
extrinsic  property  of  a  system  software.  One  can  only  measure  usability  by  explicitly 
associating the context of use. This can only be achieved by evaluating users carrying out 
tasks on a software system (see Figure 3-1). 
 
Figure 3-1: Evaluating usability by associating the context of use (adapted from [95]) 
As per the ISO definition, “usability is considered a context-dependent agreement of the 
effectiveness,  efficiency  and  satisfaction  with  which  specific  users  should  be  able  to 
perform tasks” [95].  
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Although  effectiveness  and  efficiency  are,  to  some  extent,  measured  by  the  user’s 
perceptions of these qualities, the satisfaction attribute has no quantitative specification 
and is the only metric that is measured as a whole based on the user experience with the 
system. It can be measured by subjective rating on scales such as liking or acceptability 
when carrying out different tasks. Thus, the technology is considered as satisfactory only if 
the user considers it to be so [95, 120]. 
3.3.1  Assessing Usability of Online Banking Systems’ Authentication 
The  majority  of  security-related  usability  studies  focus  on  specific  measures,  such  as 
password selection and user behaviours, rather than looking at usability of a system or 
service as a whole [92]. Although several publications discuss the relationship between 
usability and security, few studies provide empirical data in this area. 
For  example,  Piazzalunga  [121]  compared  three  different  token-based  authentication 
methods for email protection. The usability metrics used in this study were set according to 
the ISO 9126 standard for evaluation of software products. The usability attributes used 
were: learnability, operability and attractiveness. 
A more comprehensive study by Weir [122] reported results on the evaluation of usability 
and user preferences for authentication methods in online banking in the UK. The usability 
evaluation was based on the ISO definition of usability incorporating the three usability 
attributes of effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction. The study compared three online 
banking  authentication  mechanisms:  one-factor  authentication,  two-factor  token-based 
authentication  using  a  OTP  generator  device  and  another  two-factor  multi-channel 
authentication via SMS messages to a mobile phone device. The study aimed to determine 
the  levels  of  experience,  user  acceptance  and  adoption  of  these  technologies  and 
investigated  how  online  banking  users  affected  user  attitudes  towards  usability  and 
acceptability of these authentication techniques. 
This  experiment  categorized  the  participants  into  two  groups:  novice  and  experienced 
users. It also classified users who participated in the study into three types of participants 
in terms of their level of experience of online banking: 
1.  Migrants: the current users of the service (online banking users) who were familiar 
with the single-factor authentication mechanisms and might be potential migrants to 
the new two-factor authentication mechanisms studied.  
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2.  Adopters:  these  are  the  novice  banking  users  who  had  never  used  online  banking 
services  before  and  were  unfamiliar  with  the  alternative  authentication  mechanism 
being studied. 
3.  Switchers: experienced users (online banking users) were aware of similar two-factor 
authentication  mechanisms,  but  had  no  specific  knowledge  of  the  methods  being 
compared in the experiment. 
Interestingly, one outcome of this study suggests that the relationship between security and 
usability can be positive. Weir found that participants considered the two-factor (via SMS) 
authentication mechanism to be less secure and less usable than the two-factor (via device) 
authentication  mechanism.  As  shown  in  Figure  3-2,  usability  and  security  decreased 
together  when  participants  used  mobiles  for  authentication.  This  contradicts  the 
commonly-held assumption of an inversely proportional relationship (increased security 
leads to poorer usability and vise versa). The reason for these attitudes, as mentioned by 
Weir, is related to technological problems such as network coverage, mobile battery life, 
cost associated with SMSs. Other issues raised by participants were related to the fact that 
some did not own or want to own a mobile; others did not want to share their mobile 
number. However, delivery delays of SMS messages experienced by some mobile users 
were considered unreliable for online banking authentication. 
 
Figure 3-2: Relationship between usability, quality, convenience, and security [122]  
Another outcome of the study also provided empirical evidence of the trade-off between 
usability  and  security  when  comparing  one-factor  with  two-factor  authentication  (see 
Figure 3-2). Although participants choose two-factor authentication via SMS to be the least 
preferable authentication method, the results did show that mobile authentication was more  
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usable than one-factor authentication mechanism. Weir attributed this to awareness and 
other technical issues related to the mobile service. She argued that the participants did not 
understand how OTP methods worked, which resulted in rating security without this key 
information. On the other hand, these participants were more familiar with knowledge-
based  authentication  mechanisms  and  did  not  widely  appreciate  security  advancements 
associated with OTP authentication mechanisms. 
Another study by Gunson [92] investigated usability by describing an empirical evaluation 
of two different methods for user authentication: single-factor and two-factor. The study 
aimed to measure usability (using a range of usability metrics), quality and preferences of 
each. The participants were real-life UK bank customers. The experiment was based on an 
automated telephone banking system. 
Gunson  provided  empirical  evidence  of  a  negative  relationship  between  usability  and 
security in authentication systems. She found significant evidence that the single-factor 
knowledge-based  authentication  mechanism  was  more  usable  than  the  two-factor 
knowledge-based and token-based authentication mechanism. In contrast, the latter scored 
significantly higher only on the issue of security. This also conforms to the mentioned 
results of Weir’s study between single-factor and two-factor authentication mechanisms. 
Overall, usability evaluation is an important research area which helps to understand how a 
security  technology  can  be  implemented  properly.  Finding  out  whether  an  improving 
security affects the usability, either in a positive or negative way, would greatly help to 
optimize the implementation process to achieve the best of both.   
Acceptability of security technology (i.e. the level of user acceptance of the technology), 
on  other  hand,  is  known  as  the  perceived  usability.  Unlike  usability,  acceptability  is 
measurable based on user perceptions, attitudes, and intentions towards different aspects of 
the technology [123] and is subjective. The next section covers acceptability and these 
aspects in detail.  
3.4 Acceptability 
Acceptability is defined as a measurement that depends on "whether the system is good 
enough  to  satisfy  all  the  needs  and  requirements  of  the  users  and  other  potential 
stakeholders” [98]. Usability and acceptability share the same exclusive target: humans.   
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However, the goals are different. “The goal of usability is to characterize the extent to 
which a software system can be used ” [95] while the goal of acceptability is to ensure that 
the system supports the daily business and user scenarios in a sufficient, i.e. capable of 
meeting users’ needs, and in a correct way [124].  
Jacob Nielsen [98] categorized usability as a subset of overall system acceptability (see 
Figure 3-3). It was also pointed out, using empirical studies, that usability plays a key role 
in user acceptance [125]. 
 
Figure 3-3:  A model of the attributes of system acceptability [98] 
3.4.1  Information Technology Acceptance 
Although usability is an important factor deriving appropriate design targets, it does not 
fully predict actual system use. A system might be well designed and meet all functional 
requirements but still fail to earn the acceptance of users. In other words, usability alone is 
an insufficient determinant of use [126, 127]. 
According to Thomas [123], to determine actual use of a technology, usability should be 
measured both objectively and subjectively. Objective measures of usability include user 
performance, error rates, or time taken to complete tasks. Subjective measures, on the other 
hand, include user perceptions of ease-of-use and impression of satisfaction, enjoyment 
and usefulness of the technology. While the objective measures are based on usability 
attributes defined by ISO, such as effectiveness and efficiency, an acceptance model is 
required to explain the behavioural intention of using the technology within a given system 
(the objective measures of usability).   
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Technology acceptance is one of the research areas that has been studied and modelled to 
suit  different  fields,  each  with  a  different  set  of  acceptance  determinants  [128].    The 
Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) by Davis [129] is one of the most utilized and 
widely  accepted  models  among  the  information  system  researchers  [130-133].    TAM 
proposes  perceived  usefulness  (PU)  and  perceived  ease  of  use  (PEU)  as  two  primary 
elements in determining user attitude towards adopting new technologies. According to 
Davis, PU is “the extent to which a person believes that using the system will enhance his 
or her job performance”. He also defines PEU as “the extent to which a person believes 
that using the system will be free of effort”. PU and PEU affect user’s attitude, which 
relates to intention, towards using the information system. In literature, TAM is considered 
one  of  the  most  influential  extensions  of  the  Theory  of  Reasoned  Action  (TRA)  by 
Fishbein [134].  TRA is a widely studied model from social psychology and is used to 
explain users’ performance behaviour [135].  According to TRA, someone’s performance 
behaviour  is  determined  by  his  or  her  behavioural  intention  (BI),  which  is  in  turn 
determined by his or her attitude (AT) and subjective norm (SN) concerning the behaviour 
being studied [136]. 
 
Figure 3-4:  Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) [136] 
Besides PU and PEU, TAM incorporates three other distinct factors (see Figure 3-4): 
•  Attitudes towards use (AT): is defined as “the user’s desirability of his or her using the 
system” [136] and is determined by PU and PEU. 
•  Behavioural Intention to Use (BI): is determined by users’ attitudes toward using a 
system. 
•  Actual System Use: is the adoption of the system, which is determined by BI. 
Despite the frequent use of TAM model and the validity and reliability of its instruments 
[137],  it  has  been  criticised.  According  to  Bagozzi  [138],  TAM  focuses  on  how  an  
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individual (user) perceives usefulness and ignores group and social aspects. Wang [131] 
empirically  validated  TAM  using  different  populations  of  users  and  different  software 
choices. Based on 88 published papers, King [139] statistically confirmed these results 
using meta-analysis of TAM based on different context of use. The context of use included 
type of user, such as students, professionals and general users, as well as type of usage, 
such as job-related, office and task applications. The results proved that TAM is powerful, 
highly  reliable,  valid  and  robust  predictive  model  for  different  context  of  information 
technology acceptance. 
 
Figure 3-5:  Critical success factors of online banking [140] 
While  the  basic  constructs  of  TAM,  PU  and  PEU,  have  been  considered  as  primary 
determinants  of  individual’s  acceptance  of  technology,  it  was  found  that  TAM  has 
limitations in some cases such as involving students as the empirical sample, examining 
office automation software or system development applications, and self-reported usage 
[137].  Many  researchers,  therefore,  have  suggested  that  including  new  variables  as 
extensions to the original TAM can improve its applicability and explanatory ability as 
well as its predictive power in various aspects of IS [141-144].   
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Venkatesh [128] extended TAM to what he called Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use 
of Technology (UTAUT).  He proposed this model as complete model for understanding 
the acceptance and the adoption of information technologies. The UTAUT model shows 
that the four elements namely performance expectance, effort expectance, social influence 
and  facilitating  conditions  play  a  significant  role  towards  user  acceptance  and  usage 
behaviour. 
Renaud  [145]  used  demographic  variables,  social  influence,  and  personal  factors  as 
external variables to develop a Senior Technology Acceptance Model (STAM) to model 
the acceptance process as driven by the factors that influence mobile phone adoption in the 
context of the elderly mobile phone user.  In the context of online banking, Gefen [132] 
and Nor [146] found that trust has a significant effect on attitude towards using online 
banking.  Al-Somali  [147]  added  demographic  variables  as  well  as  other  variables  like 
security, trust, quality of the Internet connection, and awareness of service and its benefits 
as  external  variables  to  TAM  to  model  and  analyse  the  factors  that  affect  customers’ 
attitudes towards Internet banking acceptance. A more recent study by Al-Somali [133] 
also  added  resistance  to  change,  social  influence  and  self-efficacy  to  the  model.  The 
studies by Khalfan [5] and Al-Sabbagh [4] both examined variables such as trust, security, 
and  ease  of  access  as  factors  influencing  adoption  of  online  banking  in  Oman. 
Furthermore, Hosein [140] developed 9 different factors that he categorized into external 
(Internet experience, computer knowledge, Internet usage, incentives, and security privacy) 
and  bank  (trust  in  online  banking,  website  navigation,  support  training,  and  in-person 
banking)  factors  (see  Figure  3-5)  to  examine  how  these  factors  affect  online  banking 
adoption. 
Information technology acceptance, therefore, is an important research area to study and 
understand how users accept and use technologies. In literature, TAM is found to be the 
most commonly used theory by researchers to model user acceptance of a technology. It 
also suggests different factors that influence the users’ decision on how and when they will 
use it. Despite Bagozzi’s criticism, this process can reasonably be considered a solitary 
activity and therefore TAM can be considered to be an appropriate model for this research. 
The research being reported here needs to evaluate acceptability in the context of a single 
user,  using  personal  computer,  performing  tasks  to  complete  personal  online  banking 
transactions. The next section covers the modelling and identifying the factors found in the 
literature that are known to influence users’ acceptance of online banking systems using 
TAM.  
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3.5 Assessing Acceptability of Online Banking Systems 
The  previous  section  looked  at  acceptability  of  security  technologies  and  introduced 
Technology  Acceptance  Model  (TAM)  in  general.  This  section  considers  how 
acceptability of security technologies, particularly in online banking systems, is assessed. 
This includes looking at how TAM can be tailored to reflect acceptance factors for these 
systems. 
The majority of acceptability studies utilize evaluation models such as TAM to measure 
specific  variables.  These  variables  range  from  demographic  characteristics,  such  as 
gender, marital status, age group, monthly income group, and education level, to internal 
variables within the evaluation TAM model. Other external variables found in the literature 
also exist for different models based on different requirements and cultural backgrounds.  
For example, factors such as ease of access, trust and relationship and security were found 
to be among major factors influencing the adoption of online technologies, such as online 
banking,  in  Oman  and  other  developing  countries  in  the  middle  east  [4,  5,  133,  147].  
These factors and other internal and external TAM variables are discussed in the following 
sub-sections. 
3.5.1  Demographic characteristics 
Many studies [147-150] have investigated the effects of users’ demographic characteristics 
on their adoption of online banking technology. One study [147] presented the relationship 
between the demographic profile of people in Saudi Arabia (a developing country bordered 
by Oman on the southeast) and their attitude towards adoption of online banking. The 
outcome revealed that only education level had a significant relationship with acceptance 
and adoption of online banking. Other demographic variables such as age, income, and 
gender were not confirmed to have effects on online banking adoption. 
Jaruwachirathanakul  [149]  investigated  the  attitudinal  factors  that  encourage  online 
banking adoption in Thailand. The study found that moderating factors such as gender, 
educational  level,  income,  and  Internet  banking  experience  were  significant  factors 
influencing adoption. Age was confirmed not to be significant in this study. 
The empirical results of Chang [150] showed that gender, age, and marital status were 
characteristics that influenced the adoption of online banking.  
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3.5.2  Internal and external variables 
Internal  and  external  TAM  variables  were  the  factors,  other  than  the  demographic 
characteristics, that were found to influence customers’ decisions to adopt online banking. 
The internal variables were the primary determinants found in the original TAM by Davis 
[151]: perceived usefulness (PU) and perceived ease of use (PEU). Many studies have 
found  that  customers  have  accepted  online  banking  as  a  technology  that  improves 
performance, increases productivity, and enhances effectiveness [129, 141, 152].  
The external variables, on the other hand, are suggested by the literature, all of which were 
found  to  influence  customers’  adoption.  Previous  studies  [153,  154]  grouped  these 
variables  into  five  components:  trust  and  relationship,  ease  of  access,  security, 
convenience, and ease of use.  This grouping process was based on what is known as 
‘Factor Analysis’. Factor analysis is a statistical approach that looks into the variables and 
identifies  their  interrelationships  with  each  other  [154].    It  looks  into  a  large  set  of 
variables  and  tries  to  condense  or  summarize  them  into  smaller  sets  of  factors  or 
components. This is done by looking for groups among the intercorrelations of a set of 
variables [155].  
While  convenience  and  ease  of  use  represent  the  same  primary  constructs  (internal 
variables)  PU  and  PEU  respectively,  the  other  three  components  namely  trust  and 
relationship, ease of access, and security are discussed below. 
3.5.2.1  Trust and relationship 
Trust and relationship are two factors that play an important role in financial sector. Some 
researchers  have  argued  that  customer  confidence  in  online  banking  transactions  is  an 
essential determinate of adoption of online banking [156].  According to Stewart [157], 
customers’ lack of trust in electronic channels is one of the major factors that contributes 
towards failures in adopting online banking. 
Trust and relationship are inter-related factors in the sense that the customer’s relationship 
with the online banking providers is more efficient in face-to-face communication than 
online.  Some  studies  found  significant  relationships  between  proximity  and  personal 
relations [158, 159].  This lack of relationship in the online context can be alleviated by 
trust, which is more important online as opposed to face-to-face banking [160]. Parties 
involved  in  financial  transactions  usually  exchange  sensitive  information  and  therefore  
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they are more concerned about privacy and security of these information while they are 
exchanged  over  the  Internet,  not  the  case  in  offline  banking.  According  to 
Rotchanakitumnuai [161], reliability of the service is one of three reasons of customers’ 
distrust of Internet technology. However, for customers whose relationship is primarily 
based on efficiency of services, online banking is an attractive alternative [153].  In this 
matter, Tomiuk [162] stated that ‘richness’ and ‘sound presence’ of the online banking 
environment  affects  the  ability  of  a  bank  to  create  a  trusting  relationship  between  its 
employees and customers. 
3.5.2.2  Ease of access 
Internet ease of access is one of the important predictors for adoption of online banking. 
Many studies [133, 140, 147, 158, 163] stated that without a reliable and high quality 
Internet connection, customers are unlikely to consider using online banking.  
According to [153], “provision of infrastructural facilities is another factor that could lead 
to quicker diffusion of innovation”. There is a significant correlation between download 
speed of a website and its users’ satisfaction [164]. Al-Somali [133] stated that there is a 
positive relationship between connection speed and the adoption of online banking.  She 
found that the current lack of infrastructure in Saudi Arabia plays a vital role in limiting 
adoption rates of online banking by Saudi customers. These results confirmed the study by 
Almogbil [165] who found that about 63% of the customers in Saudi Arabia access the 
Internet through dial up services. 
3.5.2.3  Security 
Security perception has been widely recognized as one of the main issues inhibiting online 
banking  adoption  [4,  166,  167].    Despite  the  advancements  of  security  in  Internet 
communication  such  as  cryptography,  digital  signature  and  certificates,  and  multi-
factor/level authentication methods, online customers are still concerned about security 
especially when monetary transactions are involved [168]. 
There are many studies concerning the importance of security to the acceptance of online 
banking [140, 147, 154, 158, 169, 170]. Sathye [158] found that almost 3 quarters of all 
customers decided not to adopt online banking because they were concerned about the 
safety and security of the transactions over the Internet. Another paper by Howcroft [171] 
argued that “although customers’ confidence in their bank is strong, their confidence in  
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technology is weak”. The empirical results by Cheng [170] showed that perceived web 
security has a direct effect on the intention.  This results confirms earlier empirical results 
by Salisbury [172]. 
3.5.3  Summary 
In  conclusion,  aspects  such  as  ease  of  access,  trust  and  relationship,  and  security  are 
important factors to be included in acceptability testing of authentication in online banking. 
Along with other internal factors, an extended technology acceptance model can be formed 
and  tested  to  identify  which  of  these  factors  influence  the  customers’  adoption  of  the 
technology. 
3.6 Usability and Acceptability Measurement 
Usability and acceptability testing is carried out to evaluate the usability and acceptability 
of a technology in the context of a single user performing a task to achieve a goal [173]. In 
the  context  of  online  banking,  usability  and  acceptability  are  evaluated  by  asking 
participants to perform tasks (e.g. logging in, creating beneficiary account) to achieve a 
goal  such  as  money  transfer.  Different  tools  can  be  used  to  capture  users’  input  and 
feedback.  Among  many  techniques  available,  this  study  uses  questionnaires  to  capture 
users’ feedback. This technique is widely used and implemented by researchers to evaluate 
usability and acceptability of security technologies. For example, Weir [122] used three 
questionnaires throughout her study to collect usability comments from the participants. 
She also used a pre-questionnaire to collect users’ demographics such as age, gender, use 
of  online  banking,  locations  of  use  and  mobile  phone  ownership.  The  usability 
questionnaires were based on set of positive and negative statements on a 7-point agree-
disagree Likert scale. 
Another  study  by  Gunson  [92]  used  questionnaires  to  measure  participants’  attitudes 
towards three different security technologies. She used agree-disagree Likert scale type of 
questions  in  the  form  of  stimulus  statements  for  each  usability  attribute.  According  to 
Coolican [174], participants preference of Likert scaling technique is due to its natural way 
to  complete.  It  also  has  been  shown  to  have  a  high  degree  of  validity  and  reliability. 
Furthermore, it has been shown to be effective in measuring changes over time.   
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User action logging is another recognized technique, and is used to capture the measures of 
users’ specific interaction with the system. These variables include the time users spend on 
each task, the sequence of pages users follow in order to complete these tasks, and the exit 
pages for those who leave the system without completing all tasks. The quantifiable data 
collected from this technique usually used to evaluate the quantitative side of usability, 
which includes effectiveness and efficiency covered in section 3.3. For example, Weir in 
another study [91] used time logs to measure efficiency. She also used completion time 
logs to measure the effectiveness of three different security technologies. 
Similar survey and data collection techniques were also used to measure the mentioned 
quantitative  attributes  of  usability  as  well  as  the  subjective  side  of  usability  (e.g. 
satisfaction)  and  acceptability  (e.g.  TAM  internal  and  external  variables)  of  the  online 
banking. The use of these survey techniques in this research is detailed in Chapter 7. 
3.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter discussed the importance of evaluating usability and acceptability of new 
information  technologies  in  information  system.  It  first  defined  usability  and  listed 
different usability attributes found in literature. It then discussed usability evaluation in the 
context of online authentication mechanisms. 
The  second  half  of  the  chapter  covered  acceptability  and  information  technology 
acceptance  models  found  in  the  literature.  The  history  of  TAM  and  different  studies 
undertaken to validate TAM were presented and an argument made for the suitability of 
TAM for this research. Finally, the chapter presented different external variables used in 
the literature to assess how they affected the adoption of online banking and explained how 
they can be incorporated into TAM for the purposes of this research.   
The  next  chapter  will  discusse  online  banking  and  mobile  communication.  These  two 
topics  are  essential  to  promote  a  better  understanding  of  how  authentication  is 
implemented in online, distributed systems and to foster a better appreciation of why there 
is a need to improve the existing single and two factor authentication mechanisms. 
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Chapter 4   
Online Banking and Mobile 
Communication 
4.1 Online Banking 
Banking and telecommunication sectors are two major business players in today’s market; 
their services have become necessities to many people around the globe. The high level of 
user-acceptance and the technological advances of security [169] have led the banking 
sector to introduce online banking, or what is known as branchless or virtual banking.  This 
refers to the use of the Internet as a remote delivery channel for banking services. This 
delivery  channel  includes  traditional  services,  such  as  opening  a  deposit  account  or 
transferring funds among different accounts, and new banking services, such as electronic 
bill disbursement and payment (allowing customers to receive and pay bills via a bank’s 
website). 
Internet banking refers to the deployment over the Internet of retail and wholesale 
banking services. It involves individual and corporate clients, and includes bank 
transfers,  payments  and  settlements,  documentary  collections  and  credits, 
corporate and household lending, card business and some others [175]. 
Although the infrastructure of banking systems is based on information technology, which 
places the systems among those most easily shifted online, they are also among the most 
critical applications that need to be secured online. An effective and reliable authentication 
method must accompany any form of engagement in online banking.  
This section provides a discussion of the main factors influencing the adoption of online 
banking,  followed  by  a  detailed  summary  of  the  status  of  online  banking  and  the 
authentication mechanisms implemented by different real, online, banking applications.  
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4.1.1  Factors Influencing the Adoption of Online Banking 
Online banking has become one of the core technology advancements [176] of the Internet 
and  is  considered  one  of  the  most  successful  business-to-consumer  applications  in 
electronic  commerce  [177].    For  banks,  cost  reduction,  market  share  increase,  and 
competition [164, 178] are the main factors driving online banking adoption.  They can 
also now provide more diversified, convenient and flexible services than before [179]. 
From the customer’s point of view, low fees, accessibility, and availability are the main 
advantages of online banking services [159, 169].  That is, bank services are now cheap to 
access, accessible from any Internet connection point (i.e., home, work, or even mobiles), 
and available 24 hours a day, 7 days of the week. 
On the other hand, some customers still refuse to adopt online banking services. Kusima 
[180] identified several barriers affecting online banking adoption. The functional barriers 
are categorized into usage barriers, such as the absence of concrete elements provided by 
ATM machines, and value barriers such as perceived insecurity and inefficiency. Some 
customers are used to the ATM machines and find them more convenient than the Web. 
Others trust them more than online banking. They believe it is more secure to have a bar-
code reader reading code off the bill than keying it manually from a keyboard [180].  Other 
studies found that perceived risks in general are the most prominent barriers to online 
banking adoption [160, 181-183]. 
The following points will further discuss the incentives and risks for banks as well as for 
customers that influence them to respond to online banking positively or negatively. 
4.1.1.1  Incentives 
Many incentives make online banking an essential service for banks and customers. Here 
follows  a  list  of  incentives  that  banks  would  consider  when  deciding  to  offer  online 
banking services: 
•  Accuracy: humans directly affect the reliability of transactions, especially when the 
transactions occur in a face-to-face manner. There is always a possibility of errors 
originating from either the employees or customers. Human error accounts for three-
quarters of negative transaction incidents, mainly because of policy violations [184].  
However,  building  a  computerized  application  fully  interactive  with  the  customers  
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reduces  human  error,  and  hence,  improves  the  reliability  and  accuracy  of  a  higher 
percentage of bank transactions. 
•  Service: the Web offers equal opportunities to all competitors. Banks do not have to 
worry about approaching customers in different geographical areas but rather have only 
to concentrate on providing a central web presence approachable from everywhere. 
This gives the bank focused management as well as zero-delay service quality to offer 
to customers. 
•  Market share:  offering new competitive services for customers is known to be the 
driving  force  behind  the  introduction  of  online  banking  [185].    That  is,  offering 
competitive services retains existing customers, increases their loyalty, and attracts new 
clients to maintain and increase the market share. 
•  Profit: is among the most attractive incentives for any commercial organization. For 
banks, online banking has emerged as one of the most profitable products over the past 
decade  [186].    This  is  likely  a  direct  result  of  cost  reduction  in  labour,  building 
construction  and  maintenance,  and  service  and  transaction  provision.  For  example, 
Figure 4-1 shows that online banking has a transaction cost of almost 1 cent compared 
to $1.07 for a transaction carried out on-site [187]. 
 
Figure 4-1: Cost per transaction for each banking channel 
From customers’ perspectives, online banking offers many advantages over retail banking. 
These advantages result from the overall quality of service offered by online banking, and 
can be categorized into convenience, user experience and control, and transaction speed. 
•  Convenience: this involves accessibility and availability of the service to customers. A 
customer does not have to drive to a nearby ATM machine or bank branch to carry out 
banking  transactions,  but  can  use  online  banking  from  any  Internet  access  point.   
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Customers do not have to wait for branch working hours and can utilize the banking 
services and carry out transactions any time. Moreover, some banks offer a variety of 
services  online  (e.g.,  long  dated  payment  history  and  outstanding  orders 
setup/cancellation), which are not usually offered by other electronic banking channels 
such as ATMs, tele-banking, and mobile banking. 
•  User experience and control:  online banking usually offers customers clear and easy-
to-follow instructions. All the tasks are equipped with verification mechanisms that 
make customers feel in control. 
•  Transaction speed: customers are sometimes involved in long queues in bank branches 
to  request  transactions.  Online  banking  has  eliminated  the  need  for  the  delay  and 
customers  are  able  to  process  their  transactions  as  soon  as  they  click  on  the 
confirmation button.  
4.1.1.2  Risks 
Despite the benefits of online banking to both banks and customers, there are always risks 
involved that affect both parties’ decisions to adopt online banking services.  
For banks, just like other organizations that do business on the Web, online attacks are the 
major threats to their online presence. These attacks, when successful, cost the businesses a 
considerable amount of money. In 2008, online attacks on the Pentagon cost almost $100 
million [188] for computer equipment, contractors, and manpower to clean up.  In the 
banking sector, information related to cyber attacks is usually kept confidential as it might 
affect the bank’s image and their customers’ trust. However, some figures leak to the press 
and other survey firms because other parties involved in the attacks on bank accounts 
reveal  the  customers  as  victims.  Banks  do  not  always  compensate  their  customers 
(especially those who hold commercial accounts [189]) for losses due to attacks, and some 
victims  file  lawsuits  against  them,  at  which  time  this  information  becomes  public  and 
accessible. 
According  to  [190],  “a  Texas  manufacturing  firm  filed  a  counter  lawsuit  against 
PlainsCapital bank of Lubbock in connection with the cyber theft of some $800,000 from 
its online banking account” on February 2010.  This case involved an online wire-transfer 
of  the  mentioned  amount  to  an  overseas  account  in  2009.  The  bank  was  later  able  to 
recover only 75% of the total amount, refusing to compensate the firm for the other 25%. 
The bank claimed that it processed the transaction because the thief used valid access 
credentials of the firm when placing the transaction request.  
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A similar case in late 2009 involved a Michigan-based firm that filed a lawsuit against 
Comerica Bank after a series of 107 unauthorized online wire-transfers and transfer-of-
funds requests were carried out on their behalf that resulted in a transfer of more than half 
a million U.S. dollars to different accounts in Russia, Estonia, Scotland, Finland, China, 
and the U.S. [191].  In this case, the thieves acquired the firm’s bank account access 
credentials from one of the firm’s employees in response to a man-in-the-middle phishing 
e-mail that purported to come from the bank (more details about e-mail phishing and man-
in-the-middle attacks are found in sections 2.4.3.5 and 2.4.3.6 respectively). 
Although Comerica Bank was utilizing a two-factor authentication procedure at the time of 
the incident, it did not protect the Michigan firm from real-time phishing attacks. 
Computer scams targeting small businesses cost U.S. companies $25 million in the 
third quarter of 2009 [192]  
The ability of the bank to provide an authentication mechanism that is able to protect 
customers from all known attacks is the only way to withstand the risks of adopting online 
banking  services.  The  Federal  Financial  Institutions  Examination  Council  (FFIEC) 
released guidelines for banking and financial services in 2005, titled “Authentication in an 
Internet  Banking  Environment”,  which  addressed  overhauling  security  in  the  Internet-
based  environment  and  suggested  that  banks  upgrade  their  authentication  mechanisms 
from single-factor authentication to stronger two-factor authentication mechanisms by the 
end  of  2006  [193].    However,  currently,  even  multi-factor  authentication  does  not 
withstand  the  new  attacks,  which  have  appeared  since  2005  (e.g.,  man-in-the-browser 
attack in section 2.4.3.8). 
From the customer’s perspective, five dimensions of perceived risks have been identified 
[194]:  security/privacy,  financial,  social,  time/convenience,  and  performance  risks.  The 
following explanations and real stories show how these risks are related to the adoption of 
online banking and provide some examples that prove the reality of these perceived risks 
1.  Security/privacy risks: these can be identified as the risks caused by compromising 
users accounts by means of hacking (details of hacking and attacking methods were 
covered in section 2.4). The effects of such attacks can lead to money loss and identity 
theft, both of which have a big impact on users’ decisions to adopt online banking. 
Researchers  at  security  firm  Finjan  [195]  reported  a  new  Trojan  horse  called 
“URLzone  bank  Trojan”  in  2009  that  does  not  steal  user’s  online  bank  account  
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credentials but rather steals money once the user is logged into the online account.  
Once this Trojan installs itself onto the victim’s machine, it remains inactive until the 
victim logs into an online bank account. At that point, the Trojan initiates its attack 
against  the  user’s  account  by  checking  the  available  balance  and  deciding  on  the 
amount  to  transfer  from  the  victim’s  account.  This  decision  is  based  on  defined 
formulas that will ensure the stolen amount will not reach a limit that would trigger the 
antifraud online bank system. The transaction is very transparent and is invisible to the 
victim. All communications happen behind the scene. Moreover, the Trojan hides the 
history of these transactions and manipulates the information received from the bank so 
it displays a fake balance on the user’s screen. The report stated that this Trojan was 
able to steal about €300,000 from German bank accounts during its first 22 days. 
2.  Financial risks:  these are identified as the risks related to transaction errors or account 
misuse. A story published by Olsen [196] about an online banking customer in Norway 
who was trying to transfer a large sum of money (about $100,000) electronically using 
an  online  banking  service.  She  mistyped  the  account  number,  which  resulted  in 
transferring the money to another bank customer who thought the money was the result 
of a lottery win, and therefore, spent much of it gambling before police were able to 
recover it.   
3.  Social risks:  adopting a service or product can have an impact on someone’s status 
among  other  social  group  members.  It  depends  on  one’s  social  group’s  view  (i.e., 
favourable or unfavourable) towards online banking but either view can affect peer 
opinion of its adopters [186]. 
4.  Time/convenience  risks:  these  refer  to  the  time  gaps  between  the  submission  of 
transactions and the actual time the bank processes them, especially in cases where 
payments are involved. On 30
th of December 2009, this researcher bought an Apple 
laptop online and had to process the payment transaction before getting to the year 
2010 as taxes in the UK were officially to increase from 15% to 17.5%. There was not 
enough cash to pay for the laptop using the credit card as the available limit was less 
than the price of the laptop by almost £500. To overcome this issue, the researcher 
thought of paying previous credit card bills by transferring an amount of £500 from his 
savings account to the credit card account so he would be able to pay Apple Inc. for the 
new  laptop.  However,  after  transferring  the  money  online,  a  message  popped-up 
saying, “Please allow 3 working days to process your payment!” After calling the bank, 
they confirmed that online credit card bill settlements required 3 working days while 
paying off the bills in person updates the records instantly. If Apple Inc. had not finally  
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accept another form of payment, the researcher could have paid an extra 2.5% of the 
laptop price because of the delays involved in online payment transactions. 
5.  Performance risks:  these are related to the losses incurred when the website or online 
banking application is not able to process user requests properly due to bad design or 
malfunction. A similar story to the one just mentioned could occur if the bank online 
application were to go down at the time of payment. 
4.1.2  Current Status 
With the growth of Internet services and the increased level of user acceptance of online 
business transactions, more financial institutions (i.e. banks) have found that shifting their 
services online is very competitive [164].  Therefore, online banking, or e-banking, has 
experienced strong and sustained growth in the past few years.  
Figure 4-2 shows a 10% average increase of online banking users in addition to other 
banking channels (e.g., call centres, branches, and ATMs) in the U.S. between 2006 and 
2010. 
 
Figure 4-2: USA banking delivery transactions by channel (2006-2010) 
CAGR: Compound Annual Growth Rate 
Source: http://www.towergroup.com/research/content/page.jsp?pageId=1522 
Traditionally, bankers request customers’ signatures or fingerprints to authenticate them 
for payment and other banking transactions. However, with the introduction of electronic 
banking channels, customer identification for transaction authorization has become one of 
the biggest challenges for banks [197].  In the early days, banks used the Web only for  
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marketing purposes. They published only informational websites to market their products 
and services that could be utilized by visiting their branches in person [169].   
The current implementation of Online Banking Applications (OBA), online services and 
levels of authentication can be categorized into three dimensions: informational,  local-
transactional, and transactional online banking applications.  
4.1.2.1  Informational OBA 
The basic level of OBA is informational. Banks adopt these applications with only online 
marketing strategies in mind. They are not willing to deliver transactional services online 
and  their  electronic  presence  is  focused  only  on  information  about  their  services  and 
products.   
Customers, on the other hand, may be offered only basic informational services such as 
balance inquiry, transactions history, and other value-added services. The risk is relatively 
low,  as  the  customers  have  no  ability  to  write/modify  access  to  their  accounts  in  the 
database.  This  means  the  customers  and  the  transactional  database  can  be  physically 
separated from the database feeding this kind of OBA, or the connections can have limited 
privileges with no ability to alter the records (see Figure 4-3a). 
 
Figure 4-3:  Types of online banking applications (OBA):  (a) Informational OBA,  (b) Local-
transactional OBA,  (c) Transactional OBA 
Authentication, if customers are allowed access to their accounts, is usually accomplished 
by means of a traditional username and password. This type of authentication mechanism  
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does not protect the customer from most of the attacks that target the end-user (EU) such as 
user surveillance, notes theft, brute-force, and social engineering (more details in section 
2.4.3). 
Privacy and identity theft are the main security threats to the Informational OBAs. Since an 
attacker  can  gain  access  to  the  customer  account  using  different  attack  methods,  user 
details (i.e., name, account balance, payment history, and other private details such as 
passwords) can be disclosed; if the user is using a password that he or she uses for other 
web accounts, the attacker may be able to compromise those accounts as well. 
4.1.2.2  Local-transactional OBA 
The local-transactional OBA is more interactional than the informational OBA. It offers 
customer services that involve record alteration in the database such as money transfer 
from one account to another and paying utility bills (see Figure 4-3b). The risk is higher to 
the  system,  and  therefore,  most  local-transactional  OBAs  require  more  advanced 
authentication than username and password only. 
For example, customers in some banks that offer local-transactional OBA are required to 
submit more than one authentication factor to gain full access to online banking services. 
Some banks allow customers to submit one factor (e.g. a password) to login and check 
balance  statements,  while  another  factor  (e.g.  passphrase  or  password)  is  required  to 
authorize  transactions  such  as  online  bill  payments  and  fund  transfers  between  the 
customer’s own accounts.   
Usually this type of OBA does not allow customers to exchange funds between different 
customers’ accounts or to transfer money to a foreign bank account (i.e., hence the name 
local-transactional).  These  OBAs  are  not  willing  to  afford  such  high  risk,  given  the 
limitations of the use of single channel authentication mechanisms that are usually prone to 
various  attacks  such  as  user  surveillance,  notes  theft,  malware  infection,  and  social 
engineering. 
Threats concerning local-transactional OBAs are not limited to privacy and identity theft, 
but extend to include financial, social, and time threats. An attacker can transfer money 
from the victim’s account to another even if the beneficiary account does not belong to the 
attacker. This can negatively affect both the victim and the bank. The victim will have to 
report the incident and wait for long investigation procedures to recover the money. The  
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time interval between the time the attack was initiated and the time the money is recovered 
fully can result in bad debits on the victim’s account where regular direct debit transfers or 
bill payment orders to third parties might be set up (financial and time threats). The bank, 
on the other side, might have to recover the losses of such incidents and cover all expenses 
needed for the investigation. In addition, the bank’s reputation may be damaged, which can 
have a major effect on its customers (financial and social threats). 
4.1.2.3  Transactional OBA 
This type of OBA offers a transactional level of service that can empower local and foreign 
international banking servers. That is, the customers can transfer money between different 
accounts within the same bank, the same country, or even belonging to two customers 
across different banks in different countries (see Figure 4-3c). These applications pose the 
highest  possible  risk  to  online  banking  and  a  large  number  of  online  authentication 
mechanisms  and  controls  have  to  be  implemented  in  order  to  assure  the  integrity  and 
legitimacy of transactions. That is, controls must ensure that legitimate bank customers 
have initiated all online transactions and that the details have been received by the OBA 
without modifications. 
Some banks use multi-factor authentication through different channels to secure this OBA. 
This uses the same authentication techniques as local-transactional OBA; however, some 
factors are not fixed knowledge selectable by the customers, but are rather a one-time 
authentication  factor  sent  to  the  customer  through  a  secondary  channel  other  than  the 
primary web channel (e.g., mobile network as an SMS). This factor has to be confirmed by 
the customer to carry out advance critical transactions involving money transfer from one 
account to another.   
Although this approach seems to be the most secure, unfortunately it still fails to protect 
against man-in-the-middle/browser attacks. Threats are more dangerous since a path to 
external OBAs exists. The chance of recovering transferred-away money by an attacker is 
low, especially if money is transferred internationally. 
4.1.3  Authentication Mechanisms in Online Banking 
As discussed in previous sections, there are a variety of authentication techniques and 
methods  ranging  from  single-factor  authentication  mechanisms  (i.e.  passwords  and 
personal identification numbers (PINs)) to more complicated multi-factor authentication  
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mechanisms (i.e. one-time-passwords (OTPs) combined with the use of voice biometric 
recognition). However, for any financial institution to facilitate online banking services, 
the implementation of a suitable authentication mechanism should depend upon the results 
of the financial institution’s risk-assessment process. The risk-assessment process usually 
involves the identification of the customer type (e.g. personal or corporation), the level of 
services  offered  online  (e.g.,  informational,  local-transactional,  or  transactional),  the 
usability of the system, and the volume of transactions [41]. 
In  the  following  section,  some  online  banking  applications  currently  offered  by  real 
financial  institutions  are  discussed.  More  focus  is  given  to  the  authentication  methods 
implemented and the types of services offered. The icon “ ” will be used in all figures 
to identify that the field is requesting a secret factor to be entered or identified by the 
online banking customer. A discussion will follow each case to cover the advantages of the 
methods implemented as well as to describe what attack methods are applicable and how 
they can successfully attack the implemented security measures. 
4.1.3.1  Case 1: Multi-level Authentication 
One  bank  makes  use  of  multi-level  authentication.  This  bank  provides  limited  online 
services  such  as  account  balances,  inter-account  transfers,  mobile  top-ups,  and  bill 
payments.  It  also  provides  speed  transfer  to  India,  which  is  the  only  foreign  transfer 
provided by the bank. Other applications (i.e. new chequebook requests, demand draft 
requests) and reporting (i.e. lost ATM cards reporting) services are also available (see 
Figure 4-4). 
 
Figure 4-4:  Online services page  
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The  bank  requests  users  to  provide  a  username  and  password  (both  defined  by  the 
customers at enrolment) for account login. After login, the user is redirected to the home 
page, which lists all personal accounts with their balances (see Figure 4-5). 
 
Figure 4-5: (a) Login screen, (b) Home page screen 
At this point in the application, users have only read access where they can neither transfer 
money between their own accounts nor utilize other services offered by this online banking 
application. However, these services can be accessed and confirmed by a secondary secret 
(e.g.,  passphrase)  defined  at  enrolment.  This  secondary  passphrase  is  required  only  to 
authorize  transactions.  However,  both  password  and  passphrase  are  sent  to  the  system 
using the web channel and both can be intercepted by an attacker. 
Discussion 
The services provided by this bank are very limited. The transfer option is only allowed 
between  accounts  linked  to  the  customer  and  other  top-up  service  and  utilities  bill 
payments are restricted to certain local companies. A customer is not allowed to add any 
account or utility company apart from the ones provided and supported by the OBA of this 
bank. However, there is a foreign transfer option available to one foreign country (India). 
This makes it a transactional OBA. 
In terms of authentication methods, although this bank is using a multi-level authentication 
approach, it uses only one class of factor for both levels (the password and passphrase are  
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both  considered  examples  of  something  the  user  knows).  This  means  that  both 
authentication  levels  have  the  same  security  drawbacks  as  traditional  authentication 
mechanisms  and  they  can  be  compromised  by  different  attacks.  These  attacks  include 
social engineering, pharming, brute-force, guessing, user surveillance, and note theft [43]. 
If  both  authentication  factors  (e.g.  the  password  and  passphrase)  are  captured  by  an 
attacker,  they  can  be  used  to  utilize  fully  all  services  in  the  customer’s  online  bank 
account. The bank has not enforced any password policies such as password length or 
special character requirements, and does not notify customers of any transactions being 
activated or processed unless the amount of money involved in the transaction is higher 
than a given figure amount of about £180. 
Finally, the OBA offered by this bank is transactional (since it offers international transfer 
to banks in India). However, the authentication mechanisms do not match transactional 
OBAs’  risks;  they  are  more  suitable  for  lower-risk  types  of  OBAs,  such  as  local-
transactional OBAs. 
4.1.3.2  Case 2: Multi-level, Multi-channel Authentication 
A second bank offers more services through its OBA. It allows customers to do inter-
account transfers, international telex transfers, and local third party transfers. The latter 
allows customers to transfer money from their accounts to any other national bank account. 
However, the way this OBA works is different from the one discussed in the previous 
section.  Here,  the  customer  has  to  create  what  is  called  a  “beneficiary  account”.  This 
beneficiary account is the intended account to which the customer would like to transfer 
money. Once all the details of the beneficiary account are provided, the system sends a 
one-time  pin  number  to  the  customer’s  registered  mobile  number  (i.e.,  appears  on  the 
screen) by SMS (see Figure 4-6).   
 
Figure 4-6:  Creation of a beneficiary account  
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A request code (i.e., made of 5 digits) is sent along with the OTP to help the customer trace 
which OTP should be entered in the screen if more than one SMS message with different 
OTPs have arrived on the customer’s mobile device (see Figure 4-7). 
 
Figure 4-7: Authentication code via SMS 
Once  the  customer  confirms  the  OTP  as  received  via  SMS,  the  beneficiary  account 
becomes activated and only then can the customer transfer money to it. The bank also 
implements this feature for the international telex transfer service where customers are 
allowed to transfer money to an account in a foreign country. 
Discussion 
This bank also implements a multi-level authentication mechanism. The customers are 
required only to provide a username and password to login to their online banking account. 
The  password  is  chosen  by  the  customer  but  it  has  to  follow  a  password  policy 
implemented by the bank. The implemented password policy suggests that a password 
should contain a minimum of 1 numeric character, a minimum of 1 alphabetic character (a-
z/A-Z), and a minimum of 1 special character. The system allows only balance statements 
and other information (i.e. payments history) after a customer authenticates successfully.   
The authentication method implemented at the transactional level, however, is more secure 
and  utilizes  more  than  one  communication  channel  to  authenticate  new  beneficiary 
accounts.  It  also  uses  one-time  PIN  (OTP)  as  authorization  code  to  authenticate  the 
beneficiaries. 
Although this setup protects customers from most known attacks (e.g., user surveillance, 
phishing, and pharming attacks), this multi-channel authentication implementation has one 
major flaw. Attacks like man-in-the-middle (MITM) and man-in-the-browser (MITB) are 
still possible. For example, if a customer logs in and requests to add a new beneficiary 
account, he or she will input the beneficiary details in the form and submit. At this stage, a  
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MITM or MITB could alter the details entered in the form before they leave the customer 
browser to be transmitted to the bank server (e.g. alter beneficiary account number from 
1111  to  2222).  The  bank  server  receives  the  beneficiary  details  and  processes  them 
immediately. It creates a valid request code and an OTP for the activation. These details 
are sent to the customer by SMS and the customer activates the beneficiary account by 
entering  the  received  OTP  via  the  webpage.  The  customer  believes  that  he  or  she  is 
activating the account number 1111 entered in the beneficiary account form, and the bank 
believes that the customer has added a new beneficiary account number 2222 (since the 
attacker altered the details). There is no way for the legitimate customer, nor the bank, to 
know that the beneficiary account details have been intercepted and altered, even after the 
customer confirms the addition of the new beneficiary account, because only the nickname 
the customer selected for that beneficiary account, the bank name, and the request code of 
the transaction appear in the beneficiaries list (see Figure 4-8). The beneficiary account 
number has been modified but does not appear in the beneficiary accounts list (i.e., if we 
assume  that  the  altered  account  number  2222  and  the  original  account  number  1111 
entered by the customer belong to the same bank). Although the account number will 
appear in the transfer page along with other details, it is not usually something a customer 
checks since the OBA has already advised the customer that the beneficiary account has 
been activated. 
 
Figure 4-8: Details of beneficiary accounts after activation 
The results of attacks based on such insecure implementation can be problematic. Neither 
the customer nor the bank is able to prove that the information submitted by the customer 
was  altered,  and  the  attacker  receives  payments  (e.g.  intended  to  be  transferred  to  a 
different  account  number)  from  the  legitimate  customer  without  worrying  about  being 
caught, as the legitimate customer has approved the payments. 
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4.1.3.3  Case 3: Multi-factor, Multi-level Authentication 
A  third  bank  operates  in  Kuwait  offers  its  customers  a  different  experience  of 
authentication.  Instead  of  using  only  one  method  to  authenticate  users  at  login  (i.e., 
username and password), it offers quadruple authentication methods consecutively. First, 
the user has to provide his or her bankcard number. Second, a random security question 
from five different security questions associated with the bank account is displayed and the 
user is requested to provide a valid answer. This answer should act as a secret factor 
known by the user. Third, an image and secret phrase, which have been selected by the 
user at an earlier stage, are displayed on the screen. The customer has to verify that these 
are the image and the phrase selected at enrolment time (i.e. only one image and one 
phrase is registered for each customer).   
 
Figure 4-9: The quadruple login authentication process  
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Finally, if the customer has successfully validated all previous phases, the OBA requests 
the account password to complete the login process (see Figure 4-9). 
This bank provides many online services. These services include money transfers to credit 
and  benefit  cards,  bill  payments,  and  money  transfers  to  other  local  and  international 
accounts.  However,  an  additional  authentication  level  is  required  to  complete  these 
transactions. For example, to transfer money to a local bank account, the customer has to 
add the new account as a beneficiary account (the same technique as discussed in the 
previous case). 
To authenticate the new local bank beneficiary account, the application requests that the 
customer provide three digits from different places within the customer registered civil ID, 
corporate number, passport number or military ID, which has been registered at the time of 
enrolment (see Figure 4-10). 
 
Figure 4-10: Add local beneficiary account authentication method 
After the activation of the new beneficiary account, the customer is authorized to transfer 
money to it anytime without further authentication. 
For international transfers, the application adds yet another authentication layer where the 
customer is required to validate the process of adding an international beneficiary account 
using authentication (in Figure 4-10) and a predefined PIN number known by the customer 
only. 
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Discussion 
The  authentication  method  used  by  this  bank  is  different  from  the  other  traditional 
authentication  mechanisms.  The  authentication  at  login  is  carried  out  at  four  different 
levels: the request of the customer bankcard number, the secret question, the image and 
phrase verifications, and finally, the online banking account password. Although the card 
number and the answers to the secret questions cannot be considered highly secret details, 
they work perfectly against attackers who are not in direct contact or relationship with the 
bank customer. 
The image and phrase verification process is meant to fight phishing attacks. If a bank 
customer  is  directed  to  a  fake  bank  website,  which  requests  his  or  her  authentication 
details, that website will not be able to display the image and phrase the user selected at 
enrolment time since these details do not require user input; rather they are retrieved from 
the bank database. The implementation of this method is proposed in the literature by 
Dhamija  and  Tygar  [198];  they  called  it  “Security  Skin”.    However,  this  only  works 
perfectly in non-targeted first time phishing attacks, where the attacker has not previously 
intended to attack a specific customer. If an attacker has launched a targeted phishing 
attack against one customer, the attacker will be able to gain knowledge of the type of 
image and phrase the user has selected at enrolment time, especially if the customer has 
repeatedly  answered  secret  questions  from  the  second  authentication  phase  after  the 
attacker has captured the first factor (the card number); this allows the collection of the 
different secret questions from the original OBA to inject them into the fake website. 
At the transactional level, the bank implements another authentication method for creating 
beneficiary accounts (e.g. local and international). It requests customers to input certain 
digits of their registered civil ID, corporate number, passport number, or military ID. 
From a security point of view, all authentication methods used at login and transactional 
level phases are sent using the web channel. If an attacker is able to compromise this 
channel, any or all details can be captured and changed. Although the image and phrase 
verification at login, as well as the input of certain digits of the customer ID, protect the 
customer from a single non-targeted attack, all authentication factors can be captured in 
targeted  attacks  after  the  customer  logs  in  and  makes  several  transactions,  repeatedly 
entering different digits of the ID as requested by the application.  
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Moreover, attacks like man-in-the-middle and man-in-the-browser are able to compromise 
the authentication methods implemented by this bank from the very first attempt. This is 
possible  by  altering  the  transaction  details  the  customer  enters  to  create  beneficiary 
accounts. 
4.2 Mobile Communication 
Although mobile devices are increasingly becoming susceptible to many threats, as we will 
see in the review covered in this section, the security properties offered by mobile devices 
can achieve the best possible protection for online authentication if combined with other 
independent authentication mechanisms such as the conventional username and password. 
This section presents a review and discussion of the mobile network and mobile devices, in 
terms of usability and security.   
4.2.1  Usability of mobile devices and network 
Mobile calls and SMS (Short Messaging Services) messages are globally accepted wireless 
services that enable the transmission of voice and alphanumeric messages between mobile 
subscribers.  These  services  were  first  introduced  by  the  European  standard  for  digital 
wireless (now known as the Global System for Mobile Communications or GSM) in 1991 
in Europe.   
Mobile phones, unlike other personal belongings, are considered to be the most personal 
devices (linked to one person) [35]. Compared to other tokens such as bank cards, they are 
faster to notice if lost or stolen [199], and therefore, many researchers and current online 
applications are using them as authentication factors for business transactions. Moreover, 
almost every mobile user, who has a contract, is known and registered by the mobile 
service provider, which in turn, acts as a trusted third party in any business transaction. 
Mobile phones have become tools that are carried and used by people everywhere and their 
services  are  not  limited  to  a  geographical  area  (i.e.,  the  roaming  service  has  made  it 
possible for someone to utilize the mobile phone connection without having to change the 
mobile service provider when travelling abroad). 
In the past few years, mobile phones have become the most widely used personal devices 
ever among users. Statistics show that there were approximately 60 people out of 100  
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using mobile phones in the world in 2008 (see Figure 4-11). People use mobile phones to 
make and send more than a billion calls and text messages every day [200]. 
 
Figure 4-11:  Internet and Mobile User Stats from 1998 to 2008 [201, 202] 
Unlike other services provided by mobile networks, SMS is the most convenient and most 
realistic and achievable approach [203].  It has become the most popular service for the 
following reasons [204]: 
•  Globally accepted wireless service 
•  Enables the transmission of alphanumeric messages between mobile phones 
•  Uses  store  and  forward  asynchronous  delivery  method;  messages  are  stored  and 
delivered whenever end-user becomes available. 
•  Supports notification of delivery 
•  Supports multi-languages 
These SMS features have encouraged different businesses to implement and utilize SMS 
messages  in  various  ways.  Some  examples  of  these  implementations  are  listed  below 
[205]. 
•  Marketing: many organizations use SMS messages for advertisement purposes. They 
send information about their products and offers to all mobile subscribers (who opt-in) 
for a relatively lower cost compared to other advertising media like TV programs and 
newspapers. 
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•  Authentication: some businesses are using SMS messages to authenticate transactions 
by  delivering  PIN  numbers  to/from  mobile  users.  Sometimes  SMS  authentication 
works together with other authentication methods for better security. 
•  Collection of payments: several companies like Paybox and Paypal have implemented 
payments via SMS successfully. Mobile users can pay for products and services if they 
are registered customers of these companies. There are also other forms of payment 
that utilize a derivative protocol from SMS called premium-rate SMS (PSMS). This 
protocol  allows  organizations  to  subscribe  for  special  numbers,  which  charge 
subscribers’ SMS messages a premium rate higher than the standard SMS rate set by 
the mobile operator. This is commonly seen on TV and SMS guessing contests.  
•  Couponing and ticketing: just another two forms of payment collections that are mainly 
used to cut the operation cost of issuing coupons and tickets.  Car parking tickets 
through an SMS messages is one example of this service. 
•  Direct sales: people can download contents or applications to their mobile devices and 
charge on their bill (e.g., ring tones, wallpapers, applications, etc…). 
•  Interactivity  and  data  collection:  this  is  a  very  attractive  business  to  broadcasting 
channels. People can vote for their favourite actor or player by sending SMS messages, 
which cost relatively less than other voting media. However, on a high scale, millions 
of SMS messages are received, and therefore, big profit margins are generated at the 
end of the day. 
•  Micro-finance: M-Pesa by Vodafone and MobileMoney by MTN and Standard Bank 
are two micro-finance systems. People are able to transfer money from one mobile 
user’s account to another using their mobile phone devices. 
•  Support and maintenance: mobile service providers usually send service updates to 
mobile  users  via  SMS.  Other  companies  utilize  SMS  messages  to  notify  their 
customers about a recent purchase or after sale maintenance status. 
Despite these many features available via SMS and other mobile services, when payments 
are involved, users’ level of acceptance is directly affected by the amount of payment 
required. According to SpeedFacts [206], users prefer to pay by mobile if the amount of 
payment is between 12.5 and 50 Euros while they prefer to use other payment options 
(e.g., debit/credit cards or cash) when the amount is more than 50 Euros (see Figure 4-12).  
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Figure 4-12: Preferred payment method of Internet users if away 
4.2.2  Security of mobile devices and network 
Despite the high user acceptance of mobile network services (e.g., voice calls and SMS 
messages), mobile networks, and mobile phones are not 100% secured. There are many 
articles  published,  which  address  the  weaknesses  of  the  mobile  network  infrastructure. 
Odell published a story in Financial Times about the Italian police who were able to track 
the location of a suspect using his mobile device. He also stated that mobile operators are 
able to tap all calls made from/to any mobile device utilizing their network, and worse, 
they  can  remotely  install  a  piece  of  software  that  will  turn  the  mobile  device  into  a 
microphone, which transmits the user voice even when no call is active [207]. 
Another story published by Gupta [208] addressed one of Germany’s computer scientists, 
named Karston Nohl, and his team of 24 hackers who successfully cracked the algorithm 
used to encrypt mobile calls in GSM networks.  Likewise, an article published by Stanley 
[209]  about  intercepting  and  tapping  mobile  calls  without  the  need  for  cracking  the 
algorithms. He claimed that installing a fake base station to be used by mobile devices that 
are closer to it than to other real base stations allows an attacker to tap mobile calls passing 
through the fake base station. This is achieved with the help of a few software products 
that are available for free and the fake base station materials that cost an average of £1000 . 
SMS messages have suffered widely from what is known as SMS spoofing. It occurs when 
a fraudster manipulates the SMS message address information in order to impersonate a 
subscriber [210].  Therefore, SMS spoofing can be used for spamming or for posing social 
and/or political conflicts between different parties (i.e., an attacker, A, can spoof and send 
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a SMS message with unacceptable texts to user X, which will appear to him as if it is 
coming from user Y).  
Mobile devices are also now more prone to attacks than ever because of the increasing 
number of smart phones, which were introduced to replace the traditional cell phones. The 
main difference between a cell phone and a smart phone is that a cell phone does not have 
an operating system, although it can still make calls and send SMS messages and e-mails 
[211].  The mobile’s operating system (e.g., Windows Mobile, Google’s Android, iPhone’s 
iOS, and Nokia’s Symbian) is what makes a cell phone become a smart phone with more 
services  like  e-mail  clients,  web  browsers,  and  other  Internet  services.  Smart  phones 
provide the user with the ability to connect to different networks at the same time (i.e., the 
ability to connect to the GSM network while surfing the web using EDGE, 3G, or Wifi 
networks). This makes the device vulnerable to different attacks (especially attacks from 
the Internet networks) that can compromise and utilize all other services and networks used 
by the mobile device (including services provided by GSM and CDMA). 
Hoffman [212] stated that the number of malware products targeting mobile devices is 
increasing. He said that most of the mobile platforms are susceptible to malware and they 
are not shipped with anti-virus software. Moreover, he stated that more than 400 mobile 
malware programs have already been detected; some are keyloggers, while others intercept 
communication and run functions without the need for user interaction. 
4.2.3  Mobile Devices as Authentication Tokens 
Recently, mobile devices have been widely used to authenticate payments or customers’ 
transactions online. Mobile devices are not used to identify a user; rather, the SIM card and 
the mobile number associated with it can be uniquely used to identify a user. This type of 
identification is similar to  the use of a username in the traditional username/password 
authentication mechanism. The mobile number of a user cannot be considered as a secret 
since it is available for the user’s friends and relatives and sometimes it is listed in public 
mobile phone directories or published online. Hence, mobile phone numbers can offer 
more than what a username offers in traditional authentication. A mobile number is usually 
assigned to a SIM card, which by itself can work as an authentication token if it requires a 
PIN number to unlock and operate.  
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4.3 Summary 
Online banking has been among the fastest growing online businesses in the past few 
years. The services offered to bank customers online are critical and risky. People can 
perform a number of financial transactions, including the transfer of money from their 
accounts to other foreign accounts online. Thus, there is always a need to secure online 
banking systems with the latest and most trusted authentication mechanisms that are able 
to withstand most known attacks online. 
In  this  chapter,  the  status  of  online  banking  applications  were  classified  into  three 
categories:  informational,  local-transactional,  and  transactional  online  banking 
applications.  The  chapter  then  studied  and  discussed  different  cases  of  currently 
implemented authentication mechanisms in online banking and compared their security 
against the attacks covered in Chapter 2. 
Mobile communication is also considered one of the fastest growing and most acceptable 
communication channels around the globe. Mobile devices are the most personal devices 
today and people carry them more than any other personal item or device. For this reason, 
some researchers proposed the use of mobile devices as complementary authentication 
tokens that could play a major role in improving overall security if integrated with other 
authentication mechanisms.      
The  next  chapter  proposes  a  multi-channel,  authentication  mechanism  solution.  This 
solution benefits from the advantages offered by a secondary channel other than the Web 
(e.g. mobile network) in a multilevel online banking environment. More details of the 
advantages  of  mobile  devices  in  authentication  are  discussed  in  Chapter  5:  Proposed 
Solution.  
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Chapter 5   
Proposed Solution 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 focused on authentication classes as well as attacks that can target any of the 
three  core  communication  elements:  end-user  (EU),  communication  channel  (CC),  and 
online service provider (OSP).  Chapter 4 introduced online banking as one of the most 
critical  and  widely  used  online  applications.  Evidence  was  provided  to  support  the 
assertion that current authentication mechanisms introduced by online banking applications 
are vulnerable to several online attacks. The evidence suggests that there is a need for a 
more secure authentication mechanism that is capable of providing better security while 
maintaining usability and fostering acceptability to end users. 
This chapter proposes a multi-channel authentication (MCA) infrastructure that is able to 
withstand  the  most  popular,  previously  identified  online  attacks  while  maintaining 
acceptable levels of usability and acceptability. First, section 5.2 discusses the proposed 
infrastructure in terms of online banking, applicability, feedback, and its advantages over 
the single channel approach. Section 5.3 discusses the importance of the mobile network to 
the proposed MCA mechanism and highlights those features that make it the most suitable 
secondary channel for MCA. In section 5.4, the proposed MCA infrastructure is assessed 
by means of threat modelling based on the STRIDE process. The evaluation addresses all 
applicable attacks that target end-users (EU) and communication channels (CC) covered in 
Chapter 2.  
5.2 Proposed Infrastructure 
Authentication mechanisms currently implemented by online banking sites are criticized 
for  their  inability  to  deliver  systems  that  meet  the  highest  standards  of  security  while 
maintaining high usability. Some online banking systems offer their customers advanced 
security technology and features using tokens and biometrics. However, because usability  
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is neglected in most of these systems, customers sometimes find it difficult to do banking 
online. For example, some online banking systems require the use of a SecureID token for 
the customer to transfer money from one account to another. The token by itself is not a 
personal device that one would carry all the time. If the customer does not have the token 
at the time of transfer, he or she will not be able to complete the task. Another usability 
issue  occurs  when  the  bank  implements  Java-based  add-ons  (e.g.,  on-screen  virtual 
keyboard) that are not compatible with all browsers. These usability issues may lead to 
customers  not  fully  accepting  these  authentication  mechanisms  and  this  may  lead  to 
reduced  customer  loyalty.  It  is,  therefore,  important  to  introduce  an  authentication 
mechanism that is perceived by customers to offer superior security to other alternatives 
while being usable in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, and satisfaction [213]. 
MCA  has  the  potential  to  protect  customers  from  most  known  attacks.  However,  a 
suboptimal  implementation  of  MCA  could  lead  to  security  problems  and/or  usability 
weaknesses and possible rejection by customers. In terms of security, the online banking 
application case discussed in Chapter 4 (section 4.1.3.3) proves this argument. In terms of 
usability, improper implementation of MCA could cause frustrations leading to rejection of 
the  mechanism  and  the  site,  which  could  negatively  affect  the  market  share  of  the 
organization. Therefore, it is vital to ensure the optimal implementation of MCA.  
Figure 5-1 provides a general overview of how a multi-channel authentication mechanism 
should be implemented. However, there will be variations depending on business needs 
and security level requirements. 
This proposal suggests that MCA should be implemented on a multilevel structure. A user 
should be able to carry out basic functions throughout the web application by logging in 
using a conventional authentication mechanism (e.g., knowledge-base authentication). At 
this  stage,  only  read-access  is  granted.  If  the  user  wants  write/modify  access,  then  a 
random  one-time  “secret”  with  the  task  details  should  be  passed  to  the  user  over  a 
secondary channel (this must be a non-web channel). It is important to ensure that the 
system delivers the secret factor through a channel other than the one used for user login, 
which might be compromised. Task details are sent along with the secret factor to make 
sure that the user is aware of the task he or she is verifying (i.e., to contextualize the 
message).  This  is  vital  to  avoid  any  possibility  of  man-in-the-middle  or  man-in-the-
browser  (both  will  be  abbreviated  as  MITM/B)  and  real-time  phishing/pharming  
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(abbreviated as RTP/P) attacks. These attacks are discussed in sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.3 of 
Chapter 2.  
 
Figure 5-1:  The proposed MCA infrastructure 
Once the OTP is received via the secondary channel, the user can verify his/her secret 
using any available channel. Only at this stage will the write/modify task be authenticated 
by the system. 
5.2.1  MCA for Online Banking 
Online banking systems are the most critical online business applications due to the risk 
involved in the financial transactions they offer to their customers. High security measures 
are crucial to foster a trusting relationship between the bank offering the online banking 
services and its customers. Usability, on the other hand, is also important to keep these 
customers loyal to the bank. There is no single solution that is favourable to all customers 
and that meets all of their different expectations. However, providing a system that is 
Entry point: 
User logs-in  
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customizable to match the different needs and preferences of different customers without 
compromising security gives the bank a competitive advantage over other banks. This can 
be achieved, in the context of the proposed MCA, by offering the users the opportunity to 
select  where  and  how  often  to  activate  the  MCA  throughout  the  system.  A  minimum 
requirement  must  be  implemented  at  some  point  before  online  transactions  can  be 
electronically carried out. This flexible customization does not affect the level of security 
offered by MCA; rather, it makes the application more usable and acceptable to users by 
matching their levels of risk appetite and awareness. 
To illustrate how this can be achieved, each of the customization factors (where and how 
often) is described in the practical scenarios below: 
•  Where to implement:  users should be given the ability to select where to implement 
the MCA mechanism throughout the online banking application. A user with low or no 
privacy  concerns  might  prefer  to  use  MCA  only  at  times  when  external  financial 
transactions, such as “money transfer to an external account” and “bill payments”, are 
required. This means that MCA would not be required for balance checking or internal 
financial transactions (e.g., transferring money from account A to account B of the 
same user, credit card bill payment, etc…). If the user is very concerned about security 
and  privacy,  he  or  she  might  prefer  to  require  MCA  for  every  single  transaction 
(internal or external) or even request to have MCA implemented at login. 
•  How often to implement: some users might not be willing to involve their mobile 
phones  or  other  channels  into  their  online  banking  experience,  and  therefore,  they 
would tend to minimize MCA to the least options available. For example, they may 
only activate MCA for financial transactions that involve more than a specific amount 
of money (individually and collectively). For example, if the amount specified were 
£100, no individual transaction that is more than £100 would be processed without 
MCA (whether in one transaction or multiple transactions with smaller amounts). This 
amount would be considered a threshold and it would trigger the MCA mechanism 
whenever  the  transacted  amount  reached  or  exceeded  the  limit.  Feedback  plays  a 
complementing role here as the user could be informed by SMS or by other means 
about every single transaction completed. In contrast, users who are very concerned 
about security and would like to be in more control of their accounts might prefer to 
have the MCA mechanism involved in every single transaction no matter how much 
money is transacted.  
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This study proposes a default moderate implementation of MCA. That is, a user is allowed 
to  login  to  the  online  account  using  a  conventional  authentication  mechanism  (e.g., 
username  and  password).  This  first  level  privilege  gives  the  user  access  to  account 
statements. To carry out a financial transaction (e.g., money transfer to another account) 
the user has to create a beneficiary account record for the target account. This process 
requires  use  of  the  MCA  mechanism.  The  system  sends  the  user  an  SMS  message 
containing a one-time pin (OTP) and the details of the transaction and requests the user to 
validate the transaction by providing the OTP received. Once this procedure is completed, 
the beneficiary account becomes active and the user can then transfer money to it anytime, 
using only the standard authentication.  
It  is  important  to  mention  that  this  proposal  should  support  feedback.  The  application 
should also allow only a certain number of retries when verifying the OTPs. This helps 
avoid brute-force attacks (covered in section 2.4.1.3) that can succeed if no limitations are 
enforced. The flow chart depicted in Figure 5-2 further explains the way the proposed 
MCA implementation works. 
As  shown  in  Figure  5-2,  password  retry  limitations  are  implemented  in  three  places 
throughout  the  application:  the  login  phase,  the  activation  of  beneficiaries  phase,  and 
finally, when confirming transactions. If an invalid password or OTP is entered three times 
in any of these authentication phases, the account is deactivated automatically. The re-
activation procedure can be implemented in different ways. However, discussion of this is 
beyond the scope of this study. 
5.2.2  Applicability of MCA 
MCA can meet different needs depending on the business type and the level of security. 
Some applications might require military-grade authentication mechanisms while others 
might require the conventional username and password to authenticate users. 
Correspondence  applications,  as  an  example,  might  require  MCA  to  be  applied  as  the 
primary  authentication  level.  Access  to  the  user  account  can  be  denied  until  all 
authentication  requirements  have  been  met.  However,  the  user  is  the  one  who  should 
decide whether to enable these extra security measures or to disable them as the need for 
security varies from one user to another and even between different tasks by the same user. 
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Figure 5-2: The proposed MCA in online banking 
For example, a user uses the e-mail address x@example.com to communicate socially with 
friends and family members. This user utilizes this e-mail address every day and does not 
keep  confidential  e-mails  stored  in  the  account  after  they  are  pushed  to  e-mail  client 
software installed on the user machine. In this case, this user does not require another 
verification channel for each login attempt to the e-mail client. Moreover, implementing a 
multi-channel  authentication  mechanism  for  this  e-mail  account  could  be  considered  a 
usability drawback since the user would need to be authorized several times a day using 
different channels. 
< 3 
< 3  < 3 
≥ 3  ≥ 3 
≥ 3  
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Consider  that  the  same  user  has  another  e-mail  address  y@example.com.  This  e-mail 
address is used as a main contact address for the user’s payment account with Paypal, for 
eBay  transactions,  and  as  an  alternative  e-mail  address  to  reset  other  e-mail  accounts 
belonging to the user. Although the user might not need to access this account every day, it 
is more important and critical to secure this account than to do so with the first e-mail 
address. Therefore, the user is more likely to choose to use multi-channel authentication to 
control access to the second e-mail account. 
Online banking accounts might require a different setup as covered in section 5.2.1. The 
most important tasks carried out are those that require modification of the user’s balance 
statement (transferring money or paying utility bills). MCA should be implemented only 
when a request is issued by the user to initiate such transactions. Otherwise, traditional 
authentication  may  be  enough  for  read-only  access  to  the  user  records  (e.g.,  checking 
account statements and payment histories). 
Another example is online community forums. MCA can be used by moderators or site 
administrators as they have privileges to change the site’s global settings and to edit other 
users’ posts and threads. The forum members, however, do not require such advanced 
authentication mechanism since their actions do not pose high risks that would require 
MCA. 
The proposed multi-channel infrastructure can meet the needs of many different online 
applications with many different purposes. However, the implementation should focus first 
on the usability and security requirements of the target application, and above all, should 
consider the costs and benefits of running such an infrastructure from the user’s point of 
view. 
5.2.3  Cost of MCA 
The running cost of MCA is relatively low, compared to other authentication technologies. 
The proposed MCA is the cheapest token-based authentication mechanism since it does not 
require introducing new tokens to the customers. The tokens are something the customers 
already  have  (e.g.,  mobile  devices).  Other  token-based  technologies  invest  heavily  in 
designing  and  building  the  hardware.  They  then  have  to  spend  more  on  teaching  the 
customers how to use these technologies. Worse, they are responsible for maintaining these 
tokens and offering customers live support. All these issues are avoided with MCA. Users  
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usually buy their own mobile devices and they maintain them directly with the supplier 
company.  In  terms  of  token  awareness  and  use,  SMS  is  an  inexpensive,  ubiquitous 
worldwide service that is used by most mobile users today. 
The only running cost of MCA is the cost of delivering the OTP, which is borne by the 
organization. In the proposed MCA, this means the cost of SMS messages exchanged 
between both OSP and EU. However, since there are two options for authorizing tasks in 
MCA, a customer is not required to send out SMS messages since it is sufficient to receive 
the SMS message that carries the OTP and transaction details. The customer then can 
confirm the OTP received by entering it into the screen using the Web channel (see Figure 
5-1). 
5.2.4  Feedback 
Feedback is one of the core aspects of good interface design. Nielsen included the visibility 
of system status as one of the top 10 usability heuristics [214]. He argued that any given 
system must inform its users about what is going on by means of an appropriate feedback. 
Feedback  is  categorized  into  two  categories  [215]:  required  and  confirmatory.    The 
required feedback is the feedback given during task execution. According to [216], “when 
the feedback is immediately available, the user will be less likely to automate the task, and 
more likely to work in a controlled mode – making less errors”.  Based on this, required 
feedback is about making the system more usable to users. The confirmatory feedback, on 
the other hand, is the information given to the user at the end of a task. In the context of 
MCA, this can be represented by a confirmation SMS message that is sent to the users to 
inform  them  about  the  completion  of  a  task  and  its  details.  For  example,  the  banking 
organization may send a SMS message informing the customer that an amount of £100 has 
been  transferred  to  the  account  number  12345678  successfully  on  Monday  13
th  of 
September 2010, 11:04:25pm. This feedback is a very important element of the overall 
security proposed in the MCA infrastructure. 
Another  complementary  feature  of  feedback  suggested  by  the  proposed  MCA 
infrastructure is to allow transfer delays of a few minutes before the transaction completes. 
This delay can be set to zero seconds if the amount transferred is below a certain amount 
(e.g., £100). If the amount exceeds the specified amount, the system should incur a delay 
period  before  the  transaction  takes  place.  This  allows  the  legitimate  account  owner  to  
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report  a  fake/illegal  transaction  upon  the  receipt  of  the  confirmatory  feedback  SMS 
message before the transaction is finalized. This is demonstrated in the scenario-based 
evaluation of the MCA mechanism covered in section 5.4. 
5.2.5  Advantages over Single Channel Authentication (SCA) 
The  use  of  multi-channel  authentication  (MCA),  as  opposed  to  single  channel 
authentication  (SCA),  can  offer  significant  advantages  in  terms  of  both  security  and 
usability [217].  A number of different independent channels have to be compromised 
before full access to the user account is granted to an attacker. This makes non-targeted 
attacks almost impossible. It also makes targeted attacks harder, especially if the attacker is 
not geographically close to the user to be able to gain physical access to devices used as 
verification channels. 
Unlike SCA, MCA provides protection against most real-time attacks including MITM/B, 
RTP/P, and malware. Some of these attacks have the potential to capture and manipulate, 
in  real  time,  the  data  exchanged  between  users  (e.g.,  bank  customers)  and  the  online 
service (e.g., online banking web application). These attacks target organizations and users 
for economic gain and are considered global threats [86].  Data integrity is not maintained 
and both sides (i.e., users and online service providers) are often unaware of such attacks. 
With MCA, the attack is made visible to the user to reveal that the exchanged data has 
been altered by an attacker or malware (more evaluation of other attacks in section 2.4 of 
Chapter 2). MCA is safer because the online service provider will not process transactions 
without user confirmation nor will the user verify transactions he or she did not request. 
The whole idea behind using two different independent channels is to ensure integrity and 
authenticity even if one particular channel is compromised at the time of the attack. 
Since MCA is not limited to specific channels as long as they are very independent from 
the primary channel, various independent channels can be used in the MCA infrastructure. 
However, the proposal suggests that mobile networks (e.g., GSM, TDMA, and CDMA) 
should  be  used  to  achieve  the  best  possible  balance  of  security  and  usability.  Mobile 
networks are the most practical and usable networks found to serve MCA implementation 
best. This recommendation is justified in the following section.   
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5.3 Mobile Network as Secondary Channel 
Mobile  communication  is  currently  the  most  widely  spread  and  fastest  growing 
communication technology around the world [218].  Since its introduction in the 1970s, 
mobile  technology  has  undergone  dramatic  improvements  and  enhancements.  Such 
improvements have expanded mobile communication functionality and added significant 
value to it. SMS has become a critical aspect of mobile communication and it is commonly 
used by different organizations and people around the globe (see section 4.2.1 for details 
and examples of the current use of SMS in mobile commerce). The Internet, on the other 
hand, has played a vital role in mobile communications along with SMS. The introduction 
of smart phones has expanded the range of services offered by mobile communication. For 
these reasons, mobile communication has become an integral part of day-to-day life. The 
ubiquitous influence of mobile technology has been significant in the past few years due to 
the emergence of various “m-“ services, such as m-commerce, m-learning, m-government, 
m-entertainment, m-gaming, and m-etiquette [218]. 
Mobile communication is protected against attacks by means of cryptography. For some 
mobile communication services, such as SMS, the cryptography is available to the public 
and can be used to decrypt SMS messages. For this reason, SMS messages do not offer a 
secure channel, and therefore, it has not been used solely as an authentication factor by 
itself, but rather as a complementary channel for authentication as discussed in section 
4.2.3 of Chapter 4. MCA currently proposes the use of SMS as a secondary channel. The 
status of mobile SMS messages makes them the most usable independent channel besides 
the  Web  for  authentication.  However,  other  channels  can  also  be  integrated  into  the 
structure as long as these channels are usable and do not share the same device used to 
serve the primary channel. For example, automated calls can be used to pass the OTP to 
the users via mobile or telephone networks. A user would receive an automated call from 
the service provider that would dictate the OTP number. This service can further be used to 
secure the phone call and verify that the mobile device holder is the legitimate account 
holder. This can be done by asking the customer to answer one of the registered secret 
questions (e.g., date of birth, social security number, PIN number, etc…). The answers 
provided by the customer can be entered numerically by keying the numbers using the 
mobile numpad. If the answer is correct, the program that is controlling the phone call can 
then dictate the OTP number to the customer. In this manner, the system ensures that the 
customer account remains secured even in case of targeted attacks. For example, if an  
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attacker was able to compromise a customer online account as well as physically to get 
hold of the mobile device used as a secondary authentication channel, the attacker would 
still need to know the answer to the secret questions asked by the automated call, which 
makes it harder to compromise. 
It is, however, very important to reiterate that the secondary channel cannot share the same 
device as the primary channel. As mentioned earlier, smart phones now offer different 
services other than the conventional voice calling service. A smart phone device can be 
used for Internet browsing as well as SMS, instant messaging, and voice-over-IP (VoIP) 
calling. If the same device is used as a primary channel (e.g., using the smart phone web 
browser to login to the bank account) and, at the same time, to receive SMS with OTP as a 
secondary channel, then compromising the device means compromising both channels at 
once.  Therefore,  the  MCA  proposed  in  this  study  strongly  suggests  the  use  of  two 
physically separated independent channels to achieve the highest possible level of security 
to protect an online banking customer from the common attacks listed in section 2.4.  
5.4 Theoretical Evaluation of MCA 
The quality attributes of any given system architecture can be evaluated either theoretically 
or practically. These analyses complement each other to determine the extent to which 
such systems meet the desirable benefits and fits the needs of users. In terms of the MCA 
proposed in this study, secure Internet banking is the ultimate goal to reach. Although it is 
often impossible to prove that a given design is secure, a proper evaluation of the security 
properties of the design will usually enhance security. This is the essence of what is known 
as threat modelling [219].  
According to Jones [220], “Threat modelling is the core step in any security solution. It is 
a  way  to  start  making  sense  of  the  vulnerability  landscape”.  It  is  a  six-stage  process 
illustrated in Figure 5-3. These stages are required to evaluate a system thoroughly at the 
design  phase.  This  study  does  not  evaluate  a  complete,  online  banking  system 
infrastructure. Rather, it evaluates only the authentication mechanism at the application 
level  where  the  underlying  network,  host  infrastructure  design,  and  web-server 
technologies are ignored. 
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Figure 5-3: Threat modelling six-stage process 
To  evaluate  MCA  architecture  theoretically,  a  scenario-based  evaluation  suggested  by 
[221] is used.  This employs threat modelling using STRIDE (an acronym for Spoofing, 
Tampering,  Repudiation,  Information  Disclosure,  Denial  of  Service  and  Elevation  of 
Privilege) and DREAD (Damage potential, Reproducibility, Exploitability, Affected users 
and  Discoverability).  STRIDE  and  DREAD  are  processes  developed  by  the  Microsoft 
Application Consulting and Engineering Team to represent various methods or scenarios 
through which an adversary may attack a system [222].  These processes will involve 
examining the proposed MCA architecture against attacks that target the communication 
channels  (CC)  and  end-users  (EU)  listed  in  sections  2.4.2  and  2.4.3  respectively.  The 
attacks on online service providers (OSP), however, are ignored here because the MCA 
provides protections for the user and communication channel levels only.  
The practical evaluation of the proposed MCA architecture, on the other hand, involves 
empirical prototype testing on a sample of Internet users, which is covered thoroughly in 
Chapter 7. Information about attempted/successful attacks on banks’ online systems was 
not included in this chapter as banks treat these figures as strictly confidential and refuse to 
release them to the public. They believe that these statistics would severely affect their 
image  and  customers’  trust  if  made  public.  A  few  cases,  leaked  to  the  press  about 
successful attacks on bank customers' accounts, were covered in section 4.1.1.2. These 
cases support the fact that the existing banks’ authentication mechanisms are still unable to  
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protect customers from cyber attacks. However, these limited cases do not reflect the real 
impact of cyber attacks on online banking systems. 
There are other threat modelling systems exist such as AS/NZS [223], CVSS [224] and 
OCTAVE [225]. However, the threat modelling process by Microsoft is the most suitable 
threat modelling approach for web application security risks and was used by Microsoft for 
their internal software threat and risk modelling for years. According to [226], AS/NZS 
approach is applicable for non-technical risks and does not provide structured methods to 
enumerate  web  application  security  risks.  CVSS  also,  unlike  threat  modelling  by 
Microsoft,  suffers  from  a  complex  ranking  system  and  does  not  cover  design  flaws. 
Although OCTAVE threat modelling is considered as a heavyweight risk methodology 
approach for large and small organizations, it does not provide assessment and mitigation 
of web application security risks.  
The following sub-sections will cover the six-stage process of threat modelling for MCA 
architecture using the STRIDE and DREAD processes as suggested by [220]. 
5.4.1  MCA Application Model and Attack Target Nodes 
Figure 5-4 shows a high-level architecture diagram that describes the composition and 
structure of an online banking application with MCA. The diagram illustrates how the 
main elements are connected to each other. These elements are: 
•  Data Flows: represented by the one way arrows  
•  Processes: represented by large diamonds 
•  Data Stores: represented in the figure by the database 
•  Interactors: represented by the EU and the web server 
•  Trust boundaries: represented by the dotted lines 
The diagram also presents the assets of the system that need to be protected against attacks. 
Some of these assets (e.g., end user, informational services) do not pose high risks by 
themselves. However, if an attacker compromises them along with other types of assets 
such  as  transactional  services,  they  could  severely  affect  the  overall  security  of  the 
customer’s account.  
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Figure 5-4: The proposed online-banking application architecture diagram 
The attack target nodes, which are represented in Figure 5-4 by the large dots, show the 
parts  that  need  critical  analyses  at  component  levels  to  identify  the  threats.  Trust 
boundaries, on the other hand, guard the entry points of the system where the passing data 
need  to  be  validated,  authenticated,  and  authorized.  Four  trust  boundaries  exist  in  the 
proposed architecture:  
•  A trust boundary exists between the EUs and the OSP’s web server. It is responsible 
for authenticating end users and authorizing them to access the informational services 
of their accounts on the OSP’s web server. A conventional authentication mechanism is 
sufficient at this stage as discussed earlier in section 5.2.1. 
•  Another  trust  boundary  exists  between  the  OSP’s  web  server  and  the  EU.  This 
addresses  the  delivery  of  transaction  details  and  OTPs  that  the  customers  need  to 
authorize transactions. The data flow is contained entirely within a trust boundary and 
no further authentication factors are needed. For example, in the case of mobile SMS 
messages, a mobile number of the customer identifies him/her to the system and the 
SIM unlock code, if it exists, represents the authentication factor. 
•  A third trust boundary lies within the web server itself and splits the services offered by 
the system into informational and transactional. This trust boundary is responsible for 
authorizing customers to carry out transactional services that are assumed to be of 
high-risk  nature  (e.g.,  money  transfer,  bill  payments,  etc…).  In  this  stage,  multi-
channel authentication is the proper authentication mechanism to apply (see section 
5.2.1).  
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•  The last trust boundary exists between the web server and the database and it protects 
the database from unauthorized read/write requests. Usually the database resides in a 
separate server, and therefore, this trust boundary allows the web application to access 
the  database  server  using  a  fixed  and  trusted  identity.  This  type  of  authentication 
mechanism is not related directly to the end users and is, therefore, out of the scope of 
this research. 
5.4.2  Identify and Categorize Application Threats Based on STRIDE 
According  to  [227],  the  identification  of  threats  requires  three  tasks  to  be  performed: 
identification  of  network  threats,  identification  of  host  threats,  and  identification  of 
application  threats.    Since  this  research  is  solely  concerned  with  the  authentication 
mechanisms of an online banking application, the focus is on the third task only.  
The identifying and analyzing process requires categorizing the threats into the following 
six STRIDE nodes: 
•  Spoofing: occurs when an attacker pretends to be a legitimate user/customer while 
he/she is not. 
•  Tampering:  occurs when the data sent by a legitimate user/customer is modified in 
transit before it gets to its final destination. 
•  Repudiation:  the ability for someone to deny that he/she has performed an action. 
•  Information  disclosure:    occurs  when  an  attacker  is  able  to  read  confidential 
information. 
•  Denial of service:  occurs when an attacker disables the communication between the 
EU and the OSP. 
•  Elevation  of  privilege:    occurs  when  an  attacker  is  able  to  takeover  access 
controls/privileges that he/she would not normally have. 
Each of the elements (data flows, data stores, processes, and interactors) depicted in Figure 
5-4 has a set of threats.  Table 5-1 shows the threats affecting each of these elements.  
The following sub-sections analyze and identify these elements individually based on the 
attack target nodes and the STRIDE approach. 
	 ﾠ 
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Spoofing  Tampering  Repudiation  Information 
Disclosure 
Denial of 
Service 
Elevation of 
Privilege 
Data Flows    X    X  X   
Data 
Stores    X    X  X   
Processes  X  X  X  X  X  X 
Interactors  X    X       
Table 5-1:  Threats affecting elements [219] 
5.4.2.1  Analyzing data flows 
This section will cover the analysis of threats identified in the data flows. There are four 
data  flows  identified  in  Figure  5-4,  which  can  be  broken  down  and  analyzed  into  the 
following: 
1.  EU to web server (Informational Level):  The data flows from end users to the web 
server  are  sensitive  and  confidential  and  might  carry  access  credentials.  This  data 
might be sniffed (Information Disclosure) either before they leave the EU or while they 
travel over the Internet. In addition, the web server might be targeted by an attack that 
could  result  in  a  complete  failure  either  to  accept  the  data  or  to  respond  to  the 
customers’  requests  (Denial  of  Service).  Figure  5-5  presents  the  type  of  STRIDE 
threats category for this data flow level. 
 
Figure 5-5:  EU to web server (Informational Level) data flows threats 
2.  Web server to EU (via a secondary channel):  The data flows from the web or Short 
Message Service Center (SMSC) server (in the case that SMS messages are used to 
serve  as  a  secondary  channel),  which  is  responsible  for  delivering  the  verification 
codes to the customers via a secondary channel. This data can be captured at the user 
end or on the fly (section 0 covers how this could be done on mobile networks), and 
Informational 
Level  
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thus, are vulnerable to information disclosure types of STRIDE threats. Although there 
is no single incident recorded yet on a targeted denial of service on mobile devices, 
there are commercial devices used to disable mobile devices by preventing them from 
receiving  signals  from  the  base  station.  These  devices  are  called  “mobile  phone 
jammers” and are primarily found in places where mobile phones must be switched off. 
These jammers can also be used as targeted attacks on mobile phones near the attacker 
to block the signals and ensure that the victim’s mobile coverage is lost (Denial of 
Service).  
3.  EU to web server (Transactional Level):  The data flows from end users to the web 
server at the transactional level are susceptible to similar threats as those discussed for 
data flows from EUs to web servers at the informational level. 
4.  Web server to the database:  This data flow is out of the scope of this research since it 
does not relate to the end user or the multi-channel authentication mechanism. 
5.4.2.2  Analyzing data stores 
The application model shows only one data store represented by a database component. 
This data store is vulnerable to tampering, especially if the attacker is among the bank 
employees  who  have  legitimate  access  credentials  to  access  the  database.  Information 
disclosure  is  another  major  threat  since  customers’  records  in  banking  systems  might 
contain very sensitive information such as credit card numbers, account details, and online 
banking access details. 
 
Figure 5-6:  Data store (database) STRIDE threats 
Databases are also prone to denial of service attacks. This could happen intentionally, 
caused by an attacker (whether an outsider or insider) or unintentionally due to a simple 
database error or a technical problem such as a full database drive. These kinds of issues 
might corrupt the database files and cause the database services to stop functioning or to go  
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down,  hence  causing  a  total  failure  in  responding  to  queries.  Figure  5-6  identifies  the 
STRIDE threats applicable to the data store. 
5.4.2.3  Analyzing processes 
Processes are the only element susceptible to all STRIDE threats. A process that pretends 
to be the web server (Spoofing) has the ability to collect all the data that are submitted by 
the deceived customers. This also leads to information disclosure since these data could be 
sensitive and must only be known to the legitimate user. Furthermore, denial of service is 
another applicable threat here since the actual process is not accessible to the deceived 
customers. 
Elevation of privilege occurs when an attacker is able to tamper with the customer records 
or get physical access to the secondary channel. For example, an attack from an insider 
(employee) could modify the customer’s mobile number registered in the bank database 
with his/her own number. This allows the attacker to receive verification codes (OTPs) that 
are meant to be sent to the account holder’s mobile phone. If this occurs, the attacker will 
be able to carry out transactions on behalf of the legitimate customer. 
If there is no logging mechanism applied within the system or if an attacker were able to 
access the logs database, he/she could tamper with the data stored and modify the records. 
These records usually contain valuable tracing details such as the destination bank account 
number of the transaction the attacker accomplishes on behalf of the account holder. Thus, 
access to the database would allow the attacker to wipe out the evidences of such action 
(Repudiation Threat).  
5.4.2.4  Analyzing interactors 
Interactors are the end points of the system, such as EUs and OSPs. According to [219], 
interactors “are the data providers and consumers that are outside the scope of your system, 
but clearly related to it.” 
From the OSP side, the web server does not know who is connected to the customer’s 
account when a session starts. If the user is able to provide valid access credentials, then 
the web server assumes it is a legitimate user. However, if an attacker, at some point in 
time, were able to capture these credentials, then it could be the attacker who is connected 
to the web server (Spoofing), not the customer. The same threat types apply to the web 
server (OSP side). Sections 2.4.3.5 to 2.4.3.7 covered different attack techniques used to  
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deceive  customers  to  provide  access  credentials  to  a  fake  website  different  from  the 
original one hosted by the bank’s web server. 
Repudiation is another attack threat that occurs at times when an attacker is able to login to 
a customer account and request transactions on the customer’s behalf using a proxy server 
that is untraceable. 
5.4.3  Build an Attack Tree 
An attack tree is a formal and methodical way of collecting, documenting, and describing 
potential attacks on any given system in a structured and hierarchical manner [59, 227].  It 
contains a root node that represents the optimum goal of the attacker. It also contains leaf 
nodes, which are the attack methodologies used to achieve this goal. Figure 5-7 represents 
an attack tree for the proposed online banking application with MCA approach. The figure 
illustrates how an attacker could compromise a user online bank account and identifies the 
path the attacker would follow in order to accomplish this task. The main entries to achieve 
a successful attack are the EU, the CC, and the OSP. 
5.4.4  Evaluation of Threats 
Evaluating identified threats is the fifth step in the threat modelling process and it is about 
investigating each threat/attack and exploring how the new technology can mitigate its 
risk.  A  scenario-based  evaluation  is  considered  in  the  following  sub-sections  for  this 
purpose where each applicable attack is evaluated individually. A user named “Ahmed” 
(the EU) who has a bank account with XYZ Bank (the OSP) will be used hereafter as an 
example  case  scenario  for  all  the  attacks.  Another  Internet  user  called  “Zaid”  will  be 
considered  as  an  attacker  who  will  try  all  applicable  attacks  to  compromise  Ahmed’s 
online banking account. The evaluation assumes that XYZ Bank is implementing MCA as 
proposed in this research and will, therefore, show how it can mitigate the risk of the 
identified attacks.  
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Figure 5-7: An attack tree for the proposed online banking with MCA approach  
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5.4.4.1  Sniffing (2.1.1) 
Sniffing,  the  attack  represented  by  2.1.1  in  Figure  5-7,  is  an  attack  that  captures 
information transferred between EUs and OSPs. If Zaid has the proper tools that allow him 
to intercept Ahmed’s data transferred over the Web channel (the primary CC), he could 
extract Ahmed’s credentials (e.g., username and password) if this channel is not encrypted 
using SSL. If for some reason encryption were not implemented, MCA would protect 
Ahmed’s account by disallowing Zaid from initiating critical transactions such as money 
transfer. The only access Zaid will gain after he captures Ahmed’s username and password 
is  the  informational  services  offered  by  Ahmed’s  bank,  such  as  the  account  balance 
statement. The only transactional service allowed, at this point, for Zaid is money transfer 
to  the  beneficiary  accounts  that  have  been  already  approved  by  Ahmed.  However,  to 
mitigate this threat, the approved beneficiary accounts can be hidden so that only Ahmed 
can  reach  them  using  a  search  engine.  This  search  engine  allows  Ahmed  to  locate  an 
approved beneficiary account by searching for the nickname he set for that account, the 
beneficiary account, holder name, the beneficiary account number, or any other details 
associated with any of the approved beneficiary accounts. Zaid, on the other hand, will not 
be able to see any beneficiary account unless he is able to figure out a searchable piece of 
information that could retrieve the beneficiary account details. Even if this occurred, and 
Zaid were able to transfer money to an approved beneficiary account, the money could 
easily be traced since the beneficiary account is always an account Ahmed has previously 
approved and used.   
Moreover, with the confirmatory feedback feature implemented, Ahmed will receive an 
SMS message from the OSP informing him of the transaction. This will allow him to 
report such an incident quickly to the designated authority, especially if the amount is very 
high and the delay transfer feature is turned on. After all, capturing primary channel access 
credentials does not allow Zaid, even in the best scenarios, to create beneficiary accounts 
or transfer money from Ahmed’s online account to his account. The only way Zaid can 
transfer  money  to  his  own  account  is  if  his  account  were  approved  by  Ahmed  as  a 
beneficiary account. This again would be easy to trace from the transactions log. 
Zaid  will  not  be  able  to  create  new  beneficiary  accounts  since  this  task  requires  a 
confirmation of the OTP that will be sent to Ahmed’s phone over a mobile network. 
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5.4.4.2  Man-in-the-middle (2.2.2) attacks of MCA 
MITM, indicated by the box 2.2.2 in Figure 5-7, attacks are real-time sniffing attacks. This 
type of attack is capable of altering the intercepted data between the EU and the OSP. The 
attack is transparent and neither end (EU or OSP) is aware of the attack. As a result, both 
ends assume data integrity. However, with the MCA mechanism implemented within the 
system, the potential damage of such an attack becomes very low. 
For example, if Zaid is able to compromise the CC and divert all communication traffic 
from both communicating sides (Ahmed and the XYZ Bank), he is only sniffing the traffic 
without interfering (passive mode). He watches the details Ahmed is requesting from his 
online account. Once Ahmed sends a request to add a new beneficiary account, Zaid will 
then intercept the request and change the beneficiary account details so it will reflect his 
own account number rather than the beneficiary’s account number. The bank will receive 
the request and will process it accordingly. As proposed by the MCA infrastructure, the 
beneficiary accounts must be approved by an OTP, which is passed to the user via an 
independent secondary channel other than the Web (e.g., mobile network). This means that 
Ahmed will receive a SMS message from XYZ Bank with the beneficiary account details 
and an OTP that will allow him to approve the beneficiary account. Here Ahmed will 
realize that the beneficiary account details received via the SMS message do not match the 
one he requested via the Web channel. He should not approve the transaction but should 
rather report this incident to the bank support for further investigation. As a result, the 
attack fails. 
5.4.4.3  User surveillance (1.2) 
User  surveillance  aims  at  capturing  user  credentials  by  monitoring  the  users  through 
surveillance devices such as cameras. The main objective of such attacks is to replay the 
captured secrets later. With the MCA mechanism implemented, even if the surveillance 
devices were able to capture the OTP received by Ahmed’s mobile phone, that OTP is only 
valid  for  one  time.  Once  Ahmed  uses  the  received  OTP  to  approve  the  designated 
beneficiary account, the same OTP cannot be reused again to approve another beneficiary 
account. Moreover, each OTP is linked with one and only one beneficiary account. Thus 
any  given  OTP  will  not  activate/approve  any  beneficiary  account  other  than  the  one 
associated with it. 
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5.4.4.4  Notes/token theft (1.3) 
Token or note theft, in the context of MCA, exists when the password is written down or 
when Zaid physically gets hold of Ahmed’s mobile (i.e., the mobile phone in this case acts 
as an authentication token since it receives the OTP). The former, if it occurs, would help 
Zaid to gain access to the informational services of Ahmed’s account. He would have 
limited access privileges similar to the ones covered in sniffing attack section 5.4.4.1. The 
latter should grant Zaid even fewer privileges although getting physical access to Ahmed’s 
mobile  allows  Zaid  access  to  the  stored  SMS  messages.  Despite  the  fact  that  these 
messages could contain confidential information such as OTPs used to activate beneficiary 
accounts, this information is considered out-dated as long as Ahmed has already used it. 
Even if Ahmed has not used some of them at the time Zaid is able to compromise them, 
they are still associated with only the beneficiary accounts Ahmed has created. 
By physically getting control over the secondary channel, Zaid would have no access to 
Ahmed’s online bank system. This attack would only deny Ahmed from accessing his 
services temporarily. Therefore, token and note thefts are applicable attacks on MCA but 
they cannot offer Zaid full access to compromise Ahmed’s online account. 
5.4.4.5  Malware infection (1.1) 
Malware  infection  attacks  using  viruses,  Trojans,  or  any  other  malicious  software  are 
capable of capturing access credentials and pass them to the attacker. Sometimes they are 
able to modify the transaction details the user is passing to the OSP. Considering MCA, in 
the  former  case,  the  attack  outcome  is  similar  to  the  user  surveillance  and  notes  theft 
attacks discussed in the previous sections. They will fail as the OTP protects users from 
any  type  of  replay  attacks.  The  second  case  is  addressed  with  more  details  in  section 
5.4.4.8. 
MCA also has the potential to protect end users from technical and non-technical social 
engineering attacks. For example, Ahmed receives a call from Zaid who is pretending to be 
one of the IT technicians that received a report about an issue with Ahmed’s account. Even 
if Zaid were able to deceive Ahmed and able to obtain the login password of the account, 
Ahmed would receive a SMS message whenever Zaid tries to create a beneficiary account 
(i.e., the proposal suggests that a beneficiary account must be created for any account to 
which the user needs to transfer money). If Zaid’s account were among the beneficiary 
accounts  that  have  been  approved  earlier  by  Ahmed,  a  confirmatory  SMS  message  
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(feedback) would be sent to Ahmed’s mobile phone to confirm the transaction. This would 
help Ahmed to report the incident and trace the issue before the money is transferred away 
(if delayed transfer feature is implemented as discussed in section 5.2.4). 
5.4.4.6  Phishing (1.7.1) and Pharming (1.7.2 / 2.1.2.1) 
Phishing and Pharming are considered as technical social engineering types of attacks. 
Unlike non-technical social engineering, the attacker approaches online banking customers 
by means of electronic mails, websites, or DNS spoofing (see section 2.4.3.6 for more 
details). For example, Ahmed receives an e-mail from Zaid that apparently contains a link 
to XYZ Bank. The URL behind that link would take Ahmed to a fake website that is 
designed to match the look and feel of the original XYZ Bank. If Ahmed logs into that 
website, his access credentials would be stored and captured by Zaid. However, those login 
details would not help Zaid to request a money transfer from Ahmed’s account. He first 
needs to create a new beneficiary account for his own account and approve it before he is 
able to transfer money to it. 
5.4.4.7  Clickjacking (1.5) 
Clickjacking has an effect similar to the effects of malware infection attacks. It installs 
malicious software in the victim’s machine so the attacker can control it remotely. 
As an example in the case of online banking with MCA, if Ahmed clicks on a button on a 
website that results in installing a virus or Trojan in his machine, all access credentials can 
be captured and controlled by Zaid. However, Zaid also needs to control Ahmed’s mobile 
phone in order to accept and manipulate the OTP numbers sent by the OSP whenever there 
is a new request to create beneficiary accounts. 
5.4.4.8  Man-in-the-browser (2.2.3) attacks  
Man-in-the-browser (MITB) attacks are similar to the MITM attacks. The difference is that 
with  MITB,  the  controlling  element  that  intercepts  the  data  and  alters  its  details  is  a 
computer program residing in the victim’s machine. If such a program were able to control 
Ahmed’s web browser, it could create beneficiary accounts or alter existing beneficiary 
account details requested by Ahmed in the background, before these requests are sent to 
the OSP. However, as covered in section 5.4.4.2, Ahmed would know if his request has 
been altered once he receives the SMS message that contains the transaction details and the  
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OTP. If the details do not match, then Ahmed would know that his original request was 
altered. 
5.4.5  Risk Mitigation and Security Controls 
According to [220], four security controls can be adequately used to mitigate the risks 
presented  by  threats  identified  in  any  threat  modelling.  These  security  controls  are 
corrective  control,  deterrent  control,  detective  control,  and  finally,  preventive  control. 
Figure 5-8 illustrates how these controls are put in place based on the security controls 
structure presented in [220]. 
 
Figure 5-8:  Security controls implemented for the MCA infrastructure (adapted from [220]) 
These security controls are expanded further in Table 5-4, which summarizes the outcome 
of the threat modelling analysis based on the STRIDE process. 
5.4.6  Rate the Threats (based on DREAD) 
The final step in the threat modelling is to prioritize the identified threats based on the risks 
they pose.  The risk rate is calculated based on what is called “DREAD model” suggested 
by Microsoft.  It stands for the following parameters [227]:  
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•  Damage potential: the damage effect that can be caused by the vulnerability if 
exploited. 
•  Reproducibility: the easiness of reproducing the attack. 
•  Exploitability: the easiness of launching the attack. 
•  Affected users: the scope of affected users by the attack. 
•  Discoverability: the easiness of discovering the vulnerability. 
The scale used to rate the risk of the threats is represented by the values 3 (High), 2 
(Medium),  and  1  (Low).    Table  5-2  shows  a  suggested  interpretation  of  this  scale  on 
DREAD model. 
  Rating  High (3)  Medium (2)  Low (1) 
D  Damage 
potential 
The attacker can subvert 
the security system; get 
full trust authorization; 
run as administrator; 
upload content. 
Leaking sensitive 
information 
Leaking trivial 
information 
R  Reproducibility  The attack can be 
reproduced every time 
and does not require a 
timing window. 
The attack can be 
reproduced, but only 
with a timing window 
and a particular race 
situation. 
The attack is very 
difficult to reproduce, 
even with knowledge 
of the security hole. 
E  Exploitability  A novice programmer 
could make the attack 
in a short time. 
A skilled programmer 
could make the attack, 
then repeat the steps. 
The attack requires an 
extremely skilled 
person and in-depth 
knowledge every time 
to exploit. 
A  Affected users  All users, default 
configuration, key 
customers 
Some users, non-
default configuration 
Very small percentage 
of users, obscure 
feature; affects 
anonymous users 
D  Discoverability  Published information 
explains the attack. 
The vulnerability is 
found in the most 
commonly used feature 
and is very noticeable. 
The vulnerability is in 
a seldom-used part of 
the product, and only a 
few users should come 
across it. It would take 
some thinking to see 
malicious use. 
The bug is obscure, 
and it is unlikely that 
users will work out 
damage potential. 
Table 5-2: Threat rating table [227] 
To calculate the risk rate (high, medium, or low) for any given threat identified in this 
study, we need to count the risk value of each DREAD attributes based on the risk each 
threat poses to the online banking application with MCA. Then the total value of these 
ratings will indicate the proper risk rating each threat has.  Microsoft suggested that a total 
rating from 12 to 15 should be considered (High risk), a rating from 8 to 11 is considered 
(Medium risk), and finally from 5 to 7 is considered as (Low risk) where 5 is the minimum  
112 
 
score any threat could get due to the fact that there are 5 parameters exist for each threat 
(each will get at least a score of 1). 
Table 5-3 represents the outcome of the DREAD and risk rating calculations for each 
attack on the proposed MCA separately. 
Attacks  D  R  E  A  D  Total  Risk Rating 
Malware infection (1.1)  2  3  1  1  2  9  Medium 
User surveillance (1.2)  2  1  2  1  1  7  Low 
Notes theft (1.3)  2  3  3  1  1  10  Medium 
Tokens theft (1.3)  1  1  3  1  1  7  Low 
Key loggers (1.4)  2  2  2  1  3  10  Medium 
Clickjacking (1.5)  2  1  1  3  3  10  Medium 
Guessing (1.6)  2  1  1  1  1  6  Low 
Social engineering (non-
technical) (1.7)  2  1  3  1  1  8  Medium 
Phishing (1.7.1)  2  1  2  2  2  9  Medium 
Pharming (1.7.2)  2  2  1  1  2  8  Medium 
Pharming (2.1.2.1)  2  2  1  3  2  10  Medium 
Sniffing (2.1.1)  2  2  1  1  2  8  Medium 
SQL Injection (2.2.1)  2  2  1  3  2  10  Medium 
MITM (2.2.2)  2  2  2  1  1  8  Medium 
MITB (2.2.3)  2  3  1  1  2  9  Medium 
Policy Violation (3.1)  3  2  2  3  2  12  High 
DoS (3.2)  3  1  1  3  1  9  Medium 
Table 5-3:  DREAD-rating table 
5.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter proposed a MCA solution that is capable of better withstanding most known 
attacks  that  target  online  banking  applications  than  are  other  existing  authentication 
mechanisms. Based on a theoretical evaluation, while the main aim of this solution is to 
offer better security, it was also important to ensure usability and acceptability. 
To assess the security of the MCA theoretically, this chapter reported on a threat modelling 
evaluation of the MCA based on the STRIDE process and DREAD rating by Microsoft. 
The  outcome  of  the  evaluation  has  proven  that  no  single  point  of  attack  in  the  MCA 
solution  poses  high  risk  or  allows  the  attacker  to  compromise  the  customers’  online 
banking accounts. The usability and acceptability of MCA, however, can only be assessed 
practically.  Chapter  6  covers  the  design  and  implementation  of  the  proposed  MCA 
mechanism.  This  allows  better  evaluation  of  both  usability  and  acceptability  from  the 
users' point of view.  
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STRIDE 
Classification 
Entry 
Points  Impact  DREAD Risk 
Rating  Security Controls 
User surveillance 
(1.2)  • Information 
disclosure 
EU  1.  Disclose confidential access/financial info. 
2.  Transfer money to approved beneficiary 
accounts 
Low  • Encrypting EU to OSP data flow 
• Hide beneficiary accounts by allowing 
access to them via a search engine  Sniffing (2.1.1)  CC  Medium 
Man-in-the-
middle (2.2.2) 
and Man-in-the-
browser (2.2.3) 
• Spoofing 
• Tampering 
• Repudiation 
• Info. disclosure 
• Denial of service 
• Elevation of privilege 
CC 
3.  Altering transaction details sent by the 
customer 
4.  Transfer money to approved beneficiary 
accounts 
5.  Modify transaction details originated from 
both sides (EU and OSP) 
Medium 
• OTP must be valid for one use only 
• Every OTP must be associated with 
only one beneficiary account 
Notes theft (1.3)  • Info. disclosure 
EU 
6.  Disclose confidential access/financial info.  Low  • Provide alternative secondary channel 
at emergencies  Token theft (1.3)  • Denial of service  7.  Deny customer access to mobile service  Medium 
Malware 
infection (1.1) 
and Clickjacking 
(1.5) 
• Tampering 
• Information 
disclosure 
• Repudiation 
EU 
8.  Disclose confidential access/financial 
information 
9.  Modify transaction details originated from 
both sides (EU and OSP) 
Medium 
• Implement feedback through the 
secondary channel for every 
transaction 
Social 
engineering (non-
technical) (1.7) 
• Spoofing 
• Information 
disclosure 
EU 
10.  Disclose confidential financial info. 
including the OTP sent to the customer 
11.  Create beneficiary accounts and initiate 
money transfer to them 
Medium 
• Send beneficiary account details along 
with the OTP via the secondary 
channel 
• Delay process of critical transactions 
for few minutes to allow customers to 
report attack attempts on their 
accounts 
Phishing (1.7.1)  • Spoofing 
• Info. disclosure 
• Denial of service 
EU  12.  Disclose confidential financial info. 
13.  Deny customer access to the legitimate 
OSP 
Medium 
Pharming  
(1.7.1 / 2.1.2.1) 
EU/CC  Medium 
Table 5-4:  Threat modelling based on STRIDE process and DREAD rating summary table  
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Chapter 6   
Design and Implementation 
6.1 Introduction 
The main objective of the proposed MCA solution is to provide an online banking solution 
that offers better security for the customers and, at the same time, is usable and acceptable. 
These three variables (security, usability, and acceptability) need to be evaluated against 
the proposed MCA solution in order to check that it meets all proposed requirements. 
Security was evaluated theoretically using threat-modelling evaluation (covered in Chapter 
5). Usability and acceptability, on the other hand, can be assessed only in practical terms 
where  users  are  consulted  to  give  their  feedback  based  on  their  experience  with  the 
proposed solution. 
In order to evaluate the usability and the acceptability of MCA, a prototype application that 
simulates an existing online banking system was developed. This prototype application 
was designed to meet the main requirements of the proposed MCA architecture.   
This  chapter  first  presents  the  main  aspects  of  the  MCA  in  section  6.2.  The  design 
recommendations of the proposed MCA solution constitute section 6.3. The design options 
and  implementation  are  discussed  in  sections  6.4  and  6.5  respectively.  This  chapter 
concludes with a list of security and usability guidelines for real online banking application 
design and implementation. 
6.2 Aspects of the MCA 
The proposed MCA infrastructure, as proposed in Chapter 5 and shown in Figure 5-1, has 
the following aspects: levels, factors, and channels. These are the main aspects of any 
MCA design option. The requirements of any given system will specify how, what, when, 
and where to implement these elements.  
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This section discusses these aspects and shows why they are important characteristics of 
the  proposed  MCA  mechanism.  The  section  also  presents  a  guideline  for  the 
implementations of these elements. 
6.2.1  Levels 
Levels describe what service level a customer would have in an online banking system. 
This can be achieved by dividing the system core services or functions into different levels. 
Each level can be assigned to a specific group of users (see Figure 6-1). More privileges 
are granted to the users when moving to a higher level. For instance, level 1 in Figure 6-1 
offers limited services (i.e. informational services) to user group 1 while level 2 offers 
more services (i.e. transactional services) to user group 2. 
 
Figure 6-1:  System levelling structure 
Dividing an online banking system into multiple levels is a vital step towards securely and 
effectively  managing  services  and  functions  for  different  groups  of  users  using  single 
application interface. 
The MCA architecture suggests the following guidelines to implement levelling properly: 
•  Service  level:    the  services  offered  to  the  users  throughout  the  system  must  be 
represented in a cumulative way. A user authenticated to access higher-level services 
should be able to utilize the services offered by that level as well as the services offered 
by all preceding levels (see Figure 6-2).  
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Figure 6-2:  Services level diagram 
•  Session management:  despite the fact that sessions must be managed and kept alive for 
the time the users are logged-in, these sessions must be terminated at once if there is a 
suspicion of an attack, such as the account being accessed by different IP addresses at 
the same time. Also, and most importantly, the session used to authenticate users on 
transactional levels must be valid for one-time use only. The user must authenticate 
each transaction individually (see Figure 6-3). 
 
Figure 6-3:  MCA architecture session management 
•  Sequential authentication:  a user should not be granted a higher-level access unless he 
or she is already authenticated in all lower-levels. This is important to ensure that all 
channels are used to carry out a transaction. 
•  Single user interface:  although the system will be divided into different levels, all 
these levels must be represented by a consistent user interface. This is important so that 
users  do  not  feel  they  are  being  diverted  to  different  systems  or  interfaces  while 
moving from one level to another.   
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6.2.2  Factors 
Factors complement the role of levels. They are the secret keys used by users to get access 
to their accounts or to authorize critical actions within the system. Sometimes the system 
administrator can assign different levels to one or more groups of users where these users 
can use different access keys (the factors) to access each level individually (see Figure 
6-4). This is known as multi-level authentication [26] and is covered with more detail in 
Chapter 2. 
 
Figure 6-4:  The implementation of factors into multi-level system 
The  MCA  architecture  suggests  the  following  guidelines  concerning  factor 
implementation: 
•  Multi-factor:  each user must use multiple factors in order to get access to services 
provided  by  different  levels  throughout  the  system.  It  is  recommended  that  basic 
informational services are provided at the base level where users can access them using 
traditional authentication factors such as a username and password. This authentication 
mechanism  can  also  be  used  in  higher  transactional  levels  but  not  as  a  primary 
mechanism. It can be used, rather, as a complementary authentication mechanism along 
with another authentication mechanism that is delivered over a different independent 
channel.  
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•  One-time factors:  the factors used to authenticate users to the transactional level of 
their  account  must  be  single-use,  only  valid  for  one  use,  linked,  linked  to  one 
transaction only, and time-limited, valid for a specific period. These transactional-level 
factors must be delivered to the users via a different channel other than the primary 
Web  channel  used  to  authenticate  these  users  at  the  Information  Level  of  their 
accounts. 
6.2.3  Channels 
Channels are a vital component of MCA. While factors ensure proper management of user 
privileges, channels assert that these factors are exchanged between the system and the 
users in a proper and un-compromisable way. The proposed MCA architecture suggests the 
following guidelines with respect to channel implementation: 
•  Multi-channel:  each level of the system must be authenticated using a different factor, 
as stated previously, and by means of different channels where possible. The minimum 
requirement is that at least two channels be used before the user is able to access any 
upper level transactions within the system. 
•  Independence:  the channels must be independent. That is, factors and information 
exchanged via different channels must not be delivered using the same delivery path or 
medium. For example, if the factor used to authenticate users to the first level was 
exchanged between the system and the users through the Web channel, then the factor 
used to authenticate the users for the second level must not be delivered using the Web 
channel. The second factor must be delivered over a different independent channel 
such as mobile network. 
The proposed MCA solution suggests that SMS messages are used as a communication 
medium  to  exchange  the  secondary  channel  factors  with  the  user.  However,  other 
communication media can be used as long as they are independent of the primary channel 
used to authenticate users to their accounts. 
To  summarize,  Figure  6-5  encompasses  all  three  aspects  of  MCA  in  one  architecture 
diagram.  
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Figure 6-5:  MCA architecture diagram  
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6.3 Design Recommendations 
6.3.1  User Defined versus System Generated Passwords 
The passwords used to authenticate users to the base/primary level should be user-defined 
passwords. Simple password policies that ensure a balance of security and usability should 
be enforced rather than complex policies. This is important to minimize the user passwords 
being written down on notes or papers. These passwords, on their own, do not pose high 
risk since they alone cannot grant an attacker access to the transactional level of the user 
account. The users will need to use other authentication factors to access the transactional 
levels as pointed out in section 6.2.2. 
6.3.2  Language Support 
Language differences are an important aspect of cultural background. It is a neglected 
security feature in almost all online applications that, if utilized, can improve security. The 
alphabet  used  to  form  a  password  can  be  treated  as  a  knowledge-based  authentication 
factor. In fact, it is the hardest type of knowledge-based authentication since it requires 
compatible peripheral devices beside knowledge to extract and understand. For instance, a 
user from Oman who speaks Arabic can choose to receive the OTP in Arabic alphabets. 
This will limit the chances of a foreign attacker who does not understand or read Arabic 
alphabets to extract the OTP from the SMS message if he or she were able to physically 
compromise the user’s mobile phone or capture the message on the fly. Even in the case 
where the attacker uses a translator to translate the text message to English or a language 
he or she understands, an input device (e.g. keyboard) has to be available so the attacker 
would be able to send the OTP in the correct language alphabet to the bank system. It 
would be even harder for the attacker to extract the OTP if an automated call was initiated 
from the bank servers to dictate the OTP to the user rather than sending the OTP in an 
SMS message. 
The language support can also be used for the conventional username and password. The 
user should be allowed to enter the password in his or her language or using in different 
language  alphabets.  The  system  should  implement  a  feature  that  would  allow  the 
application to detect the language used in the password and compare it with the one stored 
in the user account record in the database. This would make it harder for the attacker to  
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recognize what languages the user has used since there is no form field submitted along 
with  the  password  that  will  tell  the  attacker  which  language  the  user  has  used  in  the 
password. 
6.3.3  Encryption / Securing Key Delivery 
The factors travelling between users and the system should be encrypted using the latest, 
up-to-date, cryptography formulas. This is vital to ensure that data are delivered securely 
without interference or interception. Although not all channels are considered secure, such 
as SMS messages, they significantly improve the overall security of the system when used 
as an auxiliary delivery channel alongside the Web channel. 
6.4 MCA - Design Options 
MCA is a flexible authentication mechanism that caters to different organizations’ and 
clients’  needs.  This  section  will  cover  the  design  options  of  MCA  based  on  the  three 
aspects (levels, factors, and channels) discussed in the previous section. The details of each 
of these designs, the advantages and disadvantages, and the criteria for selecting the best 
design for online banking are presented next. 
6.4.1  Design option 1 – Transaction-based Authentication 
This  design  suggests  that  the  customer  must  always  be  authenticated  using  the  MCA 
mechanism to access each successive level of the system. For instance, a user is required to 
enter  the  username  and  password  to  access  his  or  her  account.  If  both  username  and 
password matches the user record in the database, the system would prepare an OTP and 
deliver it to the user via a secondary channel such as a mobile network. Once the user 
successfully verifies the transaction by entering the OTP via the bank server, the system 
would then open a new session for him or her to access the first level services. This session 
would be responsible to keep the user authenticated for the first level of services as long as 
the user does not logout or keep the application idle for a specific length of time. These 
level  services  are  only  informational  where  the  customer  has  only  read-access  to  the 
records stored under his or her account.  
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For transactional level services, the user must authenticate each transaction individually. A 
new session would be created for each transaction after the application verifies the OTP 
submitted by the user. This session would be live until the transaction is carried out and 
then it would be terminated and would no longer be valid for another transaction. Here the 
user does not have to logout to terminate the session; the session is valid only for one 
transaction. For example, if the user would like to transfer an amount of money to another 
account, the bank will send a new OTP to the user’s mobile number. Once he or she 
verifies this OTP, the transaction will be carried out and no further transactions can be 
carried out without a new OTP (see Figure 6-6). 
 
Figure 6-6:  Design option 1 – Transaction-based authentication process 
Although  this  design  offers  the  highest  possible  MCA  security,  it  uses  the  secondary 
channel authentication mechanism exhaustively. This will increase the running cost of the 
MCA mechanism for the user since each transaction must be validated by an OTP that is 
delivered  to  the  customer  via  an  independent  channel.  It  will  also  degrade  the  overall 
usability and accessibility of the system. The users are required to access the other channel  
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each time they want to access their accounts. If the other channel is unavailable, it will 
cause disruption and latency in accessing online services. 
6.4.2  Design option 2 – Beneficiary-based Authentication 
 
Figure 6-7:  Design option 2 - Beneficiary-based authentication process 
This  granularity  option  aims  at  minimizing  the  use  of  the  secondary  channel  while 
maintaining security. It suggests that customers should have access to the informational 
level using only the conventional one factor authentication mechanism such as username 
and  password.  The  same  authentication  mechanism  should  also  be  used  to  authorize 
transactions  at  higher  levels.  However,  these  transactions  are  only  allowed  for  the 
beneficiary accounts pre-approved. These beneficiary accounts can be manipulated at the 
informational level but they are only approved by OTPs that are delivered through the 
secondary  channels.  Thus,  secondary  channels  are  used  only  to  approve  beneficiary  
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accounts once and customers are not required to utilize the secondary channel every time 
they want to authorize a transaction. 
This design offers better usability and is more cost effective than design option 1. Security 
is maintained since the attacker will not be able to create beneficiary accounts without 
compromising the secondary channel. For transactions to be carried out, the attacker also 
needs to compromise the conventional access credentials since they are requested by the 
system as depicted in Figure 6-7.   
6.5 MCA Implementation – XYZ Bank 
The implementation of the MCA proposal is an important part of this study. It was stated 
that the aim of this research is to “design an authentication mechanism that uses multiple 
channels  to  resist  attacks  more  effectively  than  most  commonly  used  mechanisms. 
Furthermore, such a mechanism will also be usable and acceptable to users”. One can 
only test the usability and acceptability by involving end users in the evaluation process. 
Such  evaluation  goes  beyond  the  technical  evaluation  of  utility  and  can  provide 
accessibility in-context [228]. 
To facilitate the evaluation, a prototype online banking web-application was implemented. 
The application features an MCA mechanism that complies with design option 2 described 
in section 6.4.2 since this design offers a moderate implementation of authentication via 
SMS.  Figure  6-8  shows  a  storyboard  for  different  pages  designed  to  achieve  proper 
implementation of the proposed MCA solution.  
The storyboard illustrates how the application pages are connected to each other. It also 
reflects the sequence in which these pages are to be accessed. For instance, the user cannot 
access page 1.1.4 (secondary channel selection) before first completing page 1.1.3 (mobile 
verification).  A  money  transfer  request  (page  1.2.2.1)  is  a  sub-page  of  the  beneficiary 
accounts page (page 1.2.2), and therefore, the user will not be able to access this page 
unless  the  request  to  access  it  comes  from  the  beneficiary  accounts  page.  The  same 
sequence is repeated for the rest of all other pages displayed in Figure 6-8. 
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Figure 6-8:  XYZ Bank prototype application storyboard 
6.5.1  Application Overview 
The prototype application has been put into five separate tiers as depicted in Figure 6-9:  
PHP files tier, Presentation logic tier, Business logic tier, Configuration tier, and the Data 
stores tier.    
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Figure 6-9:  The prototype application architecture 
Each  of  these  five  tiers  plays  an  important  role  in  the  application  architecture.  Their 
functions are described in the following bullets: 
•  PHP files tier:  this tier contains all web-application files that are accessible directly by 
the users. They produce HTML documents that are formatted in a way that users can 
read and understand. 
•  Presentation logic tier:  this tier is responsible for styling PHP files. They are usually 
made of templates that work as base format that will later shape the front-end style of 
the PHP files. The application uses templates to present the interface layout. These 
templates share almost the same layout with only differences in the codes and the links 
they display to the users. Figure 6-10 illustrates the common layout for all templates 
used in the MCA prototype application.   
 
Figure 6-10:  Common application templates layout  
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There are three main templates used in the application: 
o  Guest template: is a template responsible for pages that the users visit without 
the need to login. These pages include Home page, Research page, Contact 
researcher, Tasks page, Information sheet page, and Registration page. 
o  Signed-in template: is a template that presents all private pages that the user can 
access after he or she is signed in. These pages are restricted from other users 
who do not have accounts or records in the database. 
o  Pop-up template: this template is responsible for presenting the layout of the 
pop-up windows that appear throughout the application.   
•  Business logic tier:  this is the tier where data are manipulated and processed. It acts as 
the brain of the application, which decides what output should be produced to the users. 
The outcomes of this tier move to the presentation tier for styling and formatting before 
they are finally displayed to the users through the PHP files. 
•  Configuration tier:  is the tier that holds the configuration files. These files hold the 
key setting values that help the application to decide which language to use, which 
cookies are responsible for which elements, and which database to connect to and use. 
Configuration files also hold sensitive information such as database access credentials. 
For this reason, these files are the most critical files that should be kept secured from 
unauthorized access.  
•  Data stores:  these are represented by the database, cookies, and language files. All 
these  data  stores  are  connected  so  that  none  of  them  can  work  independently.  For 
instance,  the  language  files  contain  Arabic  and  English  phrases  that  are  used 
throughout all templates and PHP pages. The cookies stored in the users’ machines will 
have a value that will specify which language the user prefers to use. If the user has 
selected Arabic, then the cookie will store the value that represents the Arabic language 
in his machine. The Arabic language file will then be used to represent data in the 
templates and PHP files. Finally, the data sent back from the users will be stored in the 
database in the same language currently used (Arabic language in this case). 
As shown in Figure 6-9, all five tiers are separated from each other. This is important to 
improve performance, to update easily and efficiently and to maintain the core functions 
without the need to compromise the other tiers [229].  
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Figure 6-11:  MCA application - Home page (login) - Implementation 
The main page of the application presented as Figure 6-11 gives a brief illustration of how 
these  five  tiers  communicate  with  each  other  to  present  the  pages  to  the  users.  This 
document  uses  the  Guest  template  (Presentation  logic  tier)  to  present  the  header  and 
footer. The login form is directly connected to the database (Data stores tier) for a quick 
check if the user has entered a valid username and password or not. The configuration file 
is  the  intermediary  connector  that  makes  such  communication  possible  (Configuration 
tier). The cookies’ default language value is English; therefore, the English language file 
will be used to display the contents of the page (Data stores tier again). Finally, the page is 
accessed directly by the user through the file index.php (PHP files tier) which is processed 
in the web-server and converted to an HTML document as seen in Figure 6-11. 
6.6 Implementation Guidelines 
For any online banking system to implement MCA, there are several guidelines that have 
to be taken into consideration. Some of these guidelines were already implemented in the 
prototype application and some others were not implemented (marked with [*]) as part of 
this research study. They are categorized into security and usability guidelines below.  
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6.6.1  Security guidelines: 
•  [*] Users should not be allowed to enrol into the system online. There must be a way to 
verify that the user registered to use the online service is legitimate and that he or she is 
the real owner of the mobile number provided. 
•  User correspondence details (e.g. mobile number, alternative mobile number) must not 
be displayed in the user online account and must be kept hidden from online access at 
all levels. Although there are on going studies proposing encrypted version of SMS 
messages such as the one proposed in [230], current SMS protocol and the encryption 
formula are publicly available for software developers. Therefore, if an attacker were 
able to capture the account holder’s mobile numbers, he or she would be able to send 
out SMS messages to the OSP on behalf of the legitimate customer. 
•  [*] The primary communication channel (web channel) between the user and the bank 
web-server must be encrypted and secured. This can be achieved by using the HTTPS 
protocol (based on the design recommendations covered by section 6.3.3). 
•  [*] Transaction processing delays should be implemented, especially for transactions 
that involve large amounts of money. This will give the customer time to report the 
incident  in  case  of  a  social  engineering  attack  that  has  successfully  deceived  the 
customer to give out the informational level factors as well as the OTP to activate a 
beneficiary  account.  A  scenario-based  evaluation  of  this  feature  was  covered  in 
Chapter 5. 
•  [*] A further process-based authentication class can be implemented after the customer 
receives the OTP. For example, a partial disclosure technique can be used to extract a 3 
or 4 digits that can be used to confirm a transaction from 6 or more digits sent to the 
user’s mobile as OTP. The user remembers a private number which represents the 
places of these digits in the OTP (e.g. 356 represents the 3
rd, 5
th and 6
th digits of a given 
OTP).  Such mechanism is applied by Swivel Authentication Solution [231]. 
•  [*] The bank should enforce access policies that restrict customers from using the same 
smart  phone  to  access  the  bank  online  application  while  receiving  OTPs  via  SMS 
messages.  The bank can also impose this policy by restricting mobile phone browsers 
from accessing their online applications. This will ensure that there is no single point of 
attack that will help an attacker to compromise the user’s account fully. Rather, for any 
attack  to  succeed,  different  independent  authentication  channels  have  to  be 
compromised. More details of smart-phones’ security were covered in section 0 of 
Chapter 4.   
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•  Login authentication and transaction authorization must not share the same channel. If 
conventional authentication mechanisms, such as username and password, are used to 
authenticate users to login, then transactional services must be authorized using an 
independent secondary channel such as a mobile network (see section 6.2.3). 
•  Users  must  be  allowed  limited  retries  to  authorize  critical  transactions  before  the 
account is deactivated. This will secure the account from brute-force attacks that could 
try to figure out the OTPs used to authorize transactions.  
•  Confirmatory feedback via SMS messages is vital when transactions are carried out. It 
is also important to notify the account holder by SMS message when the account has 
been  deactivated  for  any  reason  (the  importance  of  feedback  is  further  covered  by 
section 5.2.4). 
•  [*] Users should be given the option to lock their accounts anytime using the mobile 
network channel. If the user receives an SMS message, for example, requesting to 
verify a given OTP without being logged into his account, this means that an attacker 
was able to compromise the account and is trying to authorize a critical transaction. At 
this  time,  the  user  should  be  able  to  lock  down  the  account  by  sending  an  SMS 
message command followed by the same OTP received or by sending the OTP in 
reverse order to the bank server from his or her mobile device. This will deny the 
attacker any further actions in the account and will allow the user to have enough time 
to report this incident to the bank. The SMS message requesting to lock the account 
down has to include the OTP sent to the user (whether in reverse order or following a 
command) to ensure that this message has been received from the legitimate account 
holder after he or she has received the SMS message that has the OTP. 
•  [*] Users should be allowed to unlock their accounts manually only (by approaching 
the bank in person or by any other legitimate means). 
6.6.2  Usability guidelines: 
•  Users should be allowed to choose whether to utilize MCA at the beneficiary account-
creation level or at the authorizing payment transactions level. Some users are more 
interested in authenticating each and every critical transaction while others prefer to 
minimize the number of times they use their mobiles to authenticate transactions. MCA 
mechanism  can  also  be  offered  at  login  level  as  suggested  in  design  option  1  if 
necessary (see section 6.4.1).  
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•  Users  should  be  allowed  to  request  the  bank  server  to  resend  the  OTP  by  SMS 
messages in case of delays or mobile network lagging. However, each SMS message 
must have a unique code that would differentiate it from other SMS messages. This is 
important to avoid confusion about which OTP to use if more than one message has 
arrived. 
6.7 Summary 
The developed prototype web-application was designed to comply with the guidelines and 
MCA mechanism design option presented in this study. The web application was designed 
to support testing the usability and user acceptability of the proposed MCA solution. After 
the application was designed, a set of 5 tasks was prepared for the users to do. All users’ 
actions were logged into the database to examine the time each user took to fulfil each task 
alone. The evaluation of the data gathered from users who tested the application is covered 
thoroughly in Chapter 7.  
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Chapter 7   
Evaluation 
Thesis Statement 
It is possible to design an authentication mechanism that uses multiple channels to 
resist attacks more effectively than most commonly used mechanisms. Furthermore, 
such a mechanism will also be both usable and acceptable to users in Oman. 
This chapter presents an overview research methodology used to test this hypothesis. The 
results show that online banking is indeed acceptable to Omani users and that MCA is, in 
particular, usable and acceptable to users in Oman. The first part of the thesis statement 
was addressed thoroughly in Chapter 5 and this chapter will only address the usability and 
acceptability aspects.  
The study reported here was carried out to assess users’ acceptance of online banking in 
Oman in general as well as usability and acceptability of the multi-channel authentication 
(MCA) mechanism to Omani users. Overall acceptance of online banking is an important 
step prior to studying the usability and acceptability of any new technology under online 
banking  applications  (including  MCA).  This  is  vital  to  ensure  the  clarity  of  feedback 
recorded from users of MCA as some users might not accept MCA because they originally 
have negative perceptions of online banking as a whole. 
The hypotheses are discussed in different sections of this chapter. In section 7.5.1, the 
demographic characteristics and their effects on the attitudes of customers to accept and 
adopt online banking were tested (Hypotheses H1a to H1e, see Table 7-1). In section 7.5.3, 
internal  and  external  variables  of  the  Technology  Acceptance  Model  (TAM)  were 
hypothesized  to  test  the  proposed  extended  TAM  for  online  banking  technology 
(Hypotheses H1f to H1h in Table 7-1). Finally, the main hypotheses on usability (section 
7.6.1)  and  acceptability  (section  7.6.2)  of  multi-channel  authentication  were  developed 
(Hypotheses H2a to H2d in Table 7-1); they are reviewed towards the end of this chapter. A 
total of 12 hypotheses are listed in Table 7-1.  
133 
 
The usability and acceptability hypothesis has been split up into the following: 
Hypotheses	 ﾠ Source	 ﾠ Mechanism	 ﾠ
Online	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠis	 ﾠacceptable	 ﾠto	 ﾠusers	 ﾠin	 ﾠOman	 ﾠ
H1a:	 ﾠ Gender significantly influences customers’ usage 
of online banking	 ﾠ [232]  Pre-questionnaire 
H1b:	 ﾠ Marital status significantly influences customers’ 
usage of online banking	 ﾠ
[232]  Pre-questionnaire 
H1c:	 ﾠ Education level significantly influences 
customers’ usage of online banking	 ﾠ [232]  Pre-questionnaire 
H1d:	 ﾠ Age significantly influences customers’ usage of 
online banking	 ﾠ [232]  Pre-questionnaire 
H1e:	 ﾠ Income significantly influences customers’ usage 
of online banking	 ﾠ [232]  Pre-questionnaire 
H1f:	 ﾠ Trust & relationship has a positive effect on 
Perceived Ease of Use (PEU)	 ﾠ [232]  Pre-questionnaire 
H1g:	 ﾠ Ease of access has a positive effect on Perceived 
Ease of Use (PEU)	 ﾠ [232]  Pre-questionnaire 
H1h:	 ﾠ Security has a positive effect on Perceived Ease 
of Use (PEU)	 ﾠ [232]  Pre-questionnaire 
Multi-ﾭ‐channel	 ﾠAuthentication	 ﾠis	 ﾠusable	 ﾠand	 ﾠacceptable	 ﾠto	 ﾠusers	 ﾠin	 ﾠOman	 ﾠ
H2a:	 ﾠ Multi-ﾭ‐channel	 ﾠauthentication	 ﾠis	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠ [48, 233]  Post-questionnaire, Logs 
H2b:	 ﾠ Multi-ﾭ‐channel	 ﾠauthentication	 ﾠis	 ﾠefficient	 ﾠ [48, 233]  Logs 
H2c:	 ﾠ Multi-ﾭ‐channel	 ﾠauthentication	 ﾠis	 ﾠsatisfactory	 ﾠ [48, 233]  Post-questionnaire 
H2d:	 ﾠ Multi-ﾭ‐channel	 ﾠauthentication	 ﾠis	 ﾠacceptable	 ﾠto	 ﾠusers	 ﾠ [232]  Post-questionnaire 
*	 ﾠOB:	 ﾠonline	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Table 7-1:  The list of hypotheses developed in this study 
This chapter is divided into six sections: the first section 7.1 covers the survey design and 
techniques used to collect data from participants. Section 7.2 presents the experiment trials 
and the difficulties encountered during the data-gathering phase. Section 7.3 outlines the 
demographic  profile  of  all  participants  and  discusses  the  dropout  rates  from  the 
experiment. Section 7.4 presents a series of preliminary tests that are essential for further 
analysis  testing  of  the  hypotheses.  Next,  section  7.5  discusses  the  factors  affecting 
adoption of online banking in Oman. The first part of this section assesses the demographic 
variables hypotheses for possible influence on the adoption of online banking in Oman. 
The second part hypothesizes some external TAM variables found in the literature to affect 
users’ adoption of online banking. It then presents the results of the hypotheses testing; the 
resulting extended TAM is presented in Figure 7-37. Section 7.6 covers the usability and 
acceptability of the multi-channel authentication mechanism and addresses the outcome of 
the last two hypotheses being tested in this chapter.  
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7.1 Survey Design 
A survey is one of the most popular methods used in social science to capture users’ 
reactions  and  performance  with  a  system  or  prototype  [234,  235].    Questionnaire  and 
observation  are  two  main  survey  techniques  used  for  data  gathering.  Sharp  defines 
questionnaires as “a series of questions designed to be answered asynchronously”; they can 
be conducted either on paper or in online format (i.e., via e-mails or web) [235].   
According to him, observations may be direct or indirect. Direct observation involves live 
monitoring of things as they happen, while indirect observation involves recording the 
user’s  activities  to  be  investigated  at  a  later  time.    In  this  research,  web-based  online 
questionnaires  and  indirect  observations  were  used  together  to  record  data  and  collect 
feedback from users. The following sections will outline the design of both techniques. 
7.1.1  Online Questionnaire Design 
Online questionnaires are becoming an increasingly common research tool for a variety of 
research  fields  [235,  236].    They  offer  distinctive  advantages  over  traditional  paper 
questionnaires such as the ability to reach a wider sample quickly and easily. They are 
interactive and cost effective (e.g., printing, travelling, data entry), and they generate a fast 
response, data validation (i.e., users input such as e-mail address, mobile number, and age 
can be validated and checked whether or not the user has entered them correctly), rule 
enforcement (i.e., selecting only one radio option), and data entry direct from users to the 
database [235, 237].  Other advantages of web-based questionnaires, compared to paper 
and e-mail-based questionnaires include live and centralized management of the questions 
in case further modifications are needed to the questionnaire items. 
Most of the scales used in the online questionnaire adopted in this study were derived from 
existing scales in the literature and adapted to fit this study’s context. For example, the 
study [232] used a list of online banking services to determine which of the services the 
users used. This list was compared with the online banking services offered by banks 
operating in Oman. Only those services that matched were presented in the questionnaire. 
These services were presented in two columns, each of which used a 5-option Likert scale. 
Each column represented a different online banking method: the first column represented 
conventional online banking systems and the second one represented the online banking 
system with multi-channel authentication. Users selected how likely they were to use each  
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of the listed services based on the types of online banking used. The scale is presented in 
Appendix B. 
To  test  the  usability  of  the  proposed  multi-channel  authentication  mechanism  and  the 
functionality of the alternative channel mechanism, questions from the survey presented by 
[48] were used. These questions were originally used to study the usability of fourth-factor 
authentication  (voucher  system).  The  same  technique  is  also  included  in  the  prototype 
application as an emergency authentication factor. 
Finally, to identify the factors affecting the adoption of online banking in Oman, five 
survey  questions  from  [232]  were  used.    These  assessed  ease  of  access,  trust  and 
relationship, security, convenience, and ease of use. These factors have been previously 
tested in Oman by [5] and [4].  The former found that security and data confidentiality 
issues have been major barriers in adopting online banking in Oman.  It also found that the 
banking sectors in Oman were reluctant to use e-commerce applications due to the security 
weaknesses these applications have. The latter study found that usefulness and ease of use 
factors were among the main drivers of online banking adoption in Oman.  It also found 
that trust and ease of access were the major inhibitors. This study sought to confirm both 
results and to determine whether customers in Oman have changed their opinions about 
adopting online banking in the intervening 4 to 6 years. 
The questionnaire was posed in two languages: English and Arabic. This was necessary 
because  all  users  are  non-native  English  users,  and  this  could  make  some  questions 
presented in the questionnaire unclear or misinterpreted if posed only in English, as argued 
by [238]. 
7.1.2  Indirect Observation 
Indirect observation is another important technique commonly used to capture user activity 
and interaction with a prototype system. In this study, it was not feasible to monitor the 
users directly in person or indirectly by recording their interaction with the system on 
surveillance cameras. Most of the participants accessed the application and tested it from 
different geographical places during the same period in Oman. Thus, the only realistic 
observation was to automate the process and log all user actions in the database. This 
logging script ran every time the user loaded a web page. It recorded the user’s identity, the 
page’s filename, the time the user visited the page (i.e., in Unix system-based time which  
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represents the number of seconds from midnight January 1, 1970), query strings, and form 
variables. Query strings and form variables (i.e., also known as GET and POST methods 
respectively) provided important details, along with the page’s filename, to better identify 
the task the user engaged in at a given time (more details in section 7.4.1.2). 
7.2 Experiment Trials 
The experiment underwent various trials and improvements between 2008 and 2010. The 
first pilot study did not reveal any issues. However, after moving to the trial phase, the 
outcome revealed usability issues that were corrected for the second trial of the prototype 
application. The results of the first trial were published in 2010 [239]. 
The following sections will report on all issues encountered in the first trial and the issues 
addressed in the second trial to overcome the emergent usability and ease of access issues. 
7.2.1  First Experiment Trial  
The  application  was  hosted  on  a  local  web-server  connected  to  the  Sultan  Qaboos 
University’s network in Oman. The server was a personal computer with limited resources 
such as low memory and slow speed. A mobile modem was connected to this server to 
send and receive SMS messages from/to the users. SMS gateway software was installed to 
serve as an intermediate gateway between the application database and the mobile modem 
(see Figure 7-1). 
 
Figure 7-1:  First trial, prototype, application structure  
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The first version of the application included many features, such as a real SMS gateway 
and support for the security skin (covered in section 4.1.3.3) allowing the users to upload a 
profile  image.  The  initial  pilot  study  of  the  first  experiment  trial  did  not  reveal  any 
usability issues. After the trial began on the 25
th of August 2008 and web users started 
using  the  application,  the  researcher  started  receiving  negative  feedback  from  some 
participants complaining about various aspects, summarized in the following points: 
•  SMS messages: some users did not receive the SMS messages from the system in good 
time. Such SMS messages should normally arrive in real time from the SMS gateway 
installed on the web server hosting the application. Other users complained that they 
had received more than one message with different one-time pin (OTP) numbers. Still 
others received advertisement messages related to the SMS gateway installed on the 
server instead of the message containing the OTP. 
•  Unclear instructions: many users were lost in some of the tasks and did not know how 
to complete them. This issue was also reported by similar study carried out in the UK 
[91]. The participants did not read or follow the instructions, which were printed in a 
sheet given to each of them, for testing a 2-factor authentication method. They had 
difficulties completing the tasks. 
•  Compatibility:  some  reported  that  some  features  were  not  compatible  with  their 
systems  (e.g.,  the  Java  script  live  countdown  timer  on  the  activate_beneficiary.php 
page did not work). 
After investigating these complaints, the researcher was able to pinpoint different issues 
that needed to be corrected.  
The delay that some users experienced in receiving SMS messages was related to the fact 
that  the  personal  mobile  modem  had  a  limited  capacity  to  send  more  than  one  SMS 
message at a time.  Thus, if many users were connected to the server and were requesting 
the application to send SMS messages all at once, the modem would queue the messages 
and send them one by one until all messages were sent. This practice also sometimes led to 
messages being sent repeatedly. The users tended to request new messages to be sent to 
their mobile phones if the first SMS did not arrive immediately. Hence, a number of SMS 
messages resulted, each with a different OTP. 
Some users received advertisement SMS messages rather than the messages with OTP. 
This was because the SMS gateway installed in the web server was commercial software 
called “Ozeki NG SMS Gateway” and was acquired on a trial basis due to the high cost of  
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the full license version. Hence, the software dropped every 10
th to 20
th SMS message sent 
from the application and replaced it with an advertisement SMS message for Ozeki NG 
Informatics Ltd. 
Some instruction clarity issues also needed to be addressed. In this first trial, users were 
instructed to download a guide, which had all the instructions on how to complete all 
required tasks. The guide was in PDF format. However, most participants ignored this 
guide and started using the application directly to do the tasks. Many of these users had 
problems completing the tasks due to usability issues. 
Most of the respondents experienced difficulties understanding task 7, which was the task 
requesting them to utilize the fourth authentication factor as an alternative channel as if the 
primary  channel  were  temporary  unavailable.  Others  suggested  making  the  application 
friendlier and presenting it in two languages (English and Arabic). 
The following subsections will discuss the outcomes of the first trial analysis and cover 
other difficulties the users encountered and reported. 
7.2.1.1  Sample profile and results 
 
Figure 7-2:  Dropouts of participants in the first trial 
A  total  of  77  people  participated  in  the  study.  However,  only  43  completed  the 
questionnaire. Figure 7-2 shows the major dropouts of participants in tasks 4 and 7. Users 
completed mobile activation to have their bank account activated in Task 4. Participants 
who dropped out at this point confirmed that they thought it was the end of the testing  
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process and they did not realize that they needed to complete further tasks, which they did 
not notice in the task guide. 
Task  7,  on  the  other  hand,  asked  the  users  to  test  the  fourth  authentication  factor  by 
pretending that their primary authentication device was not available. The fact that the 
users were testing this feature for the first time and that most of them had difficulties 
understanding the requirements could be the reasons for so many dropouts at this stage. 
 
Figure 7-3:  First trial sample profile 
Unfortunately, it was difficult to determine the demographic background (education level, 
age group, gender, etc…) of those who dropped out because the questionnaire was posed at 
the  end  of  the  application.  Users  in  the  first  trial  were  not  requested  to  complete  the 
questionnaire before they completed all required tasks, and therefore, valuable details on 
those who dropped out in the middle were missed. Figure 7-3 presents the first trial’s 
statistical information. 
Internet Banking (IB) Experience  Gender 
Age Group 
Age Group (in years) 
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
u
s
e
r
s
  
140 
 
7.2.2  Pilot Test of the Second Experiment Trial 
A  pilot  test  is  a  small  trial  of  the  main  study  and  aims  at  ensuring  that  the  proposed 
research methods are viable [235].  Performing a pilot test is especially important when 
data are collected through self-administered questionnaires where the investigator is not 
available to assist participants when they need help [240]. 
The pilot test was first tested by a research fellow from the University of Glasgow who 
provided valuable comments on the questionnaire and the wording used throughout the 
application. Another research colleague commented on questions in the questionnaire and 
advised on breaking down some general questions into sub-questions to enhance clarity. A 
few other pilot tests were carried out by academics in Sultan Qaboos University and by 
some industry personnel in Oman and revealed some minor cosmetic issues that were 
resolved before the final trial. Finally, some specialists from the banking sector in Oman 
helped in reviewing the Arabic terms used in the questionnaire and suggested some more 
appropriate alternatives commonly used by the banking sector. 
7.2.3  Usability Issues Addressed in the Second Trial 
The  second  trial  commenced  on  the  21
st  of  February  2010.  Major  changes  were 
implemented  in  this  version.  First,  the  “upload  profile  image”  feature  was  no  longer 
available  as  the  results  showed  that  only  2  to  3  participants  uploaded  images  to  their 
profiles in the first trial. Some might well have withdrawn from the application at this stage 
because they could not find images to upload on their machines. 
Secondly, the survey was split into two questionnaires: pre and post questionnaire. The 
split process was based on questionnaire focus. Those items not directly related to the 
application and multi-channel authentication were posed in the pre-questionnaire (e.g., user 
demographic details, factors influencing the adoption of online banking, etc…). The user 
was requested to complete the pre-questionnaire directly after the registration process. This 
ensured that there was a record of those users who dropped out without completing all 
tasks. The post-questionnaire was administered towards the end of the trial after the user 
had completed all required tasks.  
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Figure 7-4:  On screen mobile simulation for SMS reading and sending 
Thirdly, it was decided to incorporate a mobile simulator that appeared on the screen to 
substitute for the user mobile phone (see Figure 7-4). This was another vital improvement 
so the application could be independent of any physical modem or SMS gateway (which 
were limited by capacity and trial-based license in the first trial). Furthermore, this change 
allowed the researcher to host the application on a much more efficient, more reliable, and 
faster web-server hosted in the USA since there was no need for an SMS modem to be 
physically connected to the web-server, as in the first trial (see Figure 7-5). This change 
also allowed the participants who were concerned about divulging their mobile number to 
register fake mobile numbers since no real SMS messages were involved. Participants who 
had privacy concerns on the first trial were now free to use a spurious mobile number to 
test the application. 
 
Figure 7-5:  Second trial prototype application structure  
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Another major change was to improve the “ease of use” and to integrate the instructions 
and task guide into the application. The number of tasks was reduced to 5 and the interface 
was redesigned so each web page gave an indication of the user’s progress at any single 
point (i.e., a progress indicator displayed the user’s progress in percentage and displayed 
the  tasks  that  were  not  yet  completed).  Moreover,  along  with  on-screen  systematic 
instructions, flash tutorials with recorded screen and mouse movements were designed to 
help the user to understand how to complete the required tasks. These instructions were 
available on every web page of the application. In addition to these instructional details, 
every link that the user was required to click as the next step in the process was designed to 
blink so that the user could find his or her way to complete all tasks without any issues. 
Finally, some bugs reported in the first trial were fixed in the second trial and the overall 
design was improved to serve users better without any browser compatibility issues. The 
core templates were modified and restructured so the prototype application could serve 
users in both languages: English and Arabic. The user could switch between languages 
anytime along the way without losing any saved data. The session remained live even after 
the language had been switched. All instructions, tutorials, feedback, and phrases were 
translated  into  Arabic  accordingly.  The  results  of  the  second  trial  are  discussed  in 
subsequent sections of this chapter. 
7.2.4  Application Requirements/Tasks (Second Trial) 
There were five different requirements or tasks set up for users to test this application, 
starting with registration and finishing with money transfer. The users were asked to follow 
a list of tasks that provided information on all the requirements the user had to meet in 
order to test all the features of the prototype application. These tasks are described in the 
following subsections. 
7.2.4.1  Task 1:  Registration 
The registration process was the first requirement. It served as the enrolment process to the 
bank system. However, in real online banking systems, this element would not exist and 
the only way for the user to enrol would be to approach the bank in person and apply for an 
online banking account. This is important because there must be a way to check that the 
people applying for this service are who they claim they are.  
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Figure 7-6: Task 1 - Storyboard 
The prototype registration process had three stages: initial registration and mobile number 
registration, pre-questionnaire, and primary mobile number activation (see Figure 7-6).   
 
Figure 7-7: Registration - stage 1 - WebMD activity diagram 
In  the  first  stage,  the  user  was  asked  to  open  an  account  by  choosing  a  username,  a 
password, and an e-mail address. The application checked username availability. If no 
matches were found, the new username was registered and a new account for the user was 
created in the database (see Figure 7-7).   
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Figure 7-8: Registration page – stage 1 - Implementation 
Figure 7-8 presents the implementation design of the registration process (stage 1). This 
page included an AJAX feature that allowed the user to check the availability of the new 
username without the need to reload the page. It also featured a password strength bar, 
which reflected how strong the chosen password was. This feature utilized a formula that 
calculated the strength of a string based on factors like length, case, and special characters. 
It categorized the passwords into six categories: very weak, weak, better, medium, strong, 
and strongest. 
Once  this  first  stage  was  completed,  a  new  account  was  created  for  the  user  and  the 
application advised him or her to complete a pre-questionnaire.  After the user completed 
the pre-questionnaire, the application initiated the 2
nd stage of registration. At this stage, 
the user was asked to enter his or her name, mobile number, and an alternative mobile 
number. The user’s mobile number would be used to interact with the user directly (i.e., 
passing the OTP to the user and receiving confirmation from him or her when the mobile 
network channel is selected for verifications). The alternative mobile number, on the other 
hand, would be used solely for situations where the primary mobile number is lost or 
unavailable; hence, it exemplifies the use of 4
th factor authentication [48] as an emergency 
authentication mechanism as discussed later in this chapter.  
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Figure 7-9: Registration task - stage 3 - implementation 
The final stage of the registration task activates the primary mobile number. The user was 
redirected to the mobile activation page (see Figure 7-9). The application requested the 
user to open a mobile phone simulator to read the SMS message sent from the bank. This 
mobile simulator was used in the application to avoid any network interruptions while 
users are testing the prototype application. This implementation prevented SMS message 
delivery failure whether the user had submitted valid mobile numbers or not. In addition, 
the  SMS  gateway  software  license  and  the  hardware  needed  to  implement  live  SMS 
messages for all users without restrictions were expensive and exceeded this researcher’s 
allocated budget.  
For these reasons, the users were instructed to click on a mobile icon that appeared on the 
screen. This mobile icon opened an on-screen mobile phone that simulated a mobile phone 
the user could have in real life. Once the user clicked on the icon, a mobile phone appeared 
on the screen with a welcome message informing the user that he or she had received a 
SMS message from XYZ Bank. The user was to click on the “Read” button to read the 
message. The SMS message then appeared from the screen, representing the exact message 
that would be delivered to the user’s mobile phone number if the SMS gateway were 
enabled by the system (see Figure 7-9). The user had to read the message and extract the 
OTP  included  somewhere  within  the  message.  This  OTP  was  then  to  be  used  in  the 
available text-box on the previous screen to activate the mobile number.  
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This process was important to teach the participant how the application and mobile phone 
interacted  with  each  other.  This  3
rd  stage  does  not  exist  in  the  real  online  banking 
applications as the customer’s mobile numbers can be verified at enrolment. 
 
Figure 7-10: Mobile simulator - (a) Welcome message, (b) SMS message 
Along with the OTP that sent to the user, the SMS message also contained a request code 
(as can be seen in Figure 7-10). This request code acted as a unique code to differentiate 
between different OTPs if the user requested more than one SMS message to be sent out. 
In real implementations, and for other authentication purposes where SMS messages were 
used  to  complement  other  authentication  mechanisms,  mobile  networks  sometimes 
encounter issues such as lagging. If this happened, and the user did not receive the SMS 
message within a specific time (60 seconds in the case of the prototype application), the 
system would allow him or her to request another SMS message with a new OTP and 
different request code. If the user received both SMS messages at the same time, only the 
SMS message with the request code that matched the one displayed on the screen would be 
used to validate the request. The same applied to all other SMS correspondences between 
the application and the user.  
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7.2.4.2  Task 2:  Verification channel selection 
After the user’s mobile number had been successfully verified, the application asked the 
user  to  select  the  more  convenient  verification  channel  to  use  (see  Figure  7-11).  This 
verification channel defined how the user would verify the OTP received from the system.  
 
Figure 7-11: Task 2 - Storyboard 
There are two methods available: 
1.  Verifying OTP through the web channel (see Figure 7-12): this approach suggested that 
the user would receive the OTP via a SMS message, and then that he or she would 
verify this OTP back to the system by entering it in a text field on the screen. 
 
Figure 7-12:  Verifying OTP through the web channel 
2.  Verifying  OTP  through  the  mobile  network  channel  (see  Figure  7-13):    the  user 
received the OTP by SMS as suggested by the previous method; however, here the user 
would verify the OTP by sending it back to the system using a mobile network (by 
SMS).   
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Figure 7-13:  Verifying OTP through the mobile network channel 
Once the user selected one of the available verification methods, the application created a 
test bank account and credited an amount of OMR 10,000 to be used in later tasks. 
7.2.4.3  Task 3:  Beneficiary accounts 
The participants in this task were required to create beneficiary accounts to transfer money 
among them. There was no limit on the number of beneficiary accounts each user could 
create.  However,  the  most  important  factor  in  this  task  was  to  introduce  the  MCA 
mechanism implementation for the user to test as suggested by section 6.4.2.   
 
Figure 7-14: Task 3 - Storyboard  
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As illustrated in Figure 7-14, first the user needed to request to add a new beneficiary 
account from the beneficiary accounts page. The application then requested the user to 
enter the beneficiary account details as depicted in Figure 7-15. 
 
Figure 7-15:  Add new beneficiary account form - implementation 
After the user submitted these details, the application created a new beneficiary account, 
which was not yet active, and sent out an SMS message to the user to activate the account. 
The format of the message is shown in the Figure 7-16 below. 
   
Figure 7-16:  SMS message format for activating a beneficiary account 
Three  important  variables  were  included  in  the  SMS  message  body:  the  beneficiary 
account number, the confirmation code, and the OTP. The beneficiary account number 
helped the user to know if he or she were authenticating the beneficiary account that was 
originally created or another beneficiary account that had been created by an attacker. The 
confirmation code, on the other hand, was an identification code for the SMS message, 
which the user could match with the confirmation code displayed on the screen. If they 
matched, then the OTP sent in this message was the OTP to be entered on the screen (or to 
be replied back via SMS message to the bank system if the user selected to verify the OTP 
by SMS in Task 2). This feature served the same function as the request code covered 
earlier in Task 1.  
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Figure 7-17:  Activate beneficiary account - implementation 
For the user to activate the new added beneficiary account, he or she had to open the 
activation window assigned to the beneficiary account (see Figure 7-17). After ensuring 
that the confirmation code from the screen and the SMS message matched, then the user 
could  extract  the  OTP  from  the  message  and  write  it  in  the  text-box  available  in  the 
window. 
Once  the  correct  OTP  was  submitted,  the  beneficiary  account  was  activated  and  the 
participant could then move to Task 4. 
7.2.4.4  Task 4:  Money transfer 
Money transfer services and other financial services that involve moving money away 
from the user account belong to the transactional level of the system. All previous tasks 
dealt with the informational level only. Hence, Task 4 could not be completed without 
completing Task 3 that, in turn, required the MCA mechanism to complete. It is vital that 
transactional level services be restricted from access or manipulation unless they, or any 
services leading to them, are authenticated using the MCA mechanism.  
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Figure 7-18:  Task 4 – Storyboard 
Task 4 was comprised of three steps, starting from the account home page (see Figure 
7-18). To initiate a money transfer request, the user had to access the beneficiary accounts 
page shown in Figure 7-19. Any activated beneficiary account listed on this page had three 
options enabled in front of its record. A description of the role of each of these three 
options follows.  
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Figure 7-19:  Beneficiary accounts page - implementation 
•  Transfer: this option allowed the user to transfer money to the beneficiary account 
associated with this option. It took the user to another page with a transfer form that 
had to be filled (see Figure 7-20).  
 
Figure 7-20:  Money transfer form - implementation 
•  Delete: this option deleted the beneficiary account. Any additional beneficiary account 
required another OTP activation following a deletion.  
•  History:    this  allowed  the  user  to  view  all  transaction  history  for  the  selected 
beneficiary account. 
The maximum transfer allowed was OMR 5,000 per transaction. This limitation ensured 
that the user could test the transfer process at least twice because the application initially 
credited  the  user  account  an  amount  of  OMR  10,000  for  testing  purposes  after  the 
completion of Task 2).  
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Figure 7-21:  Money transfer confirmation page - implementation 
Figure 7-21 shows the confirmation page displayed to the user after he or she had selected 
and submitted the amount and description in the transfer page. It confirmed the transaction 
details for the user to verify. The verification process was completed by submitting the 
account login password. Once the password was submitted and verified, the transaction 
took place. 
7.2.4.5  Task 5:  Emergency authentication mechanism 
In  this  final  task,  the  user  was  advised  to  test  the  4
th  factor  authentication  approach 
suggested by [48] (see Figure 7-22). This works in real applications only in situations 
where the primary channel medium (user mobile number in this study) is not available. An 
alternative mobile number can be used to process the user transactions until the primary 
medium is available again. This can be done by creating a new beneficiary account just the 
way the user did in Task 3. However, this time the user saw the option “Switch to the 
alternative channel” in the beneficiary account, activation window (see Figure 7-23).    
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Figure 7-22: Task 5 - Storyboard 
 
Figure 7-23:  Beneficiary activation window - Task 5 - implementation 
If the user selected this option, another page asking him or her to confirm the switch 
channels request appeared. Once the user confirmed the request, a one-time password was 
sent out via SMS message. However, this time, the SMS message was not delivered to the  
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user’s mobile number; rather, it was sent to the alternative mobile number registered in the 
user’s account. The SMS message sent in this case would look like the one depicted in 
Figure 7-24. 
   
Figure 7-24:  The SMS message format sent to the alternative mobile number 
This message contained only one factor: the one-time password,  a one-time random string 
that  contains  numbers  and  letters.  The  message  asked  the  mobile  holder  to  pass  this 
password to the account owner so he or she could use it to authorize transactions. No 
further details needed to be passed along with this message for security reasons. The holder 
of this mobile number must not know what beneficiary account the account owner would 
like to activate nor would he or she know any other details related to the user account. 
Figure 7-25 shows the window that appeared to the account owner once he or she tried to 
activate a beneficiary account while the account was switched to the alternative channel 
mode. 
   
Figure 7-25:  Beneficiary account activation window - alternative channel mode - implementation 
If the valid password were entered, the beneficiary account would be activated and the user 
account would be switched back to the normal mode again.  
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After  the  user  completed  this  final  task,  the  application  showed  a  link  to  the  post-
questionnaire, which collected user feedback about the MCA mechanism implemented in 
the prototype application. 
7.2.5  Participants 
Participants were contacted by electronic mails, SMS messages and by meeting them face-
to-face.  A total number of 188 people took part in the experiment. 
Due to the tied social relationships between people in Oman, it was important to test the 
effects  of  these  independent  variables  on  the  researcher  friends  and  colleagues  who 
participated in the study.  The sample was divided into two groups: friends and colleagues 
and other participants. These two groups were assessed separately to spot any possible 
social relationship effects on the results in two different areas of the research: 
1.  Demographic profile and dropout rates (section 7.3.2). 
2.  Users’ satisfaction testing of MCA (section 0). 
 
Figure 7-26: Percentage of friends and colleagues compared to other participants in the study 
Initial frequency analysis revealed that the friends and colleagues comprised 31% of the 
total sample size of 188 participants (see Figure 7-26). 
7.3 Demographic Profile of Participants 
A total of 188 participants registered. Figure 7-27 depicts the demographic profile of all 
participants as well as the percentage of those who successfully completed all tasks.   
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Figure 7-27:  Demographic profile of all participants  
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These details are used in sections 7.3.1 and 7.5.2 to examine the relationship between the 
demographic characteristics (as independent variables) and the dependent variables (e.g., 
dropout rates and factors influencing online banking adoption). 
It is also important to mention here that the recorded literacy rate in Oman (in 2007) for 
young males and females reached 99 and 98% respectively [241].  According to the same 
source, although there were almost 96% people with phones, only 10% people in Oman 
had an Internet connection in 2007. However, according to [242], Internet usage in Oman 
has increased radically to almost 41.7% as of June 2010. 
7.3.1  Dropout Rates 
A user who did not complete all tasks required in the study was considered as a “not 
completed  case”,  which  meant  that  the  user  dropped  out  at  some  stage  within  the 
experiment.  A  total  of  95  participants  (50.5%)  dropped  out  or  did  not  complete  all 
requirements (see Figure 7-27). These participants’ details were still valid and used to 
different analysis through this chapter since more than half of these participants completed 
the pre-questionnaire (more details presented in Table 7-16).  
To  examine  the  relationship  between  the  participants’  demographic  characteristics 
(independent variables), with the dropout rates (a dependent variable), a chi-square test for 
independence was used, as suggested by [155]. 
Variable	 ﾠ Value	 ﾠ df	 ﾠ
Asymp.	 ﾠSig.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
(2-ﾭ‐sided)	 ﾠ
Gender	 ﾠ 0.605**  1  .437 
Marital	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠ .023**  1  .880 
Education	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠ 15.342*  3  .002 
Age	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠ 2.131*  3  .546 
Monthly	 ﾠincome	 ﾠ 5.080*  4  .279 
*	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠPearson	 ﾠChi-ﾭ‐Square	 ﾠ
**	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠContinuity	 ﾠCorrection	 ﾠ(computed	 ﾠonly	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠ2x2	 ﾠtable)	 ﾠ
Table 7-2: Chi-square test for independence summary results between demographic profile and 
dropout rates 
The results in Table 7-2 show that only the education level scored significantly below 0.05. 
The relationship between education level and dropout rates is significant (X
2(3) = 15.342, 
p < 0.05). This suggests that the number of users who completed all tasks is affected by the 
level of education. To examine this fact, a close look to the chi-square test results produced  
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by SPSS 19 in Table 7-3 will help to clarify the relationship between education levels and 
the dropout rates. 
Education	 ﾠLevels	 ﾠ
Completed?	 ﾠ
Total	 ﾠ
No	 ﾠ(%)	 ﾠ Yes	 ﾠ(%)	 ﾠ
Technical/Professional	 ﾠTraining	 ﾠ 19 (82.6%)     4 (17.4%)  23 
College	 ﾠgraduation	 ﾠ(4	 ﾠyears)	 ﾠ 43 (49.4%)  44 (50.6%)  87 
Master	 ﾠdegree	 ﾠor	 ﾠequivalent	 ﾠ 17 (43.6%)  22 (56.4%)  39 
Postgraduate	 ﾠdegree	 ﾠ 0 (0%)  5 (100%)  5 
Total	 ﾠ 79 (51.3%)  75 (48.7%)  154* 
* Total participants reported their level of education was 154 (82%) out of 188 (see Figure 7-27) 
Table 7-3:  Cross tabulation between education level and dropout rates 
The information depicted in Table 7-3 shows that users’ failure rate to complete the tasks 
is very high (82.6%) for those who belong to the technical/professional training category. 
This rate decreases to 49.4% for users who have a college degree and to 43.6% for those 
with a Master degree or equivalent. Finally, the failure rate reached zero for those who had 
acquired a postgraduate degree. 
Due to the small number of postgraduate degree participants who completed all tasks (5 
cases only), the test was re-run after eliminating these cases to see if they influenced the 
relationship between education level and dropout rates.  The outcome of the test was still 
significant (X
2(2) = 9.928, p = 0.007, see Appendix D1) 
These figures reflect the fact that many of those who have not yet acquired a college 
degree may have not had the chance to try online banking prior to the pilot. In contrast, 
there is a high probability that those who completed a postgraduate degree have already 
started work with or are familiar with online banking. This can be further investigated by 
checking  the  relationship  between  users  who  have  tried  online  banking  before  (online 
banking experienced users) and the dropout rate.   
Figure 7-28 illustrates the relationship between experienced users and the dropout rates. 
The results show that only 39.5% of total users who had not tried online banking before 
completed all tasks, while 57.6% of users who had used online banking before were able to 
complete all tasks. The SPSS 19 results show that the relationship between online banking 
users  (participants  who  have  experience  with  online  banking)  and  dropout  rates  is 
significant (X
2(1) = 5.293, p < 0.05, see Appendix D2)  
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Figure 7-28: Relationship between online banking (OB) experienced users and dropout rates 
7.3.2  Affects of Social Relationships on Dropout Rates 
A crosstabulation analysis by SPSS 19 was used to check the affects of social relationships 
on dropout rates. Figure 7-29 illustrates the outcome of the analysis and shows that the 
number of participants from both groups, friends and colleagues and others, were almost 
similar.  However, the number of people who dropped out was significantly different in 
both groups.  While only 11 participants from friends and colleagues group dropped out, 
84 participants dropped out from the other group. 
 
Figure 7-29: Relationship between social relationship and dropout rates 
The  chi-square  test  for  independence  indicated  significant  association  between  social 
relationships and dropout rates, X
2(1, n=188) =  33.142, p < .001, see Appendix D1. 
42.4%	 ﾠ
57.6%	 ﾠ
Dropped	 ﾠout	 ﾠ Completed	 ﾠ
OB	 ﾠUser	 ﾠ
None	 ﾠOB	 ﾠUser	 ﾠ 
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7.4 Preliminary Test 
Four preliminary tests were carried out in order to prepare the data for analysis. First, the 
questionnaire’s variables were arranged into pre, post, and common. This was necessary to 
create data sets that could be processed by SPSS 19 for analysis and hypothesis testing. 
Second, the application logs were examined and arranged in data files. New variables, 
based on the existing variables, were introduced, and saved along with other variables on 
file. This process was important to prepare data for the subsequent data screening process. 
After data were prepared in different files, they were checked for missing data. The process 
involved careful examination of each variable to determine how these missing data should 
be  treated  (i.e.,  ignore,  replace,  or  delete).  Finally,  the  data,  especially  the  data  from 
application logs, were checked for extreme scores (outliers). The process involved setting 
up  some  limitations  to  the  formula  to  ensure  that  all  extraneous  extreme  scores  were 
omitted while maintaining the outliers that existed for valid reasons. 
7.4.1  Data Preparation 
Two sets of data were collected from the application database. The first set came from the 
online questionnaires and the other set came from the logs, which recorded the users’ 
interactions with the application. The following subsections discuss how each of these sets 
was analyzed. 
7.4.1.1  Questionnaires 
Both pre and post-questionnaire data were analyzed. Data from these questionnaires were 
extracted and placed in separate files. Nevertheless, data that identified the personality and 
the background of the participant (e.g., gender, age, prior Internet banking experience, 
Internet usage frequency, education level, and monthly income groupings) were treated as 
common variables and were, therefore, included in both data files (see Figure 7-30).  
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Figure 7-30:  Common variables between the pre and post-questionnaire data files 
7.4.1.2  Application logs 
Application logs represented the interaction activities of the users and created a record for 
each link clicked on by the user. The row data in the logs table were recorded in a format 
that could not be used as variables in the analysis and, therefore, some transformation 
listed below was carried out to ensure data readiness for analysis.   
To prepare the logs for analysis, first, a new variable was created to calculate the time each 
user spent on each page of the application (in seconds). The following formula was used to 
calculate these values: 
TSn = VTn+1 – VTn 
where TS is the time spent on each page (in seconds), VT is the page visit time (in Unix 
base time), and n is the record index in the logs table. 
The formula calculated the time spent on any given page (TSn) by subtracting the time the 
user visited this page (VTn) from the time the user visited the next page (VTn+1). There 
were  12,995  records  in  the  log  table  and  calculating  TSn  manually  was  inefficient. 
Therefore, a script (see Appendix A) was designed to automate the calculation process and 
to store the TSn values in a new field in the logs. 
	 ﾠ
Start	 ﾠtask	 ﾠidentifiers	 ﾠ Finish	 ﾠtask	 ﾠidentifiers	 ﾠ Intermediate	 ﾠ
pages	 ﾠ
Page	 ﾠ Query	 ﾠString	 ﾠ Page	 ﾠ Query	 ﾠString	 ﾠ
Task	 ﾠ1	 ﾠ profile.php	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐	 ﾠ channels.php	 ﾠ mode=sent	 ﾠ 2 
Task	 ﾠ2	 ﾠ channels.php	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐	 ﾠ account.php	 ﾠ mode=new	 ﾠ 0 
Task	 ﾠ3	 ﾠ transfer.php	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐	 ﾠ transfer.php	 ﾠ activate=true	 ﾠ 3 
Task	 ﾠ4	 ﾠ transfer_page.php	 ﾠ bn_id=	 ﾠ account.php	 ﾠ acc_no=	 ﾠ 1 
Task	 ﾠ5	 ﾠ transfer.php	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐	 ﾠ transfer.php	 ﾠ activate=true	 ﾠ 6 
Table 7-4:  The 5 tasks identifiers  
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Next, a list of task identifiers was created to calculate the overall time a user spent on each 
task (see Table 7-4).  This process was vital to determine how much time each user spent 
doing each task, which, in turn, could help identify the tasks that were not user friendly or 
that were hard to complete. 
After these identifiers had been established, another script calculated the time each user 
spent on each task (see Appendix A). The following formula was used to calculate the time 
spent (TS) for each task and the total time spent (TSt) for all 5 tasks per user: 
 
where TS is the time spent on each page (in seconds), i is the pages count for a given task, 
and n is the page index. When the outcome of this formula is equal to zero, the user did not 
complete the task. 
7.4.2  Data Screening 
SPSS 19 was used to check data accuracy and validity. This was an important phase before 
analyzing  the  data.  The  results  of  descriptive  statistics  showed  no  errors  in  the  data 
gathered  from  questionnaires.  The  averages  were  normal  for  all  variables  of  both 
questionnaires  (i.e.,  the  pre-questionnaire  and  post-questionnaire).  The  minimums  and 
maximums  were  both  within  the  expected  range  for  each  set  of  questions.  The 
questionnaire data screening analysis is presented in Appendix C. 
The data gathered from database logs’ tables, however, showed some outliers and extreme 
points. The following subsections discuss these issues in more detail along with procedures 
followed to deal with the missing data values from both questionnaires and logs.  
7.4.2.1  Missing data 
Researchers [155, 243, 244] categorized missing data based on their characteristics into 
three categories: missing completely at random (MCAR), missing at random (MAR), and 
missing not at random (MNAR). MCAR happens when “subjects who have missing data 
are a random subset of the complete sample of subjects” [245].  Thus, the probability of an 
observation being missing does not depend on the information that is observed or not 
observed, and the cause of “missingness” is completely random. With data being MAR, the  
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“missingness” may depend on the information that is observed but it is independent of 
information that is not observed. MNAR, on the other hand, occurs when “missingness” 
depends on both observed and unobserved information. MCAR and MAR can be ignored 
while the MNAR cannot [155, 243, 244] because MNAR usually reflects a systematic 
pattern  and  data  are  not  missing  randomly.  Tabachnick  and  Fidell  argued  that  if  the 
“missingness” rate is lower than 5%, then the missing data could be ignored without any 
further analysis [243]. Therefore, the SPSS 19 statistical software package was used to 
identify the percentage and pattern of the missing data for the pre-questionnaire and post-
questionnaire (Appendix C).  
Variables	 ﾠ
N	 ﾠ=	 ﾠ188	 ﾠ
Valid	 ﾠ Missing	 ﾠ %	 ﾠ
How	 ﾠoften	 ﾠdo	 ﾠyou	 ﾠmake	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠInternet	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠservice?	 ﾠ 119  69  36.7 
With	 ﾠhow	 ﾠmany	 ﾠbanks	 ﾠdo	 ﾠyou	 ﾠdo	 ﾠyour	 ﾠInternet	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠservices?	 ﾠ 114  74  39.4 
Which	 ﾠis	 ﾠyour	 ﾠhighest	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠeducation?	 ﾠ 154  34  18.1 
What	 ﾠis	 ﾠyour	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠoccupation?	 ﾠ 178  10  5.3 
To	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠmonthly	 ﾠincome	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠyou	 ﾠbelong	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠOMR)?	 ﾠ 172  16  8.5 
Table 7-5: Pre-questionnaire variables that incurred a “missingness” rate higher than 5% 
The results showed that the “missingness” rate in the post-questionnaire was lower than 
5% for all variables. By contrast, pre-questionnaire data revealed 5 variables that incurred 
a “missingness” rate higher than 5% (see Table 7-5).  However, after a closer look at these 
variables, only two variables were truly missing. 
The first 2 variables in Table 7-5 were related to question 3 in Section A of the pre-
questionnaire (see Appendix B), which asked the users if they made use of an Internet 
banking facility. All participants who selected “No” for that question were asked to ignore 
the following two questions (i.e., represented by the first two variables in Table 7-5) and 
proceed to section B. The 69 participants who did not answer these questions were those 
users who participated in the study without having online banking experience. These users’ 
data will be discussed in the next section. 
The  missing  rate  in  the  second  question  is  higher,  which  means  there  were  5  more 
participants (i.e., 74 who did not answer the 2
nd question and 69 who did not answer the 1
st 
question  in  Table  7-5)  who  used  online  banking  but  preferred  not  to  answer  the  2
nd 
question. However, 5 participants out of 188 incurred only a 2.7% “missingness” rate, 
which therefore, can be treated as MCAR and ignored.  
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The education level, on the other hand, was a question to be answered by all participants (a 
total of 188) and the “missingness” rate was 18.1% (i.e., higher than 5%, and therefore, not 
able to be ignored). Thus this variable is further analysed in section 7.4.2.2. 
After a close look to the data file created in SPSS 19, it was found that 4 participants have 
ignored many consecutive questions presented in section C of the pre-questionnaire and 
also dropped out at that point. When these 4 cases were ignored for the last two variables 
in Table 7-5, the missingness rate for the variable “current occupation” dropped below 5% 
and therefore can be ignored. However, the “monthly income” variable still incurred 6.5% 
missingness rate even after these 4 cases were dropped.  Therefore, further analysis is 
required for this variable and is presented in section 7.4.2.3. 
7.4.2.2  Missing data – Education Level 
In order to examine whether this happened randomly, the SPSS 19 option “Missing Value 
Analysis (MVA)” with “Crosstabulations of categorical and indicator variables” was used 
as suggested in [246].  This method helps identify the differences in missing values among 
categories.  
Table 7-6 shows how the education level values were affected by other common variables 
(e.g., gender, marital status, current occupation, organization business area, and monthly 
income). For example, the number of missing values in the gender variable appeared to 
vary between male and female. 87.1% of male respondents reported their educational level 
while only 74.2% of female respondents did. 
A more drastic difference can be noticed in marital status. Those who were single were 
much less likely to report their level of education compared than those who were married. 
Only 73.0% of the single respondents reported their education level, while the percentage 
of those who were married and reported levels of education was 90.7%. 
Likewise, the age group variable had the same effect as seen in marital status. 24.0% of 
respondents who were 18 to 27 years old did not report their education level, while fewer 
from the age groups of 28 – 37 and 38 – 47 did not report their level of education (10.1% 
and 6.3% respectively). The age group of 48 to 57 years did not contain enough available 
data to be included. 
Looking at the table for organization or business area, the missing values among categories 
do not appear to vary much. Whether someone’s organization was a banking and financial  
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service, a communication and utilities organization, an educational facility, or a service 
industry, it did not seem to affect whether data were missing for the level of education 
variable. While the low count categories were ignored, most missing values were in the 
range from 12.3% to 16.7%.  The difference was minimal and likely due to chance. 
Variables	 ﾠ Missing	 ﾠ Education	 ﾠLevel	 ﾠ(N=188)	 ﾠ
Gender	 ﾠ 2	 ﾠ Count	 ﾠ %	 ﾠ Missing	 ﾠ %	 ﾠMissing	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Female	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 46  74.2  16  25.8 
	 ﾠ Male	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 108  87.1  16  12.9 
Marital	 ﾠStatus	 ﾠ 6	 ﾠ Count	 ﾠ %	 ﾠ Missing	 ﾠ	 ﾠ %	 ﾠMissing	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Single	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 54  73.0  20  27.0 
	 ﾠ Married	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 98  90.7  10  9.3 
Age	 ﾠGroup	 ﾠ 6	 ﾠ Count	 ﾠ %	 ﾠ Missing	 ﾠ %	 ﾠMissing	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 18	 ﾠto	 ﾠ27	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 57  76.0  18  24.0 
	 ﾠ 28	 ﾠto	 ﾠ37	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 80  89.9  9  10.1 
	 ﾠ 38	 ﾠto	 ﾠ47	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 15  93.8  1  6.3 
	 ﾠ 48	 ﾠto	 ﾠ57	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 1  50.0  1  50.0 
Current	 ﾠOccupation	 ﾠ 10	 ﾠ Count	 ﾠ %	 ﾠ Missing	 ﾠ %	 ﾠMissing	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Student	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 30  65.2  16  34.8 
	 ﾠ Self-ﾭ‐employed	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 5  83.3  1  16.7 
	 ﾠ Clerical	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 51  87.9  7  12.1 
	 ﾠ Professional	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 15  100.0  0  0.0 
	 ﾠ Service	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 3  75.0  1  25.0 
	 ﾠ Management	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 34  94.4  2  5.6 
	 ﾠ Sales	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 2  100.0  0  0.0 
	 ﾠ Other	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 8  72.7  3  27.3 
Organization	 ﾠBusiness	 ﾠArea	 ﾠ 24	 ﾠ Count	 ﾠ %	 ﾠ Missing	 ﾠ %	 ﾠMissing	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Banking	 ﾠand	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠservices	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 25  89.3  3  10.7 
	 ﾠ Transport	 ﾠand	 ﾠdistribution	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 1  100.0  0  0.0 
	 ﾠ Communication	 ﾠand	 ﾠutilities	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 13  86.7  2  13.3 
	 ﾠ Trade	 ﾠand	 ﾠcommerce	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 11  100.0  0  0.0 
	 ﾠ Education	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 50  87.7  7  12.3 
	 ﾠ Service	 ﾠindustry	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 15  83.3  3  16.7 
	 ﾠ Farming	 ﾠand	 ﾠagriculture	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 1  100.0  0  0.0 
	 ﾠ Self-ﾭ‐employed	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 0  0.0  0  0.0 
	 ﾠ Other	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 24  72.7  9  27.3 
Monthly	 ﾠIncome	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠOMR)	 ﾠ 16	 ﾠ Count	 ﾠ %	 ﾠ Missing	 ﾠ %	 ﾠMissing	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Less	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ500	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 21  63.6  12  36.4 
	 ﾠ 500	 ﾠto	 ﾠ1,000	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 71  84.5  13  15.5 
	 ﾠ 1,001	 ﾠto	 ﾠ1,500	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 30  96.8  1  3.2 
	 ﾠ 1,501	 ﾠto	 ﾠ2,000	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 12  92.3  1  7.7 
	 ﾠ More	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ2,001	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 11  100.0  0  0.0 
Table 7-6:  Crosstabulations of education level verses other common variables 
Finally, monthly income seems to be the highest influencing variable on reporting the level 
of education.  If a respondent had an income less than OMR 500, then a response for  
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education level was more likely to be missing. At least 92.3% of the respondents whose 
income  was  more  than  OMR  1,501  reported  level  of  education.    Moreover,  96.8%  of 
respondents who fell into the monthly income group of OMR 1,001 – 1,500 reported their 
education level.  On the other hand, this rate decreased dramatically with lower monthly 
incomes.  Only 84.5% of respondents from the monthly income group of OMR 500 – 
1,000 reported their education level while the highest “missingness” rate of education level 
recorded among all categories was 36.4%, which fell in the monthly income group of 
OMR 500 or less. 
7.4.2.3  Missing data – Monthly Income Group 
Missing Value Analysis (MVA) of SPSS 19 was used again to check the affects of the 
common variables on the monthly income group values.  In this analysis, however, only 
184 out of 188 participants records were used.  The four records dropped represented the 
participants who failed to answer several consecutive questions from section C in the pre-
questionnaire. 
Table 7-7 presents the outcome of the MVA between monthly income groups and other 
common variables (e.g. gender, marital status, age group, and level of education). The 
results found matched the outcome from the MVA between education level the common 
variables.  For example, male participants were more likely to report their monthly income 
than their female counterparts.  That is, 96.0% of male respondents reported their monthly 
income while only 88.3% of female respondents did. Likewise, almost 98% of married 
respondents have reported their monthly income while only 86.5 of single respondents did. 
Age group showed the most significant differences where younger participants were much 
less likely to report their monthly income than their older counterparts.  For instance, 
13.3% of respondents who belong to the age group 18 to 27 years did not report their 
monthly  income  group.  This  percentage  has  declined  drastically  to  2.2%  for  the 
participants who belong to the age group 28 to 37 years. Furthermore, all participants who 
are 38 years or more reported their monthly income group. 
Looking at the table for current occupation, only students groups recorded missing values 
of 19.6% in the monthly income group variable.  All other participants have reported the 
group of monthly income they belong to.  
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Finally, the missing values for both organization business area and education level did not 
show a specific pattern that can be reported and therefore the missingness incurred can be 
treated as MCAR. 
Variables	 ﾠ Missing	 ﾠ Monthly	 ﾠIncome	 ﾠGroup	 ﾠ(N=184*)	 ﾠ
Gender	 ﾠ 0	 ﾠ Count	 ﾠ %	 ﾠ Missing	 ﾠ %	 ﾠMissing	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Female	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 53  88.3  7  11.7 
	 ﾠ Male	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 119  96.0  5  4.0 
Marital	 ﾠStatus	 ﾠ 2	 ﾠ Count	 ﾠ %	 ﾠ Missing	 ﾠ	 ﾠ %	 ﾠMissing	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Single	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 64  86.5  10  13.5 
	 ﾠ Married	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 106  98.1  2  1.9 
Age	 ﾠGroup	 ﾠ 2	 ﾠ Count	 ﾠ %	 ﾠ Missing	 ﾠ %	 ﾠMissing	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 18	 ﾠto	 ﾠ27	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 65  86.7  10  13.3 
	 ﾠ 28	 ﾠto	 ﾠ37	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 87  97.8  2  2.2 
	 ﾠ 38	 ﾠto	 ﾠ47	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 16  100.0  0  0.0 
	 ﾠ 48	 ﾠto	 ﾠ57	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 2  100.0  0  0.0 
Current	 ﾠOccupation	 ﾠ 6	 ﾠ Count	 ﾠ %	 ﾠ Missing	 ﾠ %	 ﾠMissing	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Student	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 37  80.4  9  19.6 
	 ﾠ Self-ﾭ‐employed	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 6  100.0  0  0.0 
	 ﾠ Clerical	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 58  100.0  0  0.0 
	 ﾠ Professional	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 15  100.0  0  0.0 
	 ﾠ Service	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 4  100.0  0  0.0 
	 ﾠ Management	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 36  100.0  0  0.0 
	 ﾠ Sales	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 2  100.0  0  0.0 
	 ﾠ Other	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 11  100.0  0  0.0 
Organization	 ﾠBusiness	 ﾠArea	 ﾠ 20	 ﾠ Count	 ﾠ %	 ﾠ Missing	 ﾠ %	 ﾠMissing	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Banking	 ﾠand	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠservices	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 25  89.3  3  10.7 
	 ﾠ Transport	 ﾠand	 ﾠdistribution	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 1  100.0  0  0.0 
	 ﾠ Communication	 ﾠand	 ﾠutilities	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 13  86.7  2  13.3 
	 ﾠ Trade	 ﾠand	 ﾠcommerce	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 11  100.0  0  0.0 
	 ﾠ Education	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 50  87.7  7  12.3 
	 ﾠ Service	 ﾠindustry	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 15  83.3  3  16.7 
	 ﾠ Farming	 ﾠand	 ﾠagriculture	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 1  100.0  0  0.0 
	 ﾠ Self-ﾭ‐employed	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 0  0.0  0  0.0 
	 ﾠ Other	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 24  72.7  9  27.3 
Level	 ﾠof	 ﾠEducation	 ﾠ 30	 ﾠ Count	 ﾠ %	 ﾠ Missing	 ﾠ %	 ﾠMissing	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Technical/professional	 ﾠtraining	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 23  100.0  0  0.0 
	 ﾠ College	 ﾠgraduate	 ﾠ(4	 ﾠyears)	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 79  90.8  8  9.2 
	 ﾠ Master	 ﾠdegree	 ﾠor	 ﾠequivalent	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 38  97.4  1  2.6 
	 ﾠ Postgraduate	 ﾠdegree	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 5  100.0  0  0.0 
* Four cases (participants) were dropped from the total number because they did not complete the whole 
section of the pre-questionnaire that has these variables 
Table 7-7:  Crosstabulations of monthly income group verses other common variables 
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7.4.2.4  Outliers 
According to [247], an outlier is an observation that is numerically distant from the rest of 
the observations.  It is also simply referred to as “the values within the data that are well 
above or well below the majority of other cases” [155].  Outliers can be identified using 
different techniques.  Assessing normality of a distribution is one way to identify outliers.  
Gravetter [248] defined normal distribution as a symmetrical, bell-shaped curve, which has 
the  greatest  frequency  of  scores  in  the  middle,  with  smaller  frequencies  towards  the 
extremes. 
The data that could be checked for normality in this study were the data retrieved from the 
log table since they comprised the only data set that contained continuous variables (e.g., 
the time the user spent on each task in seconds).  The rest of the data collected from the 
questionnaires could not be tested for normality, as all variables involved were discrete 
rather than continuous. 
In order to test the normality and to check for outliers, the option “Explore” in SPSS 19 
was used. The results revealed some extreme points and abnormal figures (see Table 7-8). 
Tasks	 ﾠ Time	 ﾠSpent	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠseconds),	 ﾠn=87	 ﾠ
Task	 ﾠ1:	 ﾠRegistration	 ﾠ&	 ﾠmobile	 ﾠauth.	 ﾠ M	 ﾠ 5%	 ﾠTrim.	 ﾠM	 ﾠ Median	 ﾠ Min.	 ﾠ Max.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ a.	 ﾠCreate	 ﾠa	 ﾠprofile	 ﾠ 7978.74  1594.9  80.00  18  221401 
	 ﾠ b.	 ﾠAuthenticate	 ﾠmobile	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠ 3453.75  138.72  96.00  18  284876 
Task	 ﾠ2:	 ﾠAuth.	 ﾠchannel	 ﾠ M	 ﾠ TM*	 ﾠ Median	 ﾠ Min.	 ﾠ Max.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ a.	 ﾠSelect	 ﾠan	 ﾠauth.	 ﾠchannel	 ﾠ 66.25  55.60  41.00  8  380 
Task	 ﾠ3:	 ﾠBeneficiary	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠ M	 ﾠ TM*	 ﾠ Median	 ﾠ Min.	 ﾠ Max.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ a.	 ﾠOpen	 ﾠaccounts	 ﾠpage	 ﾠ 3980.15  72.42  40.00  6  333428 
	 ﾠ b.	 ﾠCreate	 ﾠan	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 71.66  57.16  44.00  14  766 
	 ﾠ c.	 ﾠActivate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠ 266.02  162.50  103.00  21  5775 
Task	 ﾠ4:	 ﾠMoney	 ﾠtransfer	 ﾠ M	 ﾠ TM*	 ﾠ Median	 ﾠ Min.	 ﾠ Max.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ a.	 ﾠFill	 ﾠtransfer	 ﾠdetails	 ﾠ 6940.79  38.48  29.00  7  577486 
	 ﾠ b.	 ﾠConfirm	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtransfer	 ﾠ 5923.29  24.48  20.00  8  512243 
Task	 ﾠ5:	 ﾠAlternative	 ﾠchannel	 ﾠ M	 ﾠ TM*	 ﾠ Median	 ﾠ Min.	 ﾠ Max.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ a.	 ﾠOpen	 ﾠaccounts	 ﾠpage	 ﾠ 37886.68  108.15  63.00  5  3280413 
	 ﾠ b.	 ﾠCreate	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 67.78  60.63  53.00  0  399 
	 ﾠ c.	 ﾠOpen	 ﾠactivation	 ﾠpage	 ﾠ 966.97  27.21  16.00  3  80939 
	 ﾠ d.	 ﾠSwitch	 ﾠto	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠchannel	 ﾠ 12.44  11.13  7.00  2  74 
	 ﾠ e.	 ﾠActivate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠ 5691.41  82.77  62.00  19  318568 
Table 7-8:  Descriptive statistics for the raw data from logs 
Table 7-8 shows how the data are distributed randomly without forming a specific pattern. 
This is usually caused by high numbers of extreme scores in the data and this can be noted  
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well in the table. For example, the maximum time one user spent doing the sub-task 5-a 
was 3,280,413 seconds (about one month and a week’s time). This is clearly not a realistic 
figure. The reason behind such an extreme score could have been that the user left the 
application in the middle of Task 5 and returned after almost 5 weeks to complete the 
work. This outlier negatively affected the means of all task scores. 
Similarly, the 5% trimmed mean (TM) on the table, in most of the tasks, shows significant 
differences, compared to the normal means (M). This is because the 5% trimmed mean 
ignores 5% of the data from each side. The significant change in the TM means that those 
dropped data were extreme and had a major influence on the normal data means. 
Although the extreme outliers that influenced the normal means (M) in this study could be 
removed to correct the analysis, other outliers were valid and existed for a reason. A user 
might  have  been  working  on  a  specific  task  and  suddenly  got  lost  and  was  unable  to 
continue fulfilling the requirements of that task. The user would then try to redo the task. A 
third and fourth try, which required extra time, might have been needed to go back to the 
task guide to read the instructions more carefully before the user was finally able to finish 
the task. The application, in this case, would count the time from the first try until the user 
successfully completed the requirements of that task. 
Another user might have a very slow Internet connection. It would take more time to load 
pages, which would contribute towards the total time spent in each task. If the time the user 
needed to load each page exceeded a few seconds (e.g., more than 4 to 6 seconds per 
page), this could cumulatively have added up to more than a minute to complete one task, 
such as task 5 (i.e., with about 6 pages that needed to load several times in some cases). 
Accordingly, to correct the data for further analysis, a number of seconds equal to 120 (2 
minutes) was accepted as a maximum time needed to fulfil the requirements of each page. 
Thus,  if  the  application  recorded  a  time  of  less  than  120  seconds,  then  this  data  was 
considered valid; otherwise, it was rejected and replaced with 0. Naturally, a user would 
not spend more than 2 minutes on a web page unless it was intensively asking for input 
with complex client-side validations. In this study, the most time-consuming page among 
the 5 tasks was the “profile.php” page at Task 1-a, which required the user to input the full 
name, primary mobile number, and alternative mobile number. Under normal conditions, 
this could be done in less than 15 to 20 seconds. The researcher believed that 120 seconds 
was sufficient for fulfilling the requirements of any page, taking into consideration unusual 
factors  that  might  increase  the  average  time  needed  for  each  page  such  as  Internet  
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connection slowness, slow user typing, time taken to read information from the task guide, 
and validation errors. 
After removal of the extreme scores, the “Explore” test of SPSS 19 was rerun accordingly. 
The results revealed better normality with minor outliers that were not considered extreme. 
The TM and M were close to each other in almost all tasks (see Table 7-9). 
Tasks	 ﾠ Time	 ﾠSpent	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠseconds),	 ﾠn=87	 ﾠ
Task	 ﾠ1:	 ﾠRegistration	 ﾠ&	 ﾠmobile	 ﾠauth.	 ﾠ M	 ﾠ TM*	 ﾠ Median	 ﾠ Min.	 ﾠ Max.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ a.	 ﾠCreate	 ﾠa	 ﾠprofile	 ﾠ 67.40  63.73  58.00  0  215 
	 ﾠ b.	 ﾠAuthenticate	 ﾠmobile	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠ 83.43  82.07  74.00  1  197 
Task	 ﾠ2:	 ﾠAuthentication	 ﾠchannel	 ﾠ M	 ﾠ TM*	 ﾠ Median	 ﾠ Min.	 ﾠ Max.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ a.	 ﾠSelect	 ﾠan	 ﾠauthentication	 ﾠchannel	 ﾠ 44.85  42.61  36.00  0  147 
Task	 ﾠ3:	 ﾠBeneficiary	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠ M	 ﾠ TM*	 ﾠ Median	 ﾠ Min.	 ﾠ Max.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ a.	 ﾠOpen	 ﾠaccounts	 ﾠpage	 ﾠ 43.31  39.95  37.00  6  217 
	 ﾠ b.	 ﾠCreate	 ﾠan	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 40.36  38.27  39.00  1  139 
	 ﾠ c.	 ﾠActivate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠ 87.89  83.69  69.00  21  248 
Task	 ﾠ4:	 ﾠMoney	 ﾠtransfer	 ﾠ M	 ﾠ TM*	 ﾠ Median	 ﾠ Min.	 ﾠ Max.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ a.	 ﾠFill	 ﾠtransfer	 ﾠdetails	 ﾠ 36.16  33.35  26.00  0  139 
	 ﾠ b.	 ﾠConfirm	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtransfer	 ﾠ 23.95  20.80  19.00  8  124 
Task	 ﾠ5:	 ﾠAlternative	 ﾠchannel	 ﾠ M	 ﾠ TM*	 ﾠ Median	 ﾠ Min.	 ﾠ Max.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ a.	 ﾠOpen	 ﾠaccounts	 ﾠpage	 ﾠ 67.57  61.50  46.00  4  249 
	 ﾠ b.	 ﾠCreate	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 61.80  57.37  52.00  0  230 
	 ﾠ c.	 ﾠOpen	 ﾠactivation	 ﾠpage	 ﾠ 24.85  20.60  14.00  0  202 
	 ﾠ d.	 ﾠSwitch	 ﾠto	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠchannel	 ﾠ 12.44  11.13  7.00  2  74 
	 ﾠ e.	 ﾠActivate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠ 74.17  69.55  59.50  19  238 
* 5% Trimmed Mean 
Table 7-9:  Descriptive statistics of a clean version of logs data 
The 0s that replaced the extreme scores recorded per web-page has caused the results in 
Table 7-9 to show 0 as the minimum completion-time for several sub-tasks. These 0s do 
not represent actual completion-time for these sub-tasks, but rather represent that there 
were extreme outliers that were rejected and replaced with 0s. 
The only one 0 minimum completion-time represented in Table 7-8 (sub-task 5-b) might 
be due to one participant or more who started the task but did not complete it and closed 
the web-page. Such behaviour caused a missing task end-time and therefore is represented 
by 0. 
Some of the tasks, in Table 7-9, comprised more than one web page that the user needed to 
visit  in  order  to  complete  the  whole  task.  For  example,  to  complete  task  1-b  (i.e., 
authenticate mobile number), the user had to open the authentication page followed by  
172 
 
another window, which simulated a mobile phone that the user used to “read” or “send” 
SMS messages. Once the user read the message and copied the One Time Pin (OTP), that 
window could be closed and the user returned to the authentication page to submit the 
OTP. This, accordingly, increased the total time the user needed to complete a sub-task 
(i.e., given that each web page was allowed a maximum of 120 seconds of time, which 
made the total equal to the number of web pages multiplied by 120). Therefore, another 
condition was applied to eliminate extreme outliers that might not have been cleared in the 
first cleaning cycle. This condition was implemented by defining “missing values” in SPSS 
19 for all variables that represented the sub-tasks. These definitions dropped any sub-task 
score that was more than 250 (i.e., the total time the user spent on each sub-task should not 
have been more than 250 seconds). Since all sub-tasks involved, at most, two web pages, 
no more than 240 seconds should have been spent for each sub-task per user (maximum 
value should not exceed 240). However, due to some unexpected behaviours noted from 
the  logs,  some  users  tended  to  open  more  than  one  version  of  the  web  page,  which 
duplicated the entries in the log files, and therefore, doubled the calculated time spent for 
each sub-task. The 250-second limit per sub-task dropped all scores that were affected by 
such behaviour and, at the same time, ensured that people who suffered from slow Internet 
connections were still allowed a further 10 seconds on top of the given 240s for both 
pages. 
7.4.3  Summary 
The preliminary test carried out in this section was important to screen and prepare data for 
the analysis. Two sets of data were prepared: those that came from the questionnaires and 
the ones came from the application logs table. The former dataset was first divided into 
three categories: pre, post, and common.  A data screening process using SPSS 19 was 
used  to  check  these  data  for  validity;  making  sure  they  were  transferred  into  SPSS 
correctly for further analysis. 
The application logs were then prepared and arranged into different variables to make the 
analysis  feasible.  SPSS  19  was  used  again  to  screen  the  data  and  eliminate  possible 
extreme figures.  Different formulae were used in section 7.4.1.2 to ensure data validity for 
usability analysis covered in section 7.6.1.  
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7.5 Factors Influencing Adoption of Online Banking 
7.5.1  Demographic Variables Hypotheses 
To investigate whether or not the demographic characteristics influenced the adoption of 
online banking in Oman, these characteristics were hypothesized as follows: 
H1a: Gender significantly influences customers’ usage of online banking 
H1b: Marital status significantly influences customers’ usage of online banking 
H1c: Education level significantly influences customers’ usage of online banking 
H1d: Age significantly influences customers’ usage of online banking 
H1e: Income significantly influences customers’ usage of online banking 
7.5.2  Hypotheses Testing – Demographic Variables 
To  investigate  the  effects  of  demographic  characteristics  on  the  adoption  of  online 
banking, the demographic variables (gender, marital status, education level, age group, and 
monthly income group) were compared between the online banking users and non-users. 
SPSS 19 was used to test the hypotheses drawn in section 7.5.1 for demographic variables 
(H1n, n=a to e).  Table 7-10 shows a brief summary of the chi-square test results.  
Variable	 ﾠ Value	 ﾠ df	 ﾠ
Asymp.	 ﾠSig.	 ﾠ
(2-ﾭ‐sided)	 ﾠ
Hypothesis	 ﾠtest	 ﾠresult	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
(p-ﾭ‐value=0.05)	 ﾠ
H1a:	 ﾠGender	 ﾠ 8.015**  1  .005  Support H1a 
H1b:	 ﾠMarital	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠ 7.574**  1  .006  Support H1b 
H1c:	 ﾠEducation	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠ 21.511*  3  .000  Support H1c 
H1d:	 ﾠAge	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠ 12.125*  3  .007  Support H1d 
H1e:	 ﾠMonthly	 ﾠincome	 ﾠ 23.399*  4  .000  Support H1e 
*	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠPearson	 ﾠChi-ﾭ‐Square	 ﾠ
**	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠContinuity	 ﾠCorrection	 ﾠ(computed	 ﾠonly	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠ2x2	 ﾠtable)	 ﾠ
Table 7-10: Chi-square test for independence summary results between demographic profile and 
attitude towards adopting online banking 
 
Further  analysis  was  conducted  using  cross  tabulations  to  provide  greater  insight  than 
single statistics of chi-square. Cross tabulations allow the display of joint distribution of 
two or more variables, and thus, to describe the distribution of two or more variables,  
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simultaneously [232].  The results from cross tabulation analysis are presented and briefly 
discussed in the following subsections. 
7.5.2.1  Gender 
In  literature,  there  are  many  different  arguments  on  gender  and  its  direct  impact  on 
technology  adoption.  For  example,  [249]  found  men  to  be  more  concerned  with 
achievement than women. Another study [250] stated that men may be more task-oriented 
(i.e., the accomplishment of a task that requires the use of technology [251]) than women. 
Other factors such as characteristics of system design, training, and documentation may 
also affect technology usage [151], which may manifest in differences among men and 
women’s experiences [252].  
Concerning this study, it can be noted from Figure 7-31 that 37% of female respondents 
used  online  banking  services.  This  figure  increased  to  63%  when  considering  male 
respondents.  This  confirms  that  males  are  more  likely  to  adopt  online  banking  than 
females. As chi-square test results suggested in Table 7-10, gender significantly impacted 
the adoption of online banking (X
2(1) = 8.015, p < 0.01) and these results confirmed the 
outcomes  drawn by [253] and [254].   
 
Figure 7-31: Relationship between gender and percentage of online banking (OB) experience 
In Oman, the significant relationship between gender and online banking could also be 
attributed to the dominating Arabic and Islamic cultures. These cultures specify different 
roles for male and female in the society. For example, despite the public equality of rights 
and duties, males are primarily responsible for family’s external and financial affairs, while 
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females are expected to take care of home and children. It is also socially unacceptable in 
Oman for females to attend Internet cafés. Hence, it is more appropriate for females in 
Oman to use the Internet only from home or work [255]. 
These results confirm the argument made by [256, 257] that gender is affected by social 
and cultural factors in the context of technology adoption. 
7.5.2.2  Marital Status 
Figure 7-32 shows that the adoption of online banking is significantly affected by the 
marital status of users (X
2(1) = 7.574, p < 0.01, see Table 7-10). While only 41% of single 
respondents used online banking, 63% of married respondents adopted online banking. 
This may have been a consequence of the fact that people in Oman get married in their 20s 
(i.e., based on 2003 figures: mean age at marriage in Oman is 24.8 for men and 28.1 for 
women [258]).   
 
Figure 7-32: Relationship between marital status and percentage of online banking (OB) 
It  is  common  in  Oman  that  people  do  not  open  bank  accounts  until  they  start  paid 
employment. This leaves an average of 3 to 4 years for high-school diploma graduates or 1 
to 2 years for college degree (4 years) graduates to have worked, and maybe utilized online 
banking services, before getting married. 
7.5.2.3  Education level 
Education level results depicted in Figure 7-33 show that the higher the education level 
achieved the greater the probability of the user adopting online banking. While only 36% 
59%	 ﾠ
41%	 ﾠ
37%	 ﾠ
63%	 ﾠ
0%	 ﾠ
10%	 ﾠ
20%	 ﾠ
30%	 ﾠ
40%	 ﾠ
50%	 ﾠ
60%	 ﾠ
70%	 ﾠ
Not	 ﾠOB	 ﾠUser	 ﾠ OB	 ﾠUser	 ﾠ
Single	 ﾠ
Married	 ﾠ 
176 
 
of  technical/professional  training  graduates  adopted  online  banking,  50%  of  college 
graduates had used online banking before. This percentage increased to 100% for those 
who had acquired a postgraduate degree.  Thus a highly significant relationship existed 
between education level and adoption of online banking (X
2(3) = 21.511, p < 0.001, see 
Table 7-10).  
The crosstab analysis was re-run to test the relationship significance without including the 
Postgraduate degree group since there is only a small number of participants recorded in 
this group (5 cases).  The results again revealed a highly significant relationship between 
education level and adoption of online banking (X
2(2) = 18.406, p < 0.001, see Appendix 
D2). 
 
Figure 7-33: Relationship between education level and percentage of online banking (OB) users 
These  results  were  not  surprising  as  online  banking  adoption  usually  increases  with 
education level [259]. High-educated users are more likely to utilize online banking than 
their low-educated counterparts. They are usually more Internet literate [254] and involved 
with  online  services  than  uneducated  people.  This  is  especially  true  in  Oman  since 
computer literacy was first introduced to the primary education system in the academic 
year 1998/1999 [255].  This means that the first cohort of these students were in their final 
year  of  the  higher  education  certificates  by  the  time  this  experiment  was  conducted 
(therefore excluded).  
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7.5.2.4  Age group 
Age  group,  like  other  demographic  characteristics,  showed  significant  impacts  on  the 
adoption of online banking (X
2(3) = 12.125, p < 0.01, see Table 7-10). The column chart 
results in Figure 7-34 justify this outcome.  
 
Figure 7-34: Relationship between age group and online banking (OB) users 
Although the percentage of respondents who adopted online banking was the same (50%) 
for both age groups 38 to 47 and 48 to 57, the small number of respondents in both these 
groups (see Table 7-11) did not impact the overall relationship between age group and 
online banking experience.  The percentage of online banking users increased from 39% 
for the age group between 18 to 27 years to 66% for the age group between 28 to 37 years, 
the  same  figure  decreased  to  50%  for  both  age  groups  between  38  and  47  years  and 
between 48 and 57 years (inclusive).  
Age	 ﾠGroup	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠyears)	 ﾠ
Online	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠuser?	 ﾠ
Total	 ﾠ
No	 ﾠ Yes	 ﾠ
18	 ﾠto	 ﾠ27	 ﾠ 44  28  72 
28	 ﾠto	 ﾠ37	 ﾠ 30  59  89 
38	 ﾠto	 ﾠ47	 ﾠ 8  8  16 
48	 ﾠto	 ﾠ57	 ﾠ 1  1  2 
Total	 ﾠ 83  96  179 
Table 7-11: Cross tabulation between age group and users with online banking (OB) experience 
To test the effects of the small number of respondents who belong to the age groups 38 to 
47 and 48 to 57, the test was re-run excluding these two groups.  The results revealed an 
even higher significant relationship (X
2(1) = 10.956, p = 0.001, see Appendix D2).  
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The results revealed that younger people in Oman are less likely to adopt online banking 
than their older counterparts. This does not confirm the findings reported in [147] where 
there was no significant link between age and users’ decision to adopt online banking in 
Saudi Arabia.  
7.5.2.5  Monthly Income Group 
Monthly  income  group  was  another  demographic  characteristic  that  showed  a  highly 
significant impact on online banking adoption (X
2(4) = 23.399, p < 0.001, see Table 7-10). 
Individuals with higher monthly income were more likely to adopt online banking. 
 
Figure 7-35:  Relationship  between  monthly  income  group  (in  OMR)  and  percentage  of  online 
banking (OB) users 
The stacked column chart in Figure 7-35 illustrates the positive relationship between the 
two variables. Only 39% of participants whose income was less than OMR 500 adopted 
online  banking.  This  figure  increased  dramatically  to  the  highest  figure  of  90%  for 
participants  who  incurred  a  monthly  income  rate  of  more  than  OMR  1,000.  The  rate 
decreased to 54% for those receiving a monthly income between OMR 1,501 and 2,000 
and increased again to 82% for the last group of those who have income of more than 
OMR 2,000.  
The relatively small number of participants who belong to the last two monthly income 
groups might be the reason behind maintaining a highly significant relationship between 
monthly income group variable and online banking adoption.  The first three groups that 
reflected a steady increase of adoption pattern were seen to be the ones that affected the 
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relationship because of the number of participants involved in these groups (see Table 
7-12). 
Monthly	 ﾠIncome	 ﾠGroup	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠOMR)	 ﾠ
Online	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠuser?	 ﾠ
Total	 ﾠ
No	 ﾠ Yes	 ﾠ
Less	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ500	 ﾠ 19  12  31 
500	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ1,000	 ﾠ 43  41  84 
1,001	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ1,500	 ﾠ 3  28  31 
1,501	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ2,000	 ﾠ 6  7  13 
More	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ2,000	 ﾠ 2  9  11 
Total	 ﾠ 73  97  170 
Table 7-12: Cross tabulation between monthly income group and users with online banking (OB) 
experience 
These  results  can  be  attributed  to  different  reasons.  Low-income  people  might  have 
difficulties affording the cost of home computers and Internet services.  In Oman, banks 
also charge monthly fees on accounts with balance less than OMR 100. Thus, low-income 
people might only maintain one account and not see any benefits managing it online. 
There is a correlation between age and adoption, and also between income and adoption. 
Since income tends to rise the longer we work it could well be that these two factors are 
related in some way, but we do not have the data to confirm this.  
7.5.3  External TAM Variables Hypotheses 
The TAM variables used in this research are based on questions proposed in similar studies 
carried out by Padachi [153] and Sohail [154]. These questions were analysed and grouped 
into different related questions as mentioned in section 3.5.2. It was, therefore, important in 
this research to carry out a factor analysis to identify the interrelationship between these 
questions and to identify the most suitable related groupings possible. In this sense, and 
based on factor analysis reporting guidelines suggested by Pallant [155], the 14 items in 
Table 7-13 were subjected to principal components analysis (PCA) using SPSS 19. Prior to 
performing PCA, the suitability of data for factor analysis was assessed. Inspection of the 
correlation matrix revealed the presence of many coefficients of .3 and above. The Kaiser-
Meyer-Oklin  value  was  .9,  which  exceeds  the  recommended  value  of  .6  [260],  and 
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity [261] reached statistical significance (p=.000), supporting the 
factorability of the correlation matrix (more details in Table 7-13). 
The principal components analysis shown in Table 7-13 revealed the presence of four 
components, explaining 50.9%, 9.5%, 6.3%, and 5.4% of the variance, respectively. These  
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results  were  initially  rotated,  using  varimax  rotation,  to  isolate  more  meaningful 
dimensions. The percentage of variance was reflected by a clear break after the second 
component in the screeplot (available along with Component Matrix table in Appendix D). 
All variables reported loadings scores more than 0.5. 
Factors	 ﾠ
Rotated	 ﾠfactor	 ﾠ
loading	 ﾠ
Percentage	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
variance	 ﾠ
Ease	 ﾠof	 ﾠuse	 ﾠ   50.9% 
	 ﾠ a.	 ﾠConvenient	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠbank	 ﾠtransactions	 ﾠ	 ﾠ .899   
	 ﾠ b.	 ﾠTime	 ﾠsaving	 ﾠ .851   
	 ﾠ c.	 ﾠEase	 ﾠof	 ﾠperforming	 ﾠe-ﾭ‐transaction	 ﾠ .789   
	 ﾠ d.	 ﾠUser	 ﾠfriendly	 ﾠweb	 ﾠsite	 ﾠ .694   
	 ﾠ e.	 ﾠRange	 ﾠof	 ﾠelectronic	 ﾠservices	 ﾠoffered	 ﾠ .665   
Trust	 ﾠand	 ﾠrelationship	 ﾠ   9.5% 
	 ﾠ a.	 ﾠBank	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠrate	 ﾠto	 ﾠqueries	 ﾠ .821   
	 ﾠ b.	 ﾠEthical	 ﾠand	 ﾠprofessional	 ﾠconduct	 ﾠ .780   
	 ﾠ c.	 ﾠBank’s	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠto	 ﾠcompensate	 ﾠfor	 ﾠlosses	 ﾠ .775   
	 ﾠ d.	 ﾠReliability	 ﾠof	 ﾠyour	 ﾠbanker	 ﾠ .584   
Ease	 ﾠof	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠ   6.3% 
	 ﾠ a.	 ﾠConnection	 ﾠspeed	 ﾠ .892   
	 ﾠ b.	 ﾠConvenience	 ﾠto	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠthe	 ﾠservice	 ﾠ .716   
Security	 ﾠ   5.4% 
	 ﾠ a.	 ﾠLength	 ﾠof	 ﾠInternet	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠ .849   
	 ﾠ b.	 ﾠSecurity	 ﾠof	 ﾠInternet	 ﾠtransaction	 ﾠ .677   
	 ﾠ c.	 ﾠClear	 ﾠand	 ﾠunderstandable	 ﾠinstructions	 ﾠ .519   
KMO	 ﾠand	 ﾠBartiett’s	 ﾠTest	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Kaiser-ﾭ‐Meyer-ﾭ‐Olkin	 ﾠMeasure	 ﾠof	 ﾠSampling	 ﾠAdequacy	 ﾠ .900	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Bartlett’s	 ﾠTest	 ﾠof	 ﾠSphericity	 ﾠ 	 ﾠSig.	 ﾠ .000	 ﾠ
Table 7-13: Summary of the ‘Factor Analysis’ for factors influencing adoption of online banking 
The most significant factor was ease of use. The other influencing factors were trust and 
relationship, ease of access, and security (consistent with research reported in [153, 154] 
where trust and relationship and security were treated as external variables).  The only 
differences  between  these  results  and  the  previous  two  studies  were  that  the  analysis 
carried out in this research found a significant relationship between convenience and ease 
of  use  variables  and  that  these,  therefore,  were  combined  in  one  component,  named 
‘perceived ease of use’.  
Based on the preceding factor analysis, the three factors selected as external variables were 
trust  and  relationship,  ease  of  access,  and  security.  The  TAM  internal  variables 
relationships such as PEU ￠ PU, PEU/PU ￠ Attitudes, Attitudes/PU ￠ Intention, were 
not addressed as they are out of the scope of this research.  However, the results of other 
similar studies were reported instead.   
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Based on the literature review of studies on the same area (see sections 3.5.2.1, 3.5.2.1 and 
3.5.2.3), it becomes necessary to formulate the research hypotheses for external variables 
as follow: 
H1f: Trust and relationship has a positive effect on Perceived Ease of Use (PEU) 
H1g:  Ease of access has a positive effect on Perceived Ease of Use (PEU) 
H1h: Security has a positive effect on Perceived Ease of Use (PEU) 
The measurement model for this study based on TAM can therefore be represented by 
Figure 7-36 below: 
 
Figure 7-36: The measurement model of the study based on TAM 
7.5.4  Hypotheses Testing – TAM External Variables 
There are three non-demographic hypotheses (drawn in section 7.5.3):  
H1f: Trust and relationship has a positive effect on Perceived Ease of Use (PEU) 
H1g:  Ease of access has a positive effect on Perceived Ease of Use (PEU) 
H1h: Security has a positive effect on Perceived Ease of Use (PEU) 
According to Pallant [155], correlation analysis can be used to describe the strength and 
direction of the relationship between two variables (e.g. Security ￠ PEU).   
Based on the summary results of factor analysis in Table 7-13, four components were 
found to represent all 14 questions presented in section B of the pre-questionnaire: ease of  
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use, trust and relationship, ease of access, and security. Therefore, the mean scores for each 
of these components have to be calculated separately for each participant so it can be used 
in the correlation anaylsis. 
To achieve this, SPSS 19 was used to compute the mean scores of all cases and put the 
results in a new four variables, which represents the four components identified by the 
factor analysis.  These new variables data were then used to test the hypotheses using 
correlation technique in the following sections. 
7.5.4.1  Correlation analysis 
This  section  discusses  the  results  relative  to  the  correlation  analysis  of  the  hypothesis 
formed for the external variables of the proposed TAM. The relation of these variables 
with the PEU can be assessed by examining the correlation, which illustrates how strong is 
the relationships between the dependent and independent variables, and the (R
2) value, 
which shows the amount of variance explained by independent variables. SPSS 19 was 
used to test the correlation between the forgoing external variables of TAM and results of 
correlation are shown in Table 7-14. 
	 ﾠ PEU	 ﾠ T&R	 ﾠ EoA	 ﾠ Security	 ﾠ
Perceived	 ﾠease	 ﾠof	 ﾠuse	 ﾠ Pearson	 ﾠCorrelation	 ﾠ 1       
	 ﾠ Sig.	 ﾠ(2-ﾭ‐tailed)	 ﾠ        
Trust	 ﾠand	 ﾠrelationship	 ﾠ Pearson	 ﾠCorrelation	 ﾠ .638**  1     
	 ﾠ Sig.	 ﾠ(2-ﾭ‐tailed)	 ﾠ .000       
Ease	 ﾠof	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠ Pearson	 ﾠCorrelation	 ﾠ .690**  .508**  1   
	 ﾠ Sig.	 ﾠ(2-ﾭ‐tailed)	 ﾠ .000  .000     
Security	 ﾠ Pearson	 ﾠCorrelation	 ﾠ .676**  .649**  .510**  1 
	 ﾠ Sig.	 ﾠ(2-ﾭ‐tailed)	 ﾠ .000  .000  .000   
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), n=184 
Table 7-14:  Correlation analysis results 
All three variables showed significant statistical support. Trust and relationship, ease of 
access, and security were correlated significantly (i.e. correlation > .6) with the PEU. All 
relationships  between  these  variables  and  PEU  were  investigated  using  the  Pearson 
product-moment correlation coefficient. There was a strong, positive correlation between 
trust and relationship and PEU, r = .638, n = 148, p < .001 (R
2 = 0.407, Table 7-15), with 
high  levels  of  trust  and  relationship  associated  with  high  levels  of  PEU.  The  highest 
correlated variable with the PEU was ease of access which r = .690, n = 148, p < .001 (R
2 
= 0.476, Table 7-15).  
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Hypothesis	 ﾠ Relationship	 ﾠ R
2	 ﾠ Correlation	 ﾠ p-ﾭ‐Value	 ﾠ Supported?	 ﾠ
H1f	 ﾠ T&R	 ﾠ￠	 ﾠPEU	 ﾠ 0.407  0.638  0.000  Yes 
H1g	 ﾠ EoA	 ﾠ￠	 ﾠPEU	 ﾠ 0.476  0.690  0.000  Yes 
H1h	 ﾠ Sec	 ﾠ￠	 ﾠPEU	 ﾠ 0.457  0.676  0.000  Yes 
Table 7-15: Assessment of the TAM external variables 
The second highest correlated variable with the PEU was security r = .676, n = 148, p < 
.001 (R
2 = 0.457, Table 7-15). Thus, high levels of perceived security are associated with 
high levels of PEU. 
The hypotheses were tested against the results in Table 7-15. All hypotheses proposed for 
the TAM external variables were supported. 
7.5.5  Research Model 
Based on the earlier results that cover theoretical background and analyses of different 
determinants of customer attitudes toward online banking acceptance, an extended TAM 
model for online banking acceptance in Oman was derived. Figure 7-37 illustrates this 
research model and the extended variables. 
 
Figure 7-37:  Extended TAM for online banking in Oman (Note: the results shown for internal 
TAM constructs were extracted from [147]) 
To  summarize,  all  extended  variables  tested  in  the  TAM  model  scored  significant 
relationship with PEU (see Figure 7-37). These results confirm with a similar recent study 
conducted in Saudi Arabia by Al-Somali [147].  
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7.6 MCA – Usability and Acceptability 
It is vital to mention that this study is concerned with the usability and acceptability of the 
multi-channel authentication (MCA) mechanism and is not concerned with the usability 
and acceptability of the prototype web-application. Therefore, the variables covered may 
well not be the same as the variables found in the literature for testing websites’ overall 
usability  and  acceptability.  Also  it  is  important  to  mention  that  in  some  cases,  where 
appropriate, only data from existing online banking users was used since participants who 
did not use conventional online banking could not meaningfully compare the two systems 
and were, therefore, unable to tell whether MCA was a better alternative or not. 
The following subsections address the measurement of both usability and acceptability of 
the multi-channel authentication mechanism. 
7.6.1  Measuring Usability of MCA 
Usability  in  this  research  is  measured  using  the  three  ISO  metrics  suggested  by  The 
International  Organization  for  Standardization  (ISO):  effectiveness,  efficiency  and 
satisfaction  [101]  (defined  in  section  3.2).  Effectiveness  and  efficiency  of  MCA  were 
measured, in this study, using dependent variables such as completion-time and dropout 
rates that were collected from the application logs. Satisfaction, on the other hand, was 
measured based on respondents’ feedback on a set of 5-option Likert scales in the online-
questionnaire. Hence, the following hypotheses were tested: 
H2a: Multi-channel authentication mechanism is effective 
H2b: Multi-channel authentication mechanism is efficient 
H2c: Multi-channel authentication mechanism is satisfactory 
The following subsections report on the tests of these three hypotheses individually, based 
on the three ISO usability metrics. 
7.6.1.1  Effectiveness 
Effectiveness, in the context of MCA usability evaluation, meant that the participants were 
able to complete all tasks effectively without dropping out at any point. The application 
logs  maintained  detailed  information  about  all  participants  who  registered  in  the  
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experiment. This information was useful to determine the completion rates for each of the 
5 requested tasks.  
 
Figure 7-38: Completion task rate for all participants 
Figure 7-38 illustrates the completion task rate for the 188 participants who tested the 
application. It can be noted that the major dropout happened in task 1 (registration and 
mobile authentication). This task consisted of two sub-tasks: creating a profile (T1a) and 
authenticating  the  registered  mobile  number  (T1b).  Based  on  the  statistical  frequency 
analysis  of  the  application  logs  using  SPSS  19,  which  is  depicted  in  Table  7-16,  43 
participants dropped out while creating their profile (i.e., entering their name and mobile 
number  directly  after  they  finished  filling  in  the  pre-questionnaire)  and  another  6 
participants  dropped  out  before  they  successfully  authenticated  their  registered  mobile 
number. The cumulative number of participants who dropped out before completing task 1 
was 49 and this figure was the highest recorded drop out and accounted for 22.9% of the 
total participants of this study. These participants had not, at that point, tested the multi-
channel authentication (MCA) mechanism, which entered the process after the user created 
and authenticated a beneficiary account using a mobile (task 3). Therefore, completion and 
dropout rates were ignored for the first two tasks. The independent variables that might 
have  caused  high  dropout  rates  in  these  tasks  were  analyzed  and  discussed  earlier  in 
section 7.3.1. 
Based on Table 7-16 figures, although the cumulative dropout rate was 37.8% for the first 
two tasks, the subsequent MCA related tasks (tasks 3, 4, and 5) recorded only a 12.7% 
dropout (T5e cumulative dropout rate – T2a cumulative dropout rate). Furthermore, there  
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was 2.7% to 3.1% dropout rate for sub-tasks T3b, T4a, and T5b. These tasks were basic 
functions that did not directly involve MCA to accomplish. 
Tasks	 ﾠ
Completed	 ﾠ
N	 ﾠ=	 ﾠ188	 ﾠ Dropped	 ﾠout	 ﾠ
Task	 ﾠ1:	 ﾠRegistration	 ﾠ&	 ﾠmobile	 ﾠauthentication  N	 ﾠ %	 ﾠ N	 ﾠ %	 ﾠ C.	 ﾠ≈%*	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ T1a.	 ﾠCreate	 ﾠa	 ﾠprofile	 ﾠ 145	 ﾠ 77.1	 ﾠ 43	 ﾠ 22.9	 ﾠ 22.9	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ T1b.	 ﾠAuthenticate	 ﾠmobile	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠ 139	 ﾠ 73.9	 ﾠ 6	 ﾠ 3.2	 ﾠ 26.1	 ﾠ
Task	 ﾠ2:	 ﾠAuthentication	 ﾠchannel	 ﾠ N	 ﾠ %	 ﾠ N	 ﾠ %	 ﾠ C.	 ﾠ≈%*	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ T2a.	 ﾠSelect	 ﾠan	 ﾠauthentication	 ﾠchannel	 ﾠ 117	 ﾠ 62.2	 ﾠ 22	 ﾠ 11.7	 ﾠ 37.8	 ﾠ
Task	 ﾠ3:	 ﾠBeneficiary	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠcreation	 ﾠ N	 ﾠ %	 ﾠ N	 ﾠ %	 ﾠ C.	 ﾠ≈%*	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ T3a.	 ﾠOpen	 ﾠaccounts	 ﾠpage	 ﾠ 115	 ﾠ 61.2	 ﾠ 2	 ﾠ 1.1	 ﾠ 38.8	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ T3b.	 ﾠCreate	 ﾠan	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 109	 ﾠ 58.0	 ﾠ 6	 ﾠ 3.2	 ﾠ 42.0	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ T3c.	 ﾠActivate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠ 108	 ﾠ 57.4	 ﾠ 1	 ﾠ 0.5	 ﾠ 42.6	 ﾠ
Task	 ﾠ4:	 ﾠMoney	 ﾠtransfer	 ﾠ N	 ﾠ %	 ﾠ N	 ﾠ %	 ﾠ C.	 ﾠ≈%*	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ T4a.	 ﾠFill	 ﾠtransfer	 ﾠdetails	 ﾠ 102	 ﾠ 54.3	 ﾠ 6	 ﾠ 3.2	 ﾠ 45.7	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ T4b.	 ﾠConfirm	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtransfer	 ﾠ 102	 ﾠ 54.3	 ﾠ 0	 ﾠ 0.0	 ﾠ 45.7	 ﾠ
Task	 ﾠ5:	 ﾠAlternative	 ﾠchannel  N	 ﾠ %	 ﾠ N	 ﾠ %	 ﾠ C.	 ﾠ≈%*	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ T5a.	 ﾠOpen	 ﾠaccounts	 ﾠpage	 ﾠ 100	 ﾠ 53.2	 ﾠ 2	 ﾠ 1.1	 ﾠ 46.8	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ T5b.	 ﾠCreate	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 95	 ﾠ 50.5	 ﾠ 5	 ﾠ 2.7	 ﾠ 49.5	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ T5c.	 ﾠOpen	 ﾠactivation	 ﾠpage	 ﾠ 93	 ﾠ 49.5	 ﾠ 2	 ﾠ 1.1	 ﾠ 50.5	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ T5d.	 ﾠSwitch	 ﾠto	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠchannel	 ﾠ 93	 ﾠ 49.5	 ﾠ 0	 ﾠ 0.0	 ﾠ 50.5	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ T5e.	 ﾠActivate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠ 93	 ﾠ 49.5	 ﾠ 0	 ﾠ 0.0	 ﾠ 50.5	 ﾠ
*	 ﾠRounded	 ﾠcumulative	 ﾠdropout	 ﾠpercentage	 ﾠ
Table 7-16: Sub-tasks completion and dropout rates 
T3b  and  T5b  were  identical  and  requested  users  to  create  a  beneficiary  account  by 
submitting a name and an account number using a basic form with text boxes and drop-
down menus. T4a, likewise, requested users to submit the amount of money they would 
like to transfer using a form with only two text boxes and a submit button. Therefore, it is 
unlikely that these users encountered usability issues or even made an effort  to try to 
accomplish these simple tasks. The dropout rate of these sub-tasks (total of 8.9% dropout 
rate) could have been caused by other unknown external factors. This decreases the total 
dropout rates that were more likely to be caused by the MCA mechanism to 3.8% (12.7% - 
8.9%). According to [262], a technology is effective as long as only less than 5% of its 
users will have technical issues. These technical issues could lead them to request support 
or to abandon the system, or hence, to dropout in the context of this study’s experiment.   
Since the analysis revealed that only 3.8% (less than 5%) of total participants dropped out 
before completing all tasks because of usability issues related to the MCA mechanism, the 
effectiveness hypothesis of MCA, therefore, was supported. 
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7.6.1.2  Efficiency 
Efficiency is another usability metric defined by ISO. It can be evaluated by measuring the 
completion time of each task and sub-task separately. A system is considered efficient if 
users  are  able  to  accomplish  tasks  such  as  registration  within  a  reasonable  time.  The 
response and loading time variables were neglected here since this study was testing the 
usability of the MCA mechanism rather than the web application design itself, as stated 
earlier in this section.   
This study was comprised of 5 tasks, each of which had one to five sub-tasks. A sub-task, 
most of the time, is represented by one web document where users are instructed to enter 
details in a form provided within that page or extract useful information (e.g., OTP, SMS 
message, or password) that the user might need in other subsequent tasks. Nevertheless, 
there are few sub-tasks that request users to access more than one page at a time to fulfil 
the requirements. For example, T1b (Task 1, sub-task b) was part of the registration and 
mobile authentication task. The main requirement of this sub-task was to authenticate the 
mobile number the user had to submit at T1a (creating a profile). The user was instructed 
by the application to open a web page that showed a mobile phone icon. Next, the user was 
advised to click on the mobile phone icon to read the SMS message, which contained the 
OTP, in a new web page that simulated a mobile phone. Finally, the user would have to 
navigate through the simulator and copy the OTP, after which the simulator would be 
closed and the OTP would be entered in the text field that would automatically appear in 
the previous web page (the page that originally has the mobile phone icon). 
To investigate the completion time for each sub-task, statistical frequency analysis in SPSS 
19 was used to extract the mean and median of the time-spent variable. The results are 
depicted in Table 7-17.   
The  mean  scores  provided  in  Table  7-17  clearly  show  that  most  of  the  sub-tasks 
completion times were below one minute. The highest completion times recorded were for 
the three tasks T1b, T3c and T5e which incurred mean scores of 83.4, 87.9 and 74.2 seconds 
respectively.  This could be a result of the fact that the users are requested to open the 
mobile simulator in all these three tasks to read the SMS message, extract the OTP and 
then entering it into the screen for final submission. The change in mean score between the 
similar sub-tasks cannot be attributed to learning effects because both 2
nd and 3
rd tasks 
were similar, as mentioned, to the first task T1b (task 1, sub-task b: authenticating mobile 
number). The only difference between T1b and the other tasks was that the first task’s OTP  
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was used to authenticate the mobile number, while the OTP of T3c and T5e was used to 
activate a beneficiary account. Therefore, if learning effect were the reason behind the 
decrease in the completion time mean score between T3c and T5e, then it would make more 
sense that T1b would incur a longer completion time mean than both T3c and T5e, while it 
incurred only 83.4 seconds as shown in Table 7-17. 
Tasks	 ﾠ
Completion	 ﾠtime	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠseconds)	 ﾠ
Mean	 ﾠ Median	 ﾠ
Task	 ﾠ1:	 ﾠRegistration	 ﾠ&	 ﾠmobile	 ﾠauthentication	 ﾠ Total  168.32	 ﾠ 132	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ T1a.	 ﾠCreate	 ﾠa	 ﾠprofile	 ﾠ 67.4  58 
	 ﾠ T1b.	 ﾠAuthenticate	 ﾠmobile	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠ 83.43  74 
Task	 ﾠ2:	 ﾠAuthentication	 ﾠchannel	 ﾠ	 ﾠ Total	 ﾠ 44.85  36 
	 ﾠ T2a.	 ﾠSelect	 ﾠan	 ﾠauthentication	 ﾠchannel	 ﾠ 44.85  36 
Task	 ﾠ3:	 ﾠBeneficiary	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠcreation	 ﾠ	 ﾠ Total	 ﾠ 209.36  175 
	 ﾠ T3a.	 ﾠOpen	 ﾠaccounts	 ﾠpage	 ﾠ 43.31  37 
	 ﾠ T3b.	 ﾠCreate	 ﾠan	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 40.36  39 
	 ﾠ T3c.	 ﾠActivate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠ 87.89  69 
Task	 ﾠ4:	 ﾠMoney	 ﾠtransfer	 ﾠ	 ﾠ Total	 ﾠ 66.11  49 
	 ﾠ T4a.	 ﾠFill	 ﾠtransfer	 ﾠdetails	 ﾠ 36.16  26 
	 ﾠ T4b.	 ﾠConfirm	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtransfer	 ﾠ 23.95  19 
Task	 ﾠ5:	 ﾠAlternative	 ﾠchannel	 ﾠ	 ﾠ Total  160.21  122 
	 ﾠ T5a.	 ﾠOpen	 ﾠaccounts	 ﾠpage	 ﾠ 67.57  46 
	 ﾠ T5b.	 ﾠCreate	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 61.8  52 
	 ﾠ T5c.	 ﾠOpen	 ﾠactivation	 ﾠpage	 ﾠ 24.85  14 
	 ﾠ T5d.	 ﾠSwitch	 ﾠto	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠchannel	 ﾠ 12.44  7 
	 ﾠ T5e.	 ﾠActivate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠ 74.17  59.5 
Table 7-17:  Completion time of experiment tasks 
Although  completion-time  in  online-based  experiments  is  not  as  reliable  as  other 
measurements used to test other hypotheses due to unforeseen environmental and personal 
factors (e.g., answering a phone call, discussing prompt issue with a colleague, sudden 
power shut-down, having a cup of coffee, etc…) which can intervene and affect the time 
spent on each task, it can still be made more reliable with the support of qualitative scales. 
For example, a supportive qualitative measurement of MCA efficiency was the mean score 
recorded for one of the post-questionnaire statements that asked the user to state how much 
he or she agrees or disagrees with the following statement (using 5-option Likert scale, 1 
strong disagree to 5 strong agree):  
I feel that MCA has just made things complicated and time-consuming 
Based on the analysis results illustrated in Table 7-19, the mean score for this statement 
was 2.4 (Median = 2, Mode = 1). This mean score was the lowest score recorded among  
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other statements and it clearly shows that most of the users did not find MCA a time-
consuming technology overall. However, the implementation of an on-screen simulated 
mobile phone could have affected these results where delivery delay of SMS messages and 
mobile network signal have been neglected. 
For  all  the  reasons  covered  in  this  section,  the  efficiency  hypothesis  of  MCA  was 
supported. 
7.6.1.3  Effects of experience, gender and age on usability (efficiency) 
The  effects  of  participants’  grouping  existed  in  the  independent  variables  such  as 
experience (experienced users and inexperienced users), gender (male and female) and age 
(18-27,  28-37,  38-47,  48-57  and  more  than  57  years)  was  investigated  to  test  for 
differences between these groups on overall tasks completion time. 
Mann-Whitney U Test was used to test all variables where independent-sample t-test was 
used to confirm these results. The data in each variable had enough participants to ignore 
the normality distribution assumption of t-test except for gender which had lower than 30 
female users (was ignored therefore). 
The Mann-Whitney U Test results in Table 7-18 revealed no significant difference in the 
overall tasks completion time of all groups of variables tested (experience, gender and age 
group). All probability values (p) were higher than the significance level (.05).  The results 
of the variables experience and age group were also confirmed by the outcome of the 
independent-sample t-test. 
Variables	 ﾠ Groups	 ﾠ N	 ﾠ
p	 ﾠ
U	 ﾠTest	 ﾠ t-ﾭ‐test	 ﾠ
Experience	 ﾠ Online	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠusers	 ﾠ 52 
.552  .503 
Non-ﾭ‐online	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠusers	 ﾠ 33 
Gender	 ﾠ Female	 ﾠ 28 
.813  - 
Male	 ﾠ 59 
Age	 ﾠGroup	 ﾠ
(years)	 ﾠ
18	 ﾠto	 ﾠ27	 ﾠ 34 
.707  .681 
28	 ﾠto	 ﾠ37	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 42 
Table  7-18:    Results  of  Mann-Whitney  U  Test  and  independent-sample  t-test  for  differences 
between experience, gender and age group on overall tasks completion time. 
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7.6.1.4  Satisfaction 
Satisfaction is the most subjective part of usability [263] and it  is necessary to ensure that 
users will continue to use the technology.  In the context of this study, satisfaction was 
tested based on a set of Likert scales. These questions aligned with [98]’s model of the 
attributes of system acceptability (usability part of the model) as well as with the system 
usability scale (SUS), a usability scale by [233] that can be used for global assessments of 
systems usability. 
To evaluate users’ satisfaction based on the questions asked in the questionnaire, it is first 
necessary to describe the mean scores for each of these questions.  
Variables,	 ﾠscale:	 ﾠ[Strong	 ﾠDisagree	 ﾠ(1)	 ﾠto	 ﾠStrong	 ﾠAgree	 ﾠ(5)]	 ﾠ Mean	 ﾠ Median	 ﾠ Mode	 ﾠ
If	 ﾠmulti-ﾭ‐channel	 ﾠauthentication	 ﾠ(MCA)	 ﾠservice	 ﾠis	 ﾠimplemented	 ﾠby	 ﾠyour	 ﾠ
bank,	 ﾠI	 ﾠwould	 ﾠrecommend	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠothers	 ﾠ
4.3  5  5 
I	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMCA	 ﾠto	 ﾠwork	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠit	 ﾠdid	 ﾠ 4.2  4  4 
I	 ﾠtrust	 ﾠthat	 ﾠMCA	 ﾠwould	 ﾠprotect	 ﾠme	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠInternet	 ﾠfraud	 ﾠand	 ﾠattacks	 ﾠ 4.0  4  5 
I	 ﾠfeel	 ﾠthat	 ﾠMCA	 ﾠhas	 ﾠjust	 ﾠmade	 ﾠthings	 ﾠcomplicated	 ﾠand	 ﾠtime-ﾭ‐consuming	 ﾠ 2.4  2  1 
With	 ﾠMCA,	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠnot	 ﾠworried	 ﾠabout	 ﾠusing	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠcomputers	 ﾠfor	 ﾠInternet	 ﾠ
banking	 ﾠservices	 ﾠ
3.6  4  3 
I	 ﾠwould	 ﾠimagine	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmost	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠwould	 ﾠlearn	 ﾠto	 ﾠuse	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠvery	 ﾠ
quickly	 ﾠ
3.8  4  4 
I	 ﾠfound	 ﾠthe	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠchannel	 ﾠfeature	 ﾠconvenient	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠcase)	 ﾠmy	 ﾠ
primary	 ﾠchannel	 ﾠ(for	 ﾠexample	 ﾠyour	 ﾠmobile	 ﾠphone)	 ﾠis	 ﾠunavailable	 ﾠ
4.3  5  5 
I	 ﾠwould	 ﾠprefer	 ﾠto	 ﾠuse	 ﾠthe	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠchannel	 ﾠoption	 ﾠthan	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
call-ﾭ‐center/help-ﾭ‐desk	 ﾠcall	 ﾠ
4.1  4  5 
Table 7-19:  Descriptive statistics of usability questions 
Table 7-19 provides a descriptive analysis of the user usability questions. It can be noted 
that the lowest mean score was for the only negative-type question about MCA, ‘I feel that 
MCA has just made things complicated and time-consuming’ with an average mean score 
of 2.4 (median = 2, mode = 1). This indicates that participants found MCA to be effective 
and efficient to use; supporting the results drawn in sections 7.6.1.1 and 7.6.1.2. 
In  terms  of  security,  although  most  of  participants  were  neutral  when  answered  the 
question ‘With MCA, I am not worried about using public computers for Internet banking 
services’ (mode = 3), they gave very positive responses to the question ‘I trust that MCA 
would protect me from Internet fraud and attacks’ with mean score of 4.0 (median = 4, 
mode = 5). 
It is also clear that the top two variables that scored the highest mean of 4.3 were ‘If multi-
channel authentication (MCA) service is implemented by your bank, I would recommend it  
191 
 
to  others’  and  ‘I  found  the  alternative  channel  feature  convenient  when  (in  case)  my 
primary channel in unavailable’. These figures indicate that online users found both the 
multi-channel  authentication  mechanism  and  the  emergency  alternative  authentication 
channel feature usable and were satisfied. Moreover, the fact that users were prepared to 
market  the  idea  and  recommend  it  to  their  friends  was  an  indication  of  their  overall 
satisfaction  and  willingness  to  accept  and  adopt  the  MCA  technology.  Therefore,  the 
satisfaction hypothesis of MCA was supported. 
7.6.1.5  Effects of social relationships on usability (satisfaction) 
To further validate this outcome, the affects of social relationships on satisfaction were 
also analyzed using the Mann-Whitney U Test. 
Factors	 ﾠ
F&C?*	 ﾠ Md**	 ﾠ
Z	 ﾠ p	 ﾠ	 ﾠ r***	 ﾠ
Yes	 ﾠ No	 ﾠ F&C	 ﾠ Oth.	 ﾠ
If	 ﾠMCA	 ﾠservice	 ﾠis	 ﾠimplemented	 ﾠby	 ﾠyour	 ﾠbank,	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠrecommend	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠothers	 ﾠ
43  36  5.0  4.0  -0.981  0.33  0.11 
I	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMCA	 ﾠto	 ﾠwork	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠit	 ﾠdid	 ﾠ 43  36  4.0  4.0  -0.363  0.72  0.04 
I	 ﾠtrust	 ﾠthat	 ﾠMCA	 ﾠwould	 ﾠprotect	 ﾠme	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
Internet	 ﾠfraud	 ﾠand	 ﾠattacks	 ﾠ
43  35  4.0  4.0  -0.293  0.77  0.03 
I	 ﾠfeel	 ﾠthat	 ﾠMCA	 ﾠhas	 ﾠjust	 ﾠmade	 ﾠthings	 ﾠ
complicated	 ﾠand	 ﾠtime-ﾭ‐consuming	 ﾠ
43  36  2.0  2.5  -1.172  0.24  0.13 
With	 ﾠMCA,	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠnot	 ﾠworried	 ﾠabout	 ﾠusing	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠ
computers	 ﾠfor	 ﾠInternet	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠservices	 ﾠ
42  36  4.0  3.0  -0.545  0.59  0.06 
I	 ﾠwould	 ﾠimagine	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmost	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠwould	 ﾠlearn	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠuse	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠvery	 ﾠquickly	 ﾠ
43  36  4.0  4.0  -0.727  0.47  0.08 
I	 ﾠfound	 ﾠthe	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠchannel	 ﾠfeature	 ﾠ
convenient	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠcase)	 ﾠmy	 ﾠprimary	 ﾠchannel	 ﾠ
(for	 ﾠexample	 ﾠyour	 ﾠmobile	 ﾠphone)	 ﾠis	 ﾠunavailable	 ﾠ
41  36  5.0  4.5  -0.290  0.77  0.03 
I	 ﾠwould	 ﾠprefer	 ﾠto	 ﾠuse	 ﾠthe	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠchannel	 ﾠ
option	 ﾠthan	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠa	 ﾠcall-ﾭ‐center/help-ﾭ‐desk	 ﾠcall	 ﾠ
43  36  4.0  4.0  -0.100  0.92  0.01 
*	 ﾠFriends	 ﾠand	 ﾠcolleagues?,	 ﾠ**	 ﾠMedian	 ﾠ
***	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠsize	 ﾠwas	 ﾠcalculated	 ﾠmanually	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoutcome	 ﾠof	 ﾠMann-ﾭ‐Whitney	 ﾠU	 ﾠTest.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠformula	 ﾠ
used	 ﾠwas:	 ﾠr	 ﾠ=	 ﾠ|z|	 ﾠ/	 ﾠsquare	 ﾠroot	 ﾠof	 ﾠN	 ﾠ[155]	 ﾠ(N:	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠcases	 ﾠfor	 ﾠboth	 ﾠOB	 ﾠand	 ﾠnone-ﾭ‐OB	 ﾠusers)	 ﾠ
Table 7-20:  Comparative evaluation of social relationships on satisfaction using Mann-W. U Test 
Table 7-20 illustrates the outcome of the test. It can be clearly noticed that the p values are 
larger than .05, which indicates that there is no statistically significant difference in the 
satisfaction scores of friends and colleagues and other participants.  
7.6.1.6  Effects of experience, gender and age on usability (satisfaction) 
The outcome drawn in section 0 represented the results for all participants who completed 
all tasks and did the post-questionnaire.  This includes experienced users who already 
adopted  online  banking  services  and  the  inexperienced  users  who  are  unfamiliar  with 
online  banking  services.  To  investigate  the  effects  of  experience  on  users’  satisfaction  
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measured earlier in section 0, a Mann-Whitney U Test technique is used to compare the 
mean scores of usability variables for experienced and inexperienced online banking users. 
The same test was carried out to also check for effects of gender and age on usability 
(satisfaction).  The  alternative  independent-sample  t-test  was  not  a  suitable  technique 
because the data violated some general assumptions for this test such as homogeneity of 
variance  and  normal  distribution  of  sample  (cannot  be  ignored  since  total  number  of 
inexperienced users were less than 30). The results of Mann-Whitney U Test are shown in 
Table 7-21. 
Factors	 ﾠ
N,	 ﾠExp.?*	 ﾠ
p	 ﾠ
N,	 ﾠGender	 ﾠ
p	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
N,	 ﾠAge	 ﾠGroup	 ﾠ
p	 ﾠ
Yes	 ﾠ No	 ﾠ M	 ﾠ F	 ﾠ 18-ﾭ‐27	 ﾠ 28-ﾭ‐37	 ﾠ
If	 ﾠmulti-ﾭ‐channel	 ﾠauthentication	 ﾠ
(MCA)	 ﾠservice	 ﾠis	 ﾠimplemented	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
your	 ﾠbank,	 ﾠI	 ﾠwould	 ﾠrecommend	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠothers	 ﾠ
52  25  0.69  55  24  0.70  32  38  0.18 
I	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMCA	 ﾠto	 ﾠwork	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
way	 ﾠit	 ﾠdid	 ﾠ
52  25  0.62  55  24  0.78  32  38  0.73 
I	 ﾠtrust	 ﾠthat	 ﾠMCA	 ﾠwould	 ﾠprotect	 ﾠme	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠInternet	 ﾠfraud	 ﾠand	 ﾠattacks	 ﾠ
52  24  0.15  54  24  0.57  32  38  0.90 
I	 ﾠfeel	 ﾠthat	 ﾠMCA	 ﾠhas	 ﾠjust	 ﾠmade	 ﾠ
things	 ﾠcomplicated	 ﾠand	 ﾠtime-ﾭ‐
consuming	 ﾠ
52  25  0.69  55  24  0.07  32  38  0.32 
With	 ﾠMCA,	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠnot	 ﾠworried	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ
using	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠcomputers	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
Internet	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠservices	 ﾠ
51  25  0.72  54  24  0.18  32  37  0.72 
I	 ﾠwould	 ﾠimagine	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmost	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠlearn	 ﾠto	 ﾠuse	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠvery	 ﾠ
quickly	 ﾠ
52  25  0.41  55  24  0.61  32  38  0.94 
I	 ﾠfound	 ﾠthe	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠchannel	 ﾠ
feature	 ﾠconvenient	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠcase)	 ﾠ
my	 ﾠprimary	 ﾠchannel	 ﾠ(for	 ﾠexample	 ﾠ
your	 ﾠmobile	 ﾠphone)	 ﾠis	 ﾠunavailable	 ﾠ
51  24  0.84  53  24  0.44  31  37  0.70 
I	 ﾠwould	 ﾠprefer	 ﾠto	 ﾠuse	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
alternative	 ﾠchannel	 ﾠoption	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ
making	 ﾠa	 ﾠcall-ﾭ‐center/help-ﾭ‐desk	 ﾠcall	 ﾠ
52  25  0.15  55  24  0.84  32  38  0.91 
*	 ﾠExperienced	 ﾠuser?	 ﾠ
Table 7-21:  Comparative evaluation of experience, gender, and age on users’ satisfaction (MCA) 
using Mann-Whitney U Test 
All probability values (p) shown in Table 7-21 in the experience column were not less than 
or equal to .05, so the results were not significant. There were no statistically significant 
differences in the satisfaction scores of experienced users and non-experienced users.  
The same results apply for gender and age group. None of these independent variables 
found  to  have  significant  differences  in  the  satisfaction  scores  among  their  groups 
(male/female and 18-27/28-37 years). All probability values (p) for both gender and age 
were greater than the significance level of .05. Therefore, no further investigation of effect 
size was needed.   
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7.6.2  Measuring Acceptability of MCA 
Acceptance of online banking technology was covered thoroughly in section 7.5. Both 
online users with and without online banking experience were involved in the study and all 
data was used to test the hypotheses. However, to investigate the user acceptability of the 
multi-channel  authentication  (MCA)  mechanism,  only  participants  with  online  banking 
experience were considered. It was not feasible to ask customers who had not utilized or 
tested  online  banking  services  before  to  give  feedback  on  a  new  online  banking 
technology.  They  did  not  have  the  required  background  experience  on  the  existing 
technology on which to base their decisions and opinions on a new one.  
Participants  were  asked  to  indicate  how  likely  they  would  be  to  use  different  online 
banking  services  on  an  online  banking  system  with  and  without  multi-channel 
authentication (based on their existing experience with conventional online banking). To 
analyze  these  data,  two  statistical  techniques  available  as  suggested  by  [155]:  paired-
samples t-test and Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test.  Both techniques are used when comparing 
the mean scores for one group of people based on two different conditions. In this case, the 
study  compared  the  mean  scores  for  online  banking  users’  preferences  when  using  a 
conventional  online  banking  system  and  when  using  an  online  banking  system  with  a 
multi-channel  authentication  mechanism.  The  same  assumptions  drawn  for  the 
independent-sample  t-test  and  Mann-Whitney  U  Test  discussed  earlier  in  section  7.5.4 
applied  here  for  both  techniques.  While  considering  the  violation  of  the  normally 
distributed assumption due to the large sample size, this study tested the data using paired-
samples t-test first and then confirmed the results with the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test as 
presented in the subsequent sub-sections.  
7.6.2.1  Paired-samples t-test 
Table 7-22 shows a brief summary of the results of paired-samples t-test analysis by SPSS 
19 for online users when using online banking systems with multi-channel authentication 
(OBMCA) and when using conventional online banking systems (COB) (more detailed 
results are provided in Appendix D).  
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Variables	 ﾠ
M*	 ﾠ
t	 ﾠ
Sig.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
(2-ﾭ‐
tailed)	 ﾠ
eta**	 ﾠ
squared	 ﾠ OBMCA	 ﾠ COB	 ﾠ
1.	 ﾠDo	 ﾠinter	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠfunds	 ﾠtransfer	 ﾠ 4.06	 ﾠ 3.36	 ﾠ 3.600  0.001  .146	 ﾠ
2.	 ﾠMake	 ﾠpayment	 ﾠto	 ﾠother	 ﾠpersonal	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠ 4.18	 ﾠ 2.89	 ﾠ 6.424  0.000  .355	 ﾠ
3.	 ﾠMake	 ﾠpayment	 ﾠto	 ﾠother	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠbank	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠ 4.17	 ﾠ 2.99	 ﾠ 6.434  0.000  .353	 ﾠ
4.	 ﾠTransfer	 ﾠfunds	 ﾠto	 ﾠcredit	 ﾠcard	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠ 4.05	 ﾠ 3.19	 ﾠ 5.553  0.000  .289	 ﾠ
5.	 ﾠDo	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠtransfer	 ﾠ 3.82	 ﾠ 2.38	 ﾠ 7.532  0.000  .431	 ﾠ
6.	 ﾠTop-ﾭ‐up	 ﾠmobile	 ﾠphones	 ﾠ 4.07	 ﾠ 2.61	 ﾠ 8.291  0.000  .478	 ﾠ
7.	 ﾠOrder	 ﾠcheque	 ﾠbooks	 ﾠ 3.79	 ﾠ 3.32	 ﾠ 2.509  0.014  .076	 ﾠ
8.	 ﾠStop	 ﾠlost	 ﾠATM	 ﾠcards	 ﾠ 3.99	 ﾠ 3.42	 ﾠ 2.626  0.010  .082	 ﾠ
9.	 ﾠStop	 ﾠlost	 ﾠcredit	 ﾠcards	 ﾠ 3.93	 ﾠ 3.45	 ﾠ 2.302  0.024  .066	 ﾠ
10.	 ﾠApply	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠcredit	 ﾠcard	 ﾠlimit	 ﾠchange	 ﾠ 3.87	 ﾠ 2.97	 ﾠ 4.489  0.000  .210	 ﾠ
11.	 ﾠRequest	 ﾠthe	 ﾠissue	 ﾠof	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠacct.	 ﾠstate.	 ﾠ 4.39	 ﾠ 3.73	 ﾠ 3.872  0.000  .165	 ﾠ
12.	 ﾠSetup	 ﾠstanding	 ﾠorder	 ﾠtransactions	 ﾠ 4.08	 ﾠ 2.88	 ﾠ 6.739  0.000  .380	 ﾠ
13.	 ﾠSetup	 ﾠnew	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠ 3.81	 ﾠ 2.73	 ﾠ 4.871  0.000  .236	 ﾠ
14.	 ﾠApply	 ﾠfor	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠcurrency	 ﾠaccounts	 ﾠ 3.59	 ﾠ 2.88	 ﾠ 3.233  0.002  .125	 ﾠ
15.	 ﾠApply	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdebit/credit	 ﾠcard	 ﾠ 3.86	 ﾠ 2.83	 ﾠ 5.373  0.000  .278	 ﾠ
16.	 ﾠApply	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠloan	 ﾠ 3.43	 ﾠ 2.53	 ﾠ 4.027  0.000  .180	 ﾠ
17.	 ﾠRequest	 ﾠtelephone	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠ 3.86	 ﾠ 2.84	 ﾠ 4.809  0.000  .236	 ﾠ
*	 ﾠM:	 ﾠMean	 ﾠscores;	 ﾠOBMCA:	 ﾠOnline	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠwith	 ﾠMC;	 ﾠCOB:	 ﾠConventional	 ﾠonline	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠ(without	 ﾠMCA)	 ﾠ
**	 ﾠeta	 ﾠsquared	 ﾠwas	 ﾠcalculated	 ﾠmanually	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoutcome	 ﾠof	 ﾠpaired-ﾭ‐samples	 ﾠt-ﾭ‐test	 ﾠin	 ﾠAppendex	 ﾠD.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠformula	 ﾠused	 ﾠwas:	 ﾠt2	 ﾠ/	 ﾠ(t2	 ﾠ+	 ﾠ(N	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ1))	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Table 7-22: Paired-samples t-test comparing online users’ preferences for using online banking 
services on systems with MCA and without MCA 
7.6.2.2  Discussion 
The results show significant differences in users’ preferences between OBMCA and COB 
in all of the services offered. The top five services which scored the highest magnitude of 
the MCA’s effect were make payment to other personal account, make payment to other 
local bank account, do foreign transfer, paying to top-up mobile phones and setup standing 
order transactions with eta squared of .355, .353, .431, .478 and .380 respectively. These 
scores represent a substantial difference in users’ preferences between OBMCA and COB 
(i.e., based on [264] guidelines that state an eta squared score above .14 represents a large 
effect). These five services were services that either participants might use on a daily basis 
or  have  security  concerns  using  them  via  conventional  online  banking,  unlike  other 
services, such as ordering a chequebook, stopping a lost ATM card, applying for a loan, or 
requesting telephone banking. This indicates that participants were concerned about the 
services they required more frequently or those that involves money transfer to a foreign 
accounts or countries. This can also be supported by the fact that the least mean scored 
among all services was the ‘Do foreign transfer’ service. The lowest mean scores of this 
service in conventional online banking reflects the unwillingness of bank customers to 
utilize such service without improved authentication technology such as MCA. 
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7.6.2.3  Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test 
Wilcoxon  Signed  Rank  Test  is  a  non-parametric  alternative  statistical  technique  to  the 
paired-samples t-test and especially used for the data that are measured only at the ordinal 
(ranked) level.  Similarly to the Mann-Whitney U Test, the normal distribution assumption 
is not required for this technique. 
Variables	 ﾠ Z	 ﾠ
Sig.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
(2-ﾭ‐tailed)	 ﾠ Effect	 ﾠsize	 ﾠr	 ﾠ*	 ﾠ
1.	 ﾠDo	 ﾠinter	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠfunds	 ﾠtransfer	 ﾠ -3.310  0.001  0.26 
2.	 ﾠMake	 ﾠpayment	 ﾠto	 ﾠother	 ﾠpersonal	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠ -5.144  0.000  0.41 
3.	 ﾠMake	 ﾠpayment	 ﾠto	 ﾠother	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠbank	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠ -5.049  0.000  0.40 
4.	 ﾠTransfer	 ﾠfunds	 ﾠto	 ﾠcredit	 ﾠcard	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠ -4.691  0.000  0.37 
5.	 ﾠDo	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠtransfer	 ﾠ -5.684  0.000  0.46 
6.	 ﾠTop-ﾭ‐up	 ﾠmobile	 ﾠphones	 ﾠ -5.849  0.000  0.47 
7.	 ﾠOrder	 ﾠcheque	 ﾠbooks	 ﾠ -2.401  0.016  0.19 
8.	 ﾠStop	 ﾠlost	 ﾠATM	 ﾠcards	 ﾠ -2.216  0.027  0.18 
9.	 ﾠStop	 ﾠlost	 ﾠcredit	 ﾠcards	 ﾠ -2.177  0.029  0.17 
10.	 ﾠApply	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠcredit	 ﾠcard	 ﾠlimit	 ﾠchange	 ﾠ -4.063  0.000  0.32 
11.	 ﾠRequest	 ﾠthe	 ﾠissue	 ﾠof	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠstatement	 ﾠ -3.479  0.001  0.28 
12.	 ﾠSetup	 ﾠstanding	 ﾠorder	 ﾠtransactions	 ﾠ -5.337  0.000  0.43 
13.	 ﾠSetup	 ﾠnew	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠ -4.163  0.000  0.33 
14.	 ﾠApply	 ﾠfor	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠcurrency	 ﾠaccounts	 ﾠ -3.043  0.002  0.24 
15.	 ﾠApply	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdebit/credit	 ﾠcard	 ﾠ -4.320  0.000  0.35 
16.	 ﾠApply	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠloan	 ﾠ -3.564  0.000  0.29 
17.	 ﾠRequest	 ﾠtelephone	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠ -4.214  0.000  0.34 
*	 ﾠEffect	 ﾠsize	 ﾠwas	 ﾠcalculated	 ﾠmanually	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoutcome	 ﾠof	 ﾠWilcoxon	 ﾠSigned	 ﾠRank	 ﾠTest.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠformula	 ﾠ
used	 ﾠwas:	 ﾠr	 ﾠ=	 ﾠ|z|	 ﾠ/	 ﾠsquare	 ﾠroot	 ﾠof	 ﾠN	 ﾠ[155]	 ﾠ(N:	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠcases	 ﾠfor	 ﾠboth	 ﾠOB	 ﾠand	 ﾠnone-ﾭ‐OB	 ﾠusers)	 ﾠ
Table 7-23:  Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test  comparing  online  users’  preferences  for  using online 
banking services on systems with MCA and without MCA 
7.6.2.4  Discussion 
The results from Table 7-23 show significant differences in all users’ preferences between 
OBMCA and COB in most of the services offered. This was identical to the results from 
the paired-samples t-test presented in Table 7-22. The top five variables that scored highest 
effect size (r) were Make payment to other personal account, Make payment to other local 
bank  account,  Do  foreign  transfer,  Top-up  mobile  phones  and  Setup  standing  order 
transactions with effect size values of 0.41, 0.40, 0.46, 0.47 and 0.43 respectively.  These 
results confirmed the results found earlier from paired-samples t-test. 
The variables Stop lost ATM cards and Stop lost credit cards were among the variables that 
scored the lowest significance rates in both tests and this can be attributed to the fact that 
both of these services do not pose high risk to the account holder.  They do not involve 
money transactions and therefore the majority of the participants did not mind using either  
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online  banking  with  MCA  or  conventional  online  banking  technologies  to  utilize  such 
services online. 
Overall, both tests confirmed that the participants in this study accepted and preferred to 
use online banking web-application with MCA than other conventional online banking 
authentication  techniques  for  all  17  banking  services  listed  in  section  B  of  the  post-
questionnaire (see Appendix B4). 
7.6.3  Comparison with Other Studies 
Table  7-24  summarizes  the  differences  and  matches  between  this  research  and  Weir’s 
study discussed in section 3.3.1.  
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 ﾠ Weir’s	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠ[122]	 ﾠ This	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠ
Demographics	 ﾠ • 141 participants from UK 
• 77 female and 64 male 
• 93 online banking users and 48 non-OB users 
• 188 participants from Oman 
• 62 female, 124 male and 2 missing 
• 99 online banking users, 86 non-OB users and 3 missing 
Research	 ﾠ
methodology	 ﾠ
• Controlled environment 
• OTPs were delivered to physical mobile phones given to users 
(Sony Ericsson K-700 model) via SMS 
• Uncontrolled environment 
• OTPs were delivered to a simulated on-screen mobile phone 
(Sony Ericsson 7-750 model) via SMS  
Statistical	 ﾠtechniques	 ﾠ • Parametric  • Parametric confirmed by non-parametric 
Findings 
Effectiveness	 ﾠ • Multi-channel authentication was the most effective (without no 
problems facing the participants) authentication method 
compared to other 2-factor authentication mechanisms 
• Multi-channel authentication was effective with a 3.8% dropout 
rate (section 7.6.1.1) 
Efficiency	 ﾠ • Not measured  • MCA was found efficient based on time-completion rates and 
usability questionnaire (section 7.6.1.2) 
Satisfaction	 ﾠ • 2-factor authentication methods scored significantly higher than 
the 1-factor method for online banking authentication usability 
metrics used in the questionnaire overall 
• Multi-channel authentication method scored significantly higher 
than the conventional 1-factor/2-factors authentication methods 
for online banking (section 0) 
Security	 ﾠ • The majority of participants were interested in the security 
benefits of OTP via secondary device or channel 
• The majority of participants trusted that MCA method would 
protect them from online fraud and attacks (section 0) 
Age	 ﾠ*	 ﾠUsability	 ﾠ • Younger participants scored significantly higher in terms of 
usability than their older counterparts 
• No significant differences found in the satisfaction scores among 
different age groups (section 7.6.1.6) 
Experience	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠ • Previous experience effected usability scores awarded to each 
authentication method tested 
• Previous experience had no effects on satisfaction of users 
towards MCA method (section 7.6.1.6)  
• Previous experience had no effects on efficiency of MCA method 
(section 7.6.1.3) 
Table 7-24: Comparison of findings between this research and another study in the same area  
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7.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has outlined the survey design and data collection techniques used in this 
study. It explained different preliminary analyses including data preparation and screening, 
which  were  necessary  to  provide  valid  and  clean  data  for  the  hypothesis  testing  and 
analysis.  More  importantly,  this  chapter  provided  empirical  results  that  support  the 
theoretical evaluation of multi-channel authentication covered in section 5.4 of Chapter 5. 
The  results  supported  all  hypotheses.  Details  of  the  hypotheses  testing  results  are 
illustrated in Table 7-25 below. 
Hypotheses	 ﾠ Results	 ﾠ
Online	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠis	 ﾠacceptable	 ﾠto	 ﾠusers	 ﾠin	 ﾠOman	 ﾠ
H1a:	 ﾠ Gender significantly influences customers’ usage of online banking	 ﾠ Supported	 ﾠ
H1b:	 ﾠ Marital status significantly influences customers’ usage of online banking	 ﾠ Supported	 ﾠ
H1c:	 ﾠ Education level significantly influences customers’ usage of online 
banking	 ﾠ
Supported	 ﾠ
H1d:	 ﾠ Age significantly influences customers’ usage of online banking	 ﾠ Supported	 ﾠ
H1e:	 ﾠ Income significantly influences customers’ usage of online banking	 ﾠ Supported	 ﾠ
H1f:	 ﾠ Trust & relationship has a positive effect on Perceived Ease of Use (PEU)	 ﾠ Supported	 ﾠ
H1g:	 ﾠ Ease of access has a positive effect on Perceived Ease of Use (PEU)	 ﾠ Supported	 ﾠ
H1h:	 ﾠ Security has a positive effect on Perceived Ease of Use (PEU)	 ﾠ Supported	 ﾠ
Multi-ﾭ‐channel	 ﾠAuthentication	 ﾠis	 ﾠusable	 ﾠand	 ﾠacceptable	 ﾠto	 ﾠusers	 ﾠin	 ﾠOman	 ﾠ
H2a:	 ﾠ Multi-ﾭ‐channel	 ﾠauthentication	 ﾠis	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠ Supported	 ﾠ
H2b:	 ﾠ Multi-ﾭ‐channel	 ﾠauthentication	 ﾠis	 ﾠefficient	 ﾠ Supported	 ﾠ
H2c:	 ﾠ Multi-ﾭ‐channel	 ﾠauthentication	 ﾠis	 ﾠsatisfactory	 ﾠ Supported	 ﾠ
H2d:	 ﾠ Multi-ﾭ‐channel	 ﾠauthentication	 ﾠis	 ﾠacceptable	 ﾠto	 ﾠusers	 ﾠ Supported	 ﾠ
Table 7-25: Hypotheses testing results   
The  adoption  of  online  banking  in  Oman  was  found  to  be  influenced  by  different 
demographic factors such as gender, marital status, education level, and income level as 
well as other external variables such as trust and relationship, ease of access, and security. 
All these factors had an impact on customers’ decisions about whether or not to accept and 
adopt online banking in Oman. These results were found to be consistent with the results of 
similar studies by [5] and [4]. The former found that security is the major factor that affects 
people’ decisions to adopt online banking in Oman. The latter, likewise, found security and 
other  factors  such  as  ease  of  access,  and  trust  and  relationship  to  be  among  the  main 
drivers of online banking adoption. Both of these results were confirmed by the outcomes 
of this study.  
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The second set of hypotheses was proved by testing the usability and acceptability of the 
multi-channel authentication mechanism. Usability was tested based on the three usability 
metrics defined by the ISO standards: effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction. For the 
MCA to be effective, at least 95% of the online banking customers should have been able 
to complete the tasks without making mistakes. Efficiency in the context of MCA meant 
that online banking customers were able to accomplish online banking transactions using 
the MCA mechanism in a reasonable time and with reasonable effort. Satisfaction, on the 
other hand, meant the customers felt satisfied about MCA, and therefore, the continuity of 
their usage of online banking with MCA and their willingness to recommend this service to 
others were ensured.   
Acceptability of the MCA mechanism was the final factor to be evaluated in this chapter. It 
was necessary to narrow the data used to test acceptability to only those customers who 
had already experienced conventional online banking. This was important to eliminate any 
biased results that could have resulted if non-online banking customers were involved in 
the test to show their acceptance of the MCA mechanism without prior experience with 
online banking services. All the usability and acceptability hypotheses enumerated at the 
beginning of this chapter were supported. 
The  findings  from  usability  measures  were  compared  with  another  study  published  by 
Weir in 2010. The comparison revealed the areas where the two populations of UK and 
Oman differs or matches in terms of their perceptions of usability and security for online 
banking authentication methods. 
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Chapter 8   
Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
The recent advances in communication and Internet technology have made online services 
more widely accessible. This has encouraged companies around the world, including the 
banking sector, to utilize online services for new business opportunities. Included in these 
new  services  were  online  banking  services  offered  by  banks.  Online  banking  offered 
customers usable and accessible ways of doing banking from home or work. More recent 
technologies, such as 3G networks, have allowed customers to access their bank accounts 
and accomplish transaction requests using portable devices like PDAs, mobile phones, and 
notebooks. 
On  the  other  hand,  these  technological  advances,  along  with  the  rich  and  sensitive 
information  exchanged  between  the  clients  and  their  service  providers  have  attracted 
Internet users with other agendas, honing their skills and developing new techniques to 
compromise other customers’ accounts. Online banking services, as one of the targeted 
financial services, have implemented a number of different authentication mechanisms to 
withstand  these  attacks.  The  most  recent  authentication  mechanisms  utilize  three  basic 
authentication  approaches:  multilevel  authentication,  multi-channel  authentication,  and 
multi-factor  authentication.  None  of  these  offers  protection  against  more  sophisticated 
attacks such as phishing and man-in-the-browser (MITB) attacks. 
This study proposed a multi-channel authentication (MCA) mechanism that combines the 
strength  of  the  three  popular  authentication  approaches:  multilevel,  multi-channel,  and 
multi-factor.  These  three  authentication  approaches  were  amalgamated  to  form  an 
authentication mechanism that can better protect customers’ accounts against most known 
attacks  including  phishing  and  MITB.  A  prototype  web-application  using  MCA  was 
designed and implemented to support the evaluation of the first part of the thesis statement: 
“It is possible to design an authentication mechanism that uses multiple channels to resist 
attacks  more  effectively  than  most  commonly  used  mechanisms”.  Different  users  were  
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asked to participate in the experiment to test the second part of the thesis statement: “Such 
a mechanism will also be both usable and acceptable to users in Oman.” 
The following hypotheses in Table 8-1 were tested: 
Hypotheses	 ﾠ
Online	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠis	 ﾠacceptable	 ﾠto	 ﾠusers	 ﾠin	 ﾠOman	 ﾠ
H1a:	 ﾠ Gender significantly influences customers’ usage of online banking	 ﾠ
H1b:	 ﾠ Marital status significantly influences customers’ usage of online banking	 ﾠ
H1c:	 ﾠ Education level significantly influences customers’ usage of online banking	 ﾠ
H1d:	 ﾠ Age significantly influences customers’ usage of online banking	 ﾠ
H1e:	 ﾠ Income significantly influences customers’ usage of online banking	 ﾠ
H1f:	 ﾠ Trust & relationship has a positive effect on Perceived Ease of Use (PEU)	 ﾠ
H1g:	 ﾠ Ease of access has a positive effect on Perceived Ease of Use (PEU)	 ﾠ
H1h:	 ﾠ Security has a positive effect on Perceived Ease of Use (PEU)	 ﾠ
Multi-ﾭ‐channel	 ﾠAuthentication	 ﾠis	 ﾠusable	 ﾠand	 ﾠacceptable	 ﾠto	 ﾠusers	 ﾠin	 ﾠOman	 ﾠ
H2a:	 ﾠ Multi-ﾭ‐channel	 ﾠauthentication	 ﾠis	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠ
H2b:	 ﾠ Multi-ﾭ‐channel	 ﾠauthentication	 ﾠis	 ﾠefficient	 ﾠ
H2c:	 ﾠ Multi-ﾭ‐channel	 ﾠauthentication	 ﾠis	 ﾠsatisfactory	 ﾠ
H2d:	 ﾠ Multi-ﾭ‐channel	 ﾠauthentication	 ﾠis	 ﾠacceptable	 ﾠto	 ﾠusers	 ﾠ
Table 8-1:  Hypotheses tested in this study 
8.2 Research Objectives and Contributions 
The general research topic addressed by this thesis was whether security of online banking 
users’  accounts  could  be  increased  while  maintaining  or  also  increasing  usability.  The 
specific thesis statement was “It is possible to design an authentication mechanism that 
uses  multiple  channels  to  resist  attacks  more  effectively  than  most  commonly  used 
mechanisms. Furthermore, such a mechanism will also be both usable and acceptable to 
users in Oman”. The main research objectives defined in this thesis were as follows: 
Objective 1.  Review  the  most  commonly  used  authentication  classes,  authentication 
mechanisms, and authentication attacks. 
Objective 2.  Review the usability and acceptability aspects of authentication mechansims 
and  the  evaluation  techniques  used  to  assess  them  for  new  information 
technologies. 
Objective 3.  With  respect  to  online  banking,  discuss  some  of  the  currently  used 
authentication  mechanisms  and  identify  their  weaknesses,  showing  how  
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they fail to protect customers’ accounts against different attacks identified 
in objective 1.  
Objective 4.  Propose an authentication mechanism solution that addresses the security 
and  usability  problems  identified  and  listed  in  objective  2.  Theoretically 
evaluate the security of this solution and identify all features needed for 
implementation.  
Objective 5.  Empirically evaluate the new proposed mechanism with respect to usability 
and acceptability.    
To  meet  the  first  objective,  a  thorough  review  of  literature  was  undertaken.  Six 
authentication  classes  were  identified:  knowledge-based,  token-based,  biometric-based, 
relationship-based,  process-based,  and  location-based.  These  classes  were  compared  to 
identify  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  each.  They  were  then  categorized  with 
respect to implementation into four categories: single-factor, multi-factor, multilevel, and 
multilevel multi-channel authentication mechanisms. Finally, various attack methods that 
target  these  authentication  mechanisms  were  discussed  based  on  the  communication 
component  they  target.  These  core  communication  components  are  the  online  service 
provider (OSP), the communication channel (CC), and the end user (EU).  
To address the second objective, the current status of online banking applications (OBAs) 
was discussed. These applications were categorized, according to the service types offered 
to customers, into three categories: informational, local-transactional, and transactional. 
Each category needs a different authentication mechanism setup depending on the risk 
associated with the services offered. In order to evaluate mechanisms implemented in these 
categories,  three  case  studies  were  discussed  based  on  real  OBAs.  Further  discussions 
identified the points of failure. 
The third objective was met by proposing a new multilevel, multi-channel, and multi-factor 
authentication mechanism. Three design recommendations were suggested: user-defined 
secret keys, multi-language support, and key delivery encryption. These were intended to 
increase security and usability of the proposed solution. Security was evaluated based on 
threat-model analysis. Firstly, the attacks of the application were identified and categorized 
according to the STRIDE process by Microsoft into six categories: spoofing, tampering, 
repudiation, information disclosure, denial of service, elevation of privilege, and DREAD. 
An attack tree for the identified threats was constructed and the threats were evaluated  
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using a scenario-based evaluation process. Finally, risk mitigation and security controls 
were identified. 
As part of the third objective, a prototype application was designed to test the proposed 
authentication mechanism empirically. This application simulated a real OBA and met the 
proposed solution guidelines. It further utilized an emergency authentication mechanism 
based on the relationship authentication class that can be triggered in case the secondary 
channel device (the mobile phone) is unavailable to complete the transaction. Finally, a list 
of other features and guidelines were included to complement and facilitate the actual 
implementation of the proposed multi-channel authentication (MCA) mechanism. 
To meet the fourth objective, the usability and acceptability of the proposed solution were 
evaluated empirically by inviting users to test the prototype application. Two sets of online 
questionnaires and an indirect observation survey technique were used to collect feedback 
from the participants. The users were asked to complete 5 different tasks that provided data 
to support analysis. These data were analyzed to identify the factors affecting the adoption 
of online banking in Oman and to measure the usability and acceptability of the proposed 
MCA mechanism. 
To conclude, the outcome of these analyses according to the hypotheses testing results are 
shown in Table 8-2: 
Hypotheses	 ﾠ Results	 ﾠ
Online	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠis	 ﾠacceptable	 ﾠto	 ﾠusers	 ﾠin	 ﾠOman	 ﾠ
H1a:	 ﾠ Gender significantly influences customers’ usage of online banking	 ﾠ Supported	 ﾠ
H1b:	 ﾠ Marital status significantly influences customers’ usage of online banking	 ﾠ Supported	 ﾠ
H1c:	 ﾠ Education level significantly influences customers’ usage of online 
banking	 ﾠ
Supported	 ﾠ
H1d:	 ﾠ Age significantly influences customers’ usage of online banking	 ﾠ Supported	 ﾠ
H1e:	 ﾠ Income significantly influences customers’ usage of online banking	 ﾠ Supported	 ﾠ
H1f:	 ﾠ Trust & relationship has a positive effect on Perceived Ease of Use (PEU)	 ﾠ Supported	 ﾠ
H1g:	 ﾠ Ease of access has a positive effect on Perceived Ease of Use (PEU)	 ﾠ Supported	 ﾠ
H1h:	 ﾠ Security has a positive effect on Perceived Ease of Use (PEU)	 ﾠ Supported	 ﾠ
Multi-ﾭ‐channel	 ﾠAuthentication	 ﾠis	 ﾠusable	 ﾠand	 ﾠacceptable	 ﾠto	 ﾠusers	 ﾠin	 ﾠOman	 ﾠ
H2a:	 ﾠ Multi-ﾭ‐channel	 ﾠauthentication	 ﾠis	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠ Supported	 ﾠ
H2b:	 ﾠ Multi-ﾭ‐channel	 ﾠauthentication	 ﾠis	 ﾠefficient	 ﾠ Supported	 ﾠ
H2c:	 ﾠ Multi-ﾭ‐channel	 ﾠauthentication	 ﾠis	 ﾠsatisfactory	 ﾠ Supported	 ﾠ
H2d:	 ﾠ Multi-ﾭ‐channel	 ﾠauthentication	 ﾠis	 ﾠacceptable	 ﾠto	 ﾠusers	 ﾠ Supported	 ﾠ
Table 8-2: Hypotheses testing results  
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8.3 Future Work 
This thesis has contributed to usable, improved security by contributing both knowledge 
and  practical  applications  of  a  MCA  mechanism  for  users’  authentication  in  online-
distributed systems, specifically the online banking systems.  However, it also raised new 
research directions. The following sections discuss these research opportunities in more 
detail. 
8.3.1  More Usable Channels 
Mobile  devices  have  proved  to  be  a  usable  complementary  channel  for  online 
authentication. Other possible usable communication channels can also be used to support 
the MCA mechanism. These channels need to be tested for usability and security when 
used with other conventional authentication mechanisms. 
SMS messages, on the other hand, can also be substituted with other services currently 
supported  by  mobile  phones.  Chatting  software,  in  particular,  such  as  What’s  Up  for 
iPhones and BlackBerry’s messenger are among most popular live messaging software 
nowadays. People can be allowed to set preferences on which these services (or any future 
live contact services) they prefer to receive their OTPs. 
8.3.2  MCA for the Disabled 
Although MCA proved usable and acceptable by users in Oman, disabled users might find 
it  difficult  to  utilize  it  for  their  day-to-day  financial  transactions.  The  proposed  MCA 
mechanism added another layer (mobile channel) of interactivity between users and online 
banking. This layer, in the context of online banking, needs further investigation alone and 
when combined with web-channel to see how it can be improved to meet the requirements 
of different disabilities. In this study, only people without disabilities were involved in 
testing the MCA solution. 
8.3.3  MCA for Corporate Banking 
The study has shown the MCA mechanism to address many of the current shortcomings of 
online banking. MCA can be extended to offer better usability and security to corporate 
online  banking  as  well.  For  instance,  involving  multiple  OTPs  from  different  users  to  
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authorize  one  transaction.  This  area  has  rarely  been  covered  in  the  literature  and 
investigating it would provide novel authentication solutions. 
8.4 A Final Word 
This research proposed a multi-channel authentication (MCA) mechanism that improves 
security of online banking systems while maintaining usability. The threat-analysis testing 
showed how the proposed MCA could protect users’ accounts from most known attacks 
that other authentication mechanisms fail to address. A prototype online banking system 
using MCA was designed to test MCA's usability and acceptability. The majority of users 
who participated in the study felt that the MCA improved security. They also found the 
system usable and acceptable and indicated that they would use it and recommend it to 
others. These findings should be interesting to the banking sector if they want to improve 
their online banking systems. Too often banks focus on security while degrading usability. 
The guidelines and recommendations provided in this research will provide guidelines to 
banks wishing to offer more secure yet usable online banking.  
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Appendix A 
Web-application Codes/Scripts 
A1: PHP page to automate the process of calculating the time spent variable (TSn) 
<?php require_once('Connections/ev_conn.php'); ?> 
<?php 
if (!function_exists("GetSQLValueString")) { 
function GetSQLValueString($theValue, $theType, $theDefinedValue = "", 
$theNotDefinedValue = "")  
{ 
  if (PHP_VERSION < 6) { 
    $theValue = get_magic_quotes_gpc() ? stripslashes($theValue) : $theValue; 
  } 
 
  $theValue = function_exists("mysql_real_escape_string") ? 
mysql_real_escape_string($theValue) : mysql_escape_string($theValue); 
 
  switch ($theType) { 
    case "text": 
      $theValue = ($theValue != "") ? "'" . $theValue . "'" : "NULL"; 
      break;     
    case "long": 
    case "int": 
      $theValue = ($theValue != "") ? intval($theValue) : "NULL"; 
      break; 
    case "double": 
      $theValue = ($theValue != "") ? doubleval($theValue) : "NULL"; 
      break; 
    case "date": 
      $theValue = ($theValue != "") ? "'" . $theValue . "'" : "NULL"; 
      break; 
    case "defined": 
      $theValue = ($theValue != "") ? $theDefinedValue : $theNotDefinedValue; 
      break; 
  } 
  return $theValue; 
} 
} 
 
mysql_select_db($database_ev_conn, $ev_conn); 
$query_rsData = "SELECT users.username, logs.acctnum, logs.log_id, logs.ipaddress, 
logs.visit_time, logs.visit_page, logs.user_agent, logs.get_vars, logs.post_vars 
FROM users INNER JOIN logs ON users.username = logs.username WHERE (users.level=0) 
ORDER BY logs.username, logs.log_id;"; 
$rsData = mysql_query($query_rsData, $ev_conn) or die(mysql_error()); 
$row_rsData = mysql_fetch_assoc($rsData); 
$totalRows_rsData = mysql_num_rows($rsData); 
?> 
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" 
"http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"> 
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> 
<head> 
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" /> 
<title>Data Analysis</title> 
</head> 
<body> 
<p><strong>Logs records - DATA</strong></p> 
<table width="100%" border="1">  
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  <tr> 
    <th>#</th> 
    <th>Username</th> 
    <th>Acct</th> 
    <th>logid</th> 
    <th>ipaddress</th> 
    <th>page</th> 
    <th>visit_time</th> 
    <th>time_spent</th> 
    <th>user_agent</th> 
    <th>get_vars</th> 
    <th>post_vars</th> 
  </tr> 
  <?php $x = 0; ?> 
  <?php do { ?> 
  <?php $x++;  
    if($x > 1) { 
  ?> 
    <tr> 
      <td><?php echo $x; ?></td> 
      <td><?php echo $username; ?></td> 
      <td><?php echo $acctnum; ?></td> 
      <td><?php echo $log_id; ?></td> 
      <td><?php echo $ipaddress; ?></td> 
      <td><?php echo $visit_page; ?></td> 
      <td><?php echo $visit_time; ?></td> 
      <td><?php if($username == $row_rsData['username']) echo 
($row_rsData['visit_time'] - $visit_time); ?></td> 
      <td><?php echo $user_agent; ?></td> 
      <td><?php echo $get_vars; ?></td> 
      <td><?php echo $post_vars; ?></td> 
    </tr> 
<?php 
  } 
  $username = $row_rsData['username']; 
  $acctnum = $row_rsData['acctnum']; 
  $log_id = $row_rsData['log_id']; 
  $ipaddress = $row_rsData['ipaddress']; 
  $visit_page = $row_rsData['visit_page']; 
  $visit_time = $row_rsData['visit_time']; 
  $user_agent = $row_rsData['user_agent']; 
  $get_vars = str_replace('alert','',$row_rsData['get_vars']); 
  $post_vars = str_replace('alert','',$row_rsData['post_vars']); 
?> 
<?php } while ($row_rsData = mysql_fetch_assoc($rsData)); ?> 
<tr> 
  <td>&nbsp;</td> 
  <td>&nbsp;</td> 
    <td>&nbsp;</td> 
    <td>&nbsp;</td> 
    <td>&nbsp;</td> 
    <td>&nbsp;</td> 
    <td>&nbsp;</td> 
    <td>&nbsp;</td> 
    <td>&nbsp;</td> 
    <td>&nbsp;</td> 
    <td>&nbsp;</td> 
  </tr> 
</table> 
</body> 
</html> 
<?php 
mysql_free_result($rsData); 
?>  
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A2: PHP page to automate the process of calculating the time spent variable (TSn) per 
each task 
<?php require_once('Connections/ev_conn.php'); ?> 
<?php 
if (!function_exists("GetSQLValueString")) { 
function GetSQLValueString($theValue, $theType, $theDefinedValue = "", 
$theNotDefinedValue = "")  
{ 
  if (PHP_VERSION < 6) { 
    $theValue = get_magic_quotes_gpc() ? stripslashes($theValue) : $theValue; 
  } 
 
  $theValue = function_exists("mysql_real_escape_string") ? 
mysql_real_escape_string($theValue) : mysql_escape_string($theValue); 
 
  switch ($theType) { 
    case "text": 
      $theValue = ($theValue != "") ? "'" . $theValue . "'" : "NULL"; 
      break;     
    case "long": 
    case "int": 
      $theValue = ($theValue != "") ? intval($theValue) : "NULL"; 
      break; 
    case "double": 
      $theValue = ($theValue != "") ? doubleval($theValue) : "NULL"; 
      break; 
    case "date": 
      $theValue = ($theValue != "") ? "'" . $theValue . "'" : "NULL"; 
      break; 
    case "defined": 
      $theValue = ($theValue != "") ? $theDefinedValue : $theNotDefinedValue; 
      break; 
  } 
  return $theValue; 
} 
} 
 
mysql_select_db($database_ev_conn, $ev_conn); 
$query_rsData = "SELECT users.username, logs.acctnum, logs.log_id, logs.ipaddress, 
logs.visit_time, logs.visit_page, logs.user_agent, logs.get_vars, logs.post_vars 
FROM users INNER JOIN logs ON users.username = logs.username WHERE (users.level=0) 
ORDER BY logs.username, logs.log_id"; 
$rsData = mysql_query($query_rsData, $ev_conn) or die(mysql_error()); 
$row_rsData = mysql_fetch_assoc($rsData); 
$totalRows_rsData = mysql_num_rows($rsData); 
?> 
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" 
"http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"> 
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> 
<head> 
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" /> 
<title>Data Analysis</title> 
</head> 
 
<body> 
<p><strong>Logs records per tasks</strong></p> 
 
<p>&nbsp;</p> 
<table width="100%" border="1"> 
  <tr> 
    <th>#</th> 
    <th>Username</th> 
    <th>Last logid</th> 
    <th>Acct</th> 
    <th>Task 1</th> 
    <th>Task 2</th> 
    <th>Task 3</th> 
    <th>Task 4</th>  
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    <th>Task 5</th> 
    <th>Total</th> 
  </tr> 
  <?php $x = 0; $ts = 0; 
 
  $ts1start = false; $ts1finalize = false; $ts1done = false; 
    $ts2start = false; $ts2finalize = false; $ts2done = false; 
    $ts3start = false; $ts3finalize = false; $ts3done = false; 
    $ts4start = false; $ts4finalize = false; $ts4done = false; 
    $ts5start = false; $ts5finalize = false; $ts5check = false; $ts5done = 
false; 
   ?> 
  <?php do { ?> 
  <?php $x++;  
  if($x > 1) { 
      if($ts1finalize == true && $ts1done == false) $t1=($ts1 + 
($row_rsData['visit_time'] - $visit_time));   
    if($ts2finalize == true && $ts2done == false) $t2=($ts2 + 
($row_rsData['visit_time'] - $visit_time));   
    if($ts3finalize == true && $ts3done == false) $t3=($ts3 + 
($row_rsData['visit_time'] - $visit_time));   
    if($ts4finalize == true && $ts4done == false) $t4=($ts4 + 
($row_rsData['visit_time'] - $visit_time));   
    if($ts5finalize == true && $ts5done == false) $t5=($ts5 + 
($row_rsData['visit_time'] - $visit_time));   
  ?> 
  <?php 
  } 
  $ts = $row_rsData['visit_time'] - $visit_time; 
  // do the process of calculating the total time spent for each task 
    if($row_rsData['username'] == $username) { // make sure we are dealing with 
the same user 
    // do a check for task 5 (check the intermediary page) 
    if($row_rsData['visit_page'] == '/transfer.php' && 
substr($row_rsData['get_vars'],0,17) == 'mode=alt_activate') {  
      $ts5check = true;  // trigger the task5 check intermediary 
page flag to true 
    }   
      // now we start with task 1 
    if($ts1done == false) { 
      if($ts1start == true) { 
        $ts1 = $ts1 + $ts;  // calculate task1 commulative TS 
      } 
      if($row_rsData['visit_page'] == '/profile.php' && $ts1start == 
false && $ts1done == false) {  
          $ts1 = 0; 
          $ts1start = true;  // trigger the task1 start 
flag to true 
      } 
      if($ts1finalize == true) { $ts1done = true; $ts1start = false; 
} 
      if($row_rsData['visit_page'] == '/channels.php') { // if 
finish page is reached, set flag finalize to true 
        $ts=0; 
        $ts1finalize = true; 
      } 
    } 
     
     
      // we start with task 2 
    if($ts1done == true && $ts2done == false) { 
      if($ts2start == true && $ts2done == false) { 
        $ts2 = $ts2 + $ts;  // calculate task2 commulative TS 
      } 
      if($row_rsData['visit_page'] == '/channels.php' && $ts2start 
== false && $ts2done == false) {  
          $ts2 = 0; 
          $ts2start = true;  // trigger the task1 start 
flag to true 
      }  
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      if($ts2finalize == true) { $ts2done = true; $ts2start = false; 
} 
      if($row_rsData['visit_page'] == '/account.php') { // if finish 
page is reached, set flag finish to true 
        $ts=0; 
        $ts2finalize = true; 
      } 
    } 
     
     
     // we start with task 3 
    if($ts2done == true && $ts3done == false) { 
      if(($ts3start == true && $ts3done == false) && $ts2done == 
true) { 
        $ts3 = $ts3 + $ts;  // calculate task3 commulative TS 
      } 
      if($row_rsData['visit_page'] == '/addbeneficiary.php' && 
$ts3start == false && $ts3done == false) {  
          $ts3 = 0; 
          $ts3start = true;  // trigger the task1 start 
flag to true 
      } 
      if($ts3finalize == true) { $ts3done = true; $ts3start = false; 
} 
      if(($row_rsData['visit_page'] == '/transfer.php' && 
$row_rsData['get_vars'] == 'activate=true') || ($row_rsData['visit_page'] == 
'/scripts/checksms.php' && $row_rsData['get_vars'] == 'chktype=1') ) { // if 
finish page is reached, set flag finish to true 
        $ts=0; 
        $ts3finalize = true; 
      } 
    } 
 
 
      // we start with task 4 
    if($ts3done == true && $ts4done == false) { 
      if($ts4start == true && $ts4done == false) { 
        $ts4 = $ts4 + $ts;  // calculate task4 commulative TS 
      } 
      if(($row_rsData['visit_page'] == '/transfer_page.php' && 
substr($row_rsData['get_vars'],0,6) == 'bn_id=') && $ts4start == false && $ts4done 
== false) {  
          $ts4 = 0; 
          $ts4start = true;  // trigger the task1 start 
flag to true 
      } 
      if($ts4finalize == true) { $ts4done = true; $ts4start = false; 
} 
      if($row_rsData['visit_page'] == '/account.php' && 
substr($row_rsData['get_vars'],0,7) == 'acc_no=') { // if finish page is reached, 
set flag finish to true 
        $ts=0; 
        $ts4finalize = true; 
      } 
    } 
 
 
      // we start with task 5 ONLY IF all previous tasks are DONE 
    if($ts1done == true && $ts2done == true && $ts3done == true && 
$ts4done == true && $ts5done == false) { 
      if($ts5start == true) { 
        $ts5 = $ts5 + $ts;  // calculate task5 commulative TS 
      } 
      if($row_rsData['visit_page'] == '/addbeneficiary.php' && 
$ts5start == false && $ts5done == false && $ts4done == true) {  
          $ts5 = 0; 
          $ts5start = true;  // trigger the task5 start 
flag to true 
      } 
      if($ts5check == true) {  
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        if($ts5finalize == true) { $ts5done = true; $ts5start = 
false; } 
        if($row_rsData['visit_page'] == '/transfer.php' && 
$row_rsData['get_vars'] == 'activate=true') { // if finish page is reached, set 
flag finish to true 
          $ts=0; 
          $ts5finalize = true; 
        } 
      } 
    } 
  } else { 
  // if username is changed, reset all variables for a new cycle 
    $ts1start = false; $ts1finalize = false; $ts1done = false; 
    $ts2start = false; $ts2finalize = false; $ts2done = false; 
    $ts3start = false; $ts3finalize = false; $ts3done = false; 
    $ts4start = false; $ts4finalize = false; $ts4done = false; 
    $ts5start = false; $ts5finalize = false; $ts5check = false; $ts5done = 
false; 
  $tsout = ''; 
  } 
?> 
<?php  
// output the results before moving to a new user 
if($username != $row_rsData['username']) { ?> 
     <tr> 
      <td><?php echo $x; ?></td> 
      <td><?php echo $username; ?></td> 
      <td><?php echo $log_id; ?></td> 
      <td><?php echo $acctnum; ?></td> 
      <td><?php if($t1==0) { echo '<font color=red>'.$t1.'</font>'; } else { echo 
$t1; } ?></td> 
      <td><?php if($t2==0) { echo '<font color=red>'.$t2.'</font>'; } else { echo 
$t2; } ?></td> 
      <td><?php if($t3==0) { echo '<font color=red>'.$t3.'</font>'; } else { echo 
$t3; } ?></td> 
      <td><?php if($t4==0) { echo '<font color=red>'.$t4.'</font>'; } else { echo 
$t4; } ?></td> 
      <td><?php if($t5==0) { echo '<font color=red>'.$t5.'</font>'; } else { echo 
$t5; } ?></td> 
      <td><?php echo ($t1+$t2+$t3+$t4+$t5); $t1=0; $t2=0; $t3=0; $t4=0; $t5=0; 
?></td> 
    </tr> 
<?php } ?> 
<? 
  $username = $row_rsData['username']; 
  $acctnum = $row_rsData['acctnum']; 
  $log_id = $row_rsData['log_id']; 
  $ipaddress = $row_rsData['ipaddress']; 
  $visit_page = $row_rsData['visit_page']; 
  $visit_time = $row_rsData['visit_time']; 
  $user_agent = $row_rsData['user_agent']; 
  $get_vars = str_replace('alert','',$row_rsData['get_vars']); 
  $post_vars = str_replace('alert','',$row_rsData['post_vars']); 
?> 
    <?php } while ($row_rsData = mysql_fetch_assoc($rsData)); ?> 
</table> 
</body> 
</html> 
<?php 
mysql_free_result($rsData); 
?> 
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Appendix B 
Online Questionnaires 
B1: Pre-questionnaire – Section A (English) 
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B2: Pre-questionnaire – Section B (English) 
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B3: Pre-questionnaire – Section C (English) 
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B4: Post-questionnaire – Section A (English) 
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B5: Post-questionnaire – Section B (English) 
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B6: Pre-questionnaire – Section A (Arabic) 
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B7: Pre-questionnaire – Section B (Arabic) 
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B8: Pre-questionnaire – Section C (Arabic) 
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B9: Post-questionnaire – Section A (Arabic) 
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B10: Post-questionnaire – Section B (Arabic) 
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Appendix C 
Data Screening Results 
C1: Pre-questionnaire data frequency and missing details (all participants) 
Variables	 ﾠ
N	 ﾠ=	 ﾠ188	 ﾠ
Mean	 ﾠ Min.	 ﾠ Max.	 ﾠ
Valid	 ﾠ Missing	 ﾠ %	 ﾠ
Do	 ﾠyou	 ﾠmake	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠInternet	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠfacility?	 ﾠ 185  3  1.6  0.54  0  1 
Please	 ﾠstate	 ﾠyour	 ﾠgender	 ﾠ 186  2  1.1  0.67  0  1 
Based on two options (0 and 1) 
Variables	 ﾠ
N	 ﾠ=	 ﾠ188	 ﾠ
Mean	 ﾠ Min.	 ﾠ Max.	 ﾠ
Valid	 ﾠ Missing	 ﾠ %	 ﾠ
How	 ﾠfrequently	 ﾠdo	 ﾠyou	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠthe	 ﾠInternet	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
Home?	 ﾠ
182  6  3.2  1.55  1  4 
How	 ﾠfrequently	 ﾠdo	 ﾠyou	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠthe	 ﾠInternet	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠWork?	 ﾠ 181  7  3.7  1.73  1  4 
How	 ﾠfrequently	 ﾠdo	 ﾠyou	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠthe	 ﾠInternet	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
School?	 ﾠ
159  29  15.4  3.16  1  4 
How	 ﾠfrequently	 ﾠdo	 ﾠyou	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠthe	 ﾠInternet	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
Public?	 ﾠ
166  22  11.7  3.36  1  4 
How	 ﾠfrequently	 ﾠdo	 ﾠyou	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠthe	 ﾠInternet	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
Mobile?	 ﾠ
173  15  8.0  2.55  1  4 
How	 ﾠfrequently	 ﾠdo	 ﾠyou	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠthe	 ﾠInternet	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
places?	 ﾠ
85  103  54.8  3.81  1  4 
What	 ﾠis	 ﾠyour	 ﾠmarital	 ﾠstatus?	 ﾠ 182  6  3.2  1.59  1  2 
Based on four options (1 to 4) 
Variables	 ﾠ
N	 ﾠ=	 ﾠ188	 ﾠ
Mean	 ﾠ Min.	 ﾠ Max.	 ﾠ
Valid	 ﾠ Missing	 ﾠ %	 ﾠ
How	 ﾠoften	 ﾠdo	 ﾠyou	 ﾠmake	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠInternet	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠ
service?	 ﾠ
119  69  36.7  3.39  1  6 
Please	 ﾠindicate	 ﾠyour	 ﾠage	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠyears)	 ﾠ 182  6  3.2  1.70  1  4 
Based on six options (1 to 6) 
Variables	 ﾠ
N	 ﾠ=	 ﾠ188	 ﾠ
Mean	 ﾠ Min.	 ﾠ Max.	 ﾠ
Valid	 ﾠ Missing	 ﾠ %	 ﾠ
What	 ﾠtype	 ﾠof	 ﾠbusiness	 ﾠarea	 ﾠbest	 ﾠdescribes	 ﾠyour	 ﾠ
organization?	 ﾠ
164  24  12.8  4.98  1  9 
Based on nine options (1 to 9) 
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Variables	 ﾠ
N	 ﾠ=	 ﾠ188	 ﾠ
Mean	 ﾠ Min.	 ﾠ Max.	 ﾠ
Valid	 ﾠ Missing	 ﾠ %	 ﾠ
If	 ﾠyou	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠthe	 ﾠInternet	 ﾠdaily,	 ﾠhow	 ﾠmany	 ﾠ
minutes/hours	 ﾠin	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠdo	 ﾠyou	 ﾠusually	 ﾠspend	 ﾠon	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
each	 ﾠday?	 ﾠ
181  7  3.7  3.36  1  5 
With	 ﾠhow	 ﾠmany	 ﾠbanks	 ﾠdo	 ﾠyou	 ﾠdo	 ﾠyour	 ﾠInternet	 ﾠ
banking	 ﾠservices?	 ﾠ
114  74  39.4  1.65  1  5 
To	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠmonthly	 ﾠincome	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠyou	 ﾠbelong	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠ
OMR)?	 ﾠ
172  16  8.5  2.33  1  5 
Which	 ﾠis	 ﾠyour	 ﾠhighest	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠeducation?	 ﾠ 154  34  18.1  3.17  2  5 
Accessibility:	 ﾠconvenience	 ﾠto	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠthe	 ﾠservice	 ﾠ 181  7  3.7  3.95  1  5 
Accessibility:	 ﾠconnection	 ﾠspeed	 ﾠ 182  6  3.2  3.94  1  5 
T&R*:	 ﾠreliability	 ﾠof	 ﾠyour	 ﾠbanker	 ﾠ 179  9  4.8  3.99  1  5 
T&R*:	 ﾠbank	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠrate	 ﾠto	 ﾠqueries	 ﾠ 183  5  2.7  3.67  1  5 
T&R*:	 ﾠEthical	 ﾠand	 ﾠprofessional	 ﾠconduct	 ﾠ 179  9  4.8  3.89  1  5 
T&R*:	 ﾠbank’s	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠto	 ﾠcompensate	 ﾠfor	 ﾠlosses	 ﾠ 178  10  5.3  3.62  1  5 
Reluctance:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbank	 ﾠwillingness	 ﾠto	 ﾠadopt	 ﾠtechnology	 ﾠ 181  7  3.7  3.89  1  5 
Reluctance:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbank	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠawareness	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Internet	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠservice	 ﾠ
177  11  5.9  3.99  1  5 
Security:	 ﾠclear	 ﾠand	 ﾠunderstandable	 ﾠinstructions	 ﾠ 182  6  3.2  4.12  1  5 
Security:	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠof	 ﾠInternet	 ﾠtransaction	 ﾠ 179  9  4.8  4.04  1  5 
Security:	 ﾠlength	 ﾠof	 ﾠInternet	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠ 179  9  4.8  3.72  1  5 
Convenience:	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠelectronic	 ﾠservices	 ﾠoffered	 ﾠ 180  8  4.3  3.77  1  5 
Convenience:	 ﾠconvenient	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠbank	 ﾠ
transactions	 ﾠ
180  8  4.3  3.84  1  5 
Convenience:	 ﾠtime	 ﾠsaving	 ﾠ 179  9  4.8  4.16  1  5 
Ease	 ﾠof	 ﾠuse:	 ﾠuser	 ﾠfriendly	 ﾠweb	 ﾠsite	 ﾠ 182  6  3.2  4.03  1  5 
Ease	 ﾠof	 ﾠuse:	 ﾠease	 ﾠof	 ﾠperforming	 ﾠe-ﾭ‐transaction	 ﾠ 180  8  4.3  4.07  1  5 
*	 ﾠTrust	 ﾠand	 ﾠrelationship 
Based on five options (1 to 5) 
Variables	 ﾠ
N	 ﾠ=	 ﾠ188	 ﾠ
Mean	 ﾠ Min.	 ﾠ Max.	 ﾠ
Valid	 ﾠ Missing	 ﾠ %	 ﾠ
What	 ﾠis	 ﾠyour	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠoccupation?	 ﾠ 178  10  5.3  3.66  1  10 
Based on ten options (1 to 10) 
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C2:  Post-questionnaire  data  frequency  and  missing  details  (participants  who 
completed all tasks) 
Variables	 ﾠ
N	 ﾠ=	 ﾠ90	 ﾠ
Mean	 ﾠ Min.	 ﾠ Max.	 ﾠ
Valid	 ﾠ Missing	 ﾠ %	 ﾠ
Current	 ﾠSystems	 ﾠ
Payments:	 ﾠDo	 ﾠinter	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠfunds	 ﾠtransfer	 ﾠ 88  2  2.2  3.3  1  5 
Payments:	 ﾠMake	 ﾠpayment	 ﾠto	 ﾠother	 ﾠpersonal	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠ 89  1  1.1  2.84  1  5 
Payments:	 ﾠMake	 ﾠpayment	 ﾠto	 ﾠother	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠbank	 ﾠacct.	 ﾠ 89  1  1.1  2.94  1  5 
Payments:	 ﾠTransfer	 ﾠfunds	 ﾠto	 ﾠcredit	 ﾠcard	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠ 88  2  2.2  3.16  1  5 
Payments:	 ﾠDo	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠtransfer:	 ﾠdraft	 ﾠor	 ﾠSWIFT	 ﾠ 87  3  3.3  2.47  1  5 
Payments:	 ﾠTop-ﾭ‐up	 ﾠmobile	 ﾠphones	 ﾠ 87  3  3.3  2.61  1  5 
Requests:	 ﾠOrder	 ﾠcheque	 ﾠbooks	 ﾠ 89  1  1.1  3.3  1  5 
Requests:	 ﾠStop	 ﾠlost	 ﾠATM	 ﾠcards	 ﾠ 89  1  1.1  3.35  1  5 
Requests:	 ﾠStop	 ﾠlost	 ﾠcredit	 ﾠcards	 ﾠ 88  2  2.2  3.32  1  5 
Requests:	 ﾠApply	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠcredit	 ﾠcard	 ﾠlimit	 ﾠchange	 ﾠ 88  2  2.2  2.98  1  5 
Requests:	 ﾠ Request	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ issue	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ current	 ﾠ account	 ﾠ
statement	 ﾠ
89  1  1.1  3.73  1  5 
Requests:	 ﾠSetup	 ﾠstanding	 ﾠorder	 ﾠtransactions	 ﾠ 86  4  4.4  2.93  1  5 
Requests:	 ﾠSetup	 ﾠnew	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠ 90  0  0  2.84  1  5 
Requests:	 ﾠApply	 ﾠfor	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠcurrency	 ﾠaccounts	 ﾠ 87  3  3.3  2.95  1  5 
Requests:	 ﾠApply	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdebit/credit	 ﾠcard	 ﾠ 87  3  3.3  2.86  1  5 
Requests:	 ﾠApply	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠloan	 ﾠ 86  4  4.4  2.63  1  5 
Requests:	 ﾠRequest	 ﾠtelephone	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠ 87  3  3.3  2.84  1  5 
Multichannel	 ﾠAuthentication	 ﾠ(MCA)	 ﾠ
Payments:	 ﾠDo	 ﾠinter	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠfunds	 ﾠtransfer	 ﾠ 88  2  2.2  4.1  1  5 
Payments:	 ﾠMake	 ﾠpayment	 ﾠto	 ﾠother	 ﾠpersonal	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠ 87  3  3.3  4.22  1  5 
Payments:	 ﾠMake	 ﾠpayment	 ﾠto	 ﾠother	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠbank	 ﾠacct.	 ﾠ 88  2  2.2  4.24  1  5 
Payments:	 ﾠTransfer	 ﾠfunds	 ﾠto	 ﾠcredit	 ﾠcard	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠ 89  1  1.1  4.07  1  5 
Payments:	 ﾠDo	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠtransfer:	 ﾠdraft	 ﾠor	 ﾠSWIFT	 ﾠ 87  3  3.3  3.8  1  5 
Payments:	 ﾠTop-ﾭ‐up	 ﾠmobile	 ﾠphones	 ﾠ 87  3  3.3  4.08  1  5 
Requests:	 ﾠOrder	 ﾠcheque	 ﾠbooks	 ﾠ 88  2  2.2  3.78  1  5 
Requests:	 ﾠStop	 ﾠlost	 ﾠATM	 ﾠcards	 ﾠ 89  1  1.1  4.04  1  5 
Requests:	 ﾠStop	 ﾠlost	 ﾠcredit	 ﾠcards	 ﾠ 87  3  3.3  4  1  5 
Requests:	 ﾠApply	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠcredit	 ﾠcard	 ﾠlimit	 ﾠchange	 ﾠ 89  1  1.1  3.85  1  5 
Requests:	 ﾠ Request	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ issue	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ current	 ﾠ account	 ﾠ
statement	 ﾠ
87  3  3.3  4.43  1  5 
Requests:	 ﾠSetup	 ﾠstanding	 ﾠorder	 ﾠtransactions	 ﾠ 86  4  4.4  4.05  1  5 
Requests:	 ﾠSetup	 ﾠnew	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠ 88  2  2.2  3.77  1  5 
Requests:	 ﾠApply	 ﾠfor	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠcurrency	 ﾠaccounts	 ﾠ 86  4  4.4  3.59  1  5 
Requests:	 ﾠApply	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdebit/credit	 ﾠcard	 ﾠ 88  2  2.2  3.91  1  5 
Requests:	 ﾠApply	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠloan	 ﾠ 89  1  1.1  3.43  1  5 
Requests:	 ﾠRequest	 ﾠtelephone	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠ 89  1  1.1  3.93  1  5 
Post-questionnaire: section A questions 
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Variables	 ﾠ
N	 ﾠ=	 ﾠ90	 ﾠ
Mean	 ﾠ Min.	 ﾠ Max.	 ﾠ
Valid	 ﾠ Missing	 ﾠ %	 ﾠ
Question	 ﾠ1	 ﾠ
Amount	 ﾠof	 ﾠSMS	 ﾠcommunication	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsite	 ﾠ 89  1  1.1  4.26  2  5 
Ease	 ﾠof	 ﾠperforming	 ﾠtransactions	 ﾠ 89  1  1.1  4.31  2  5 
Level	 ﾠof	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠimplemented	 ﾠ 89  1  1.1  4.28  1  5 
Question	 ﾠ2	 ﾠ
If	 ﾠmulti-ﾭ‐channel	 ﾠauthentication	 ﾠ(MCA)	 ﾠservice	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
implemented	 ﾠby	 ﾠyour	 ﾠbank,	 ﾠI	 ﾠwould	 ﾠrecommend	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠothers	 ﾠ
89  1  1.1  4.36  3  5 
I	 ﾠfound	 ﾠMCA	 ﾠeasy	 ﾠto	 ﾠuse	 ﾠoverall	 ﾠ 89  1  1.1  4.3  2  5 
I	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMCA	 ﾠto	 ﾠwork	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠit	 ﾠdid	 ﾠ 89  1  1.1  4.16  3  5 
I	 ﾠtrust	 ﾠthat	 ﾠMCA	 ﾠwould	 ﾠprotect	 ﾠme	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠInternet	 ﾠ
fraud	 ﾠand	 ﾠattacks	 ﾠ
88  2  2.2  4.03  1  5 
I	 ﾠfeel	 ﾠthat	 ﾠMCA	 ﾠhas	 ﾠjust	 ﾠmade	 ﾠthings	 ﾠcomplicated	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠtime-ﾭ‐consuming	 ﾠ
89  1  1.1  2.28  1  5 
With	 ﾠMCA,	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠnot	 ﾠworried	 ﾠabout	 ﾠusing	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠ
computers	 ﾠfor	 ﾠInternet	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠservices	 ﾠ
88  2  2.2  3.59  1  5 
I	 ﾠwould	 ﾠimagine	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmost	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠwould	 ﾠlearn	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
use	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠvery	 ﾠquickly	 ﾠ
89  1  1.1  3.84  1  5 
I	 ﾠfound	 ﾠthe	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠchannel	 ﾠfeature	 ﾠconvenient	 ﾠ
when	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠcase)	 ﾠmy	 ﾠprimary	 ﾠchannel	 ﾠ(for	 ﾠexample	 ﾠ
your	 ﾠmobile	 ﾠphone)	 ﾠis	 ﾠunavailable	 ﾠ
87  3  3.3  4.28  1  5 
I	 ﾠwould	 ﾠprefer	 ﾠto	 ﾠuse	 ﾠthe	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠchannel	 ﾠoption	 ﾠ
than	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠa	 ﾠcall-ﾭ‐center/help-ﾭ‐desk	 ﾠcall	 ﾠ
88  2  2.2  4.19  1  5 
Post-questionnaire: section B questions 
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Appendix D 
Demographics Characteristics 
D1: Relationship between Demographic Profile of Participants and Dropout Rates 
Gender	 ﾠand	 ﾠCompleted	 ﾠCrosstabulations	 ﾠ Completed?	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Value	 ﾠ df	 ﾠ Sig.	 ﾠ Missing	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ No	 ﾠ Yes	 ﾠ Total	 ﾠ
0.605**  1  .437  2  Female	 ﾠ Count	 ﾠ 34  28  62 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠGender	 ﾠ 54.8%  45.2%  100.0% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠCompleted?	 ﾠ 36.6%  30.1%  33.3% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠof	 ﾠTotal	 ﾠ 18.3%  15.1%  33.3% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Male	 ﾠ Count	 ﾠ 59  65  124 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠGender	 ﾠ 47.6%  52.4%  100.0% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠCompleted?	 ﾠ 63.4%  69.9%  66.7% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠof	 ﾠTotal	 ﾠ 31.7%  34.9%  66.7% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Total	 ﾠ Count	 ﾠ 93  93  186 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠGender	 ﾠ 50.0%  50.0%  100.0% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠCompleted?	 ﾠ 100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠof	 ﾠTotal	 ﾠ 50.0%  50.0%  100.0% 
*	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠPearson	 ﾠChi-ﾭ‐Square	 ﾠ
**	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠContinuity	 ﾠCorrection	 ﾠ(computed	 ﾠonly	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠ2x2	 ﾠtable)	 ﾠ
Relationship between Gender and Dropout Rates 
 
Marital	 ﾠStatus	 ﾠand	 ﾠCompleted	 ﾠCrosstabulations	 ﾠ Completed?	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Value	 ﾠ df	 ﾠ Sig.	 ﾠ Missing	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ No	 ﾠ Yes	 ﾠ Total	 ﾠ
.023**  1  .880  6  Single	 ﾠ Count	 ﾠ 36  38  74 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠM.	 ﾠStatus	 ﾠ 48.6%  51.4%  100.0% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠCompleted?	 ﾠ 39.6%  41.8%  40.7% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠof	 ﾠTotal	 ﾠ 19.8%  20.9%  40.7% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Married	 ﾠ Count	 ﾠ 55  53  108 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠM.	 ﾠStatus	 ﾠ 50.9%  49.1%  100.0% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠCompleted?	 ﾠ 60.4%  58.2%  59.3% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠof	 ﾠTotal	 ﾠ 30.2%  29.1%  59.3% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Total	 ﾠ Count	 ﾠ 91  91  182 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠM.	 ﾠStatus	 ﾠ 50.0%  50.0%  100.0% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠCompleted?	 ﾠ 100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠof	 ﾠTotal	 ﾠ 50.0%  50.0%  100.0% 
*	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠPearson	 ﾠChi-ﾭ‐Square	 ﾠ
**	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠContinuity	 ﾠCorrection	 ﾠ(computed	 ﾠonly	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠ2x2	 ﾠtable)	 ﾠ
Relationship between Marital Status and Dropout Rates 
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Education	 ﾠLevel	 ﾠand	 ﾠCompleted	 ﾠCrosstabulations	 ﾠ Completed?	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Value	 ﾠ df	 ﾠ Sig.	 ﾠ Missing	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ No	 ﾠ Yes	 ﾠ Total	 ﾠ
19.607*  3  .000  34  Technical	 ﾠ/	 ﾠ
Professional	 ﾠ
Training	 ﾠ
Count	 ﾠ 19  4  23 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠEdu.	 ﾠLevel	 ﾠ 82.6%  17.4%  100.0% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠCompleted?	 ﾠ 24.1%  5.3%  14.9% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠof	 ﾠTotal	 ﾠ 12.3%  2.6%  14.9% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ College	 ﾠgrad.	 ﾠ
(4	 ﾠyears)	 ﾠ
Count	 ﾠ 43  44  87 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠEdu.	 ﾠLevel	 ﾠ 49.4%  50.6%  100.0% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠCompleted?	 ﾠ 54.4%  58.7%  56.5% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠof	 ﾠTotal	 ﾠ 27.9%  28.6%  56.5% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Master	 ﾠdeg.	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠequivalent	 ﾠ
Count	 ﾠ 17  22  39 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠEdu.	 ﾠLevel	 ﾠ 43.6%  56.4%  100.0% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠCompleted?	 ﾠ 21.5%  29.3%  25.3% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠof	 ﾠTotal	 ﾠ 11.0%  14.3%  25.3% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Postgraduate	 ﾠ
degree	 ﾠ
Count	 ﾠ 0  5  5 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠEdu.	 ﾠLevel	 ﾠ 0%  100.0%  100.0% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠCompleted?	 ﾠ 0%  6.7%  3.2% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠof	 ﾠTotal	 ﾠ 0%  3.2%  3.2% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Total	 ﾠ Count	 ﾠ 79  75  154 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠEdu.	 ﾠLevel	 ﾠ 51.3%  48.7%  100.0% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠCompleted?	 ﾠ 100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠof	 ﾠTotal	 ﾠ 51.3%  48.7%  100.0% 
*	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠPearson	 ﾠChi-ﾭ‐Square	 ﾠ
**	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠContinuity	 ﾠCorrection	 ﾠ(computed	 ﾠonly	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠ2x2	 ﾠtable)	 ﾠ
Relationship between Education Level and Dropout Rates 
 
Education	 ﾠLevel	 ﾠand	 ﾠCompleted	 ﾠCrosstabulations	 ﾠ Completed?	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Value	 ﾠ df	 ﾠ Sig.	 ﾠ Missing	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ No	 ﾠ Yes	 ﾠ Total	 ﾠ
9.928*  2  .007  39  Technical	 ﾠ/	 ﾠ
Professional	 ﾠ
Training	 ﾠ
Count	 ﾠ 19  4  23 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠEdu.	 ﾠLevel	 ﾠ 82.6%  17.4%  100.0% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠCompleted?	 ﾠ 24.1%  5.7%  15.4% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠof	 ﾠTotal	 ﾠ 12.8%  2.7%  15.4% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ College	 ﾠgrad.	 ﾠ
(4	 ﾠyears)	 ﾠ
Count	 ﾠ 43  44  87 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠEdu.	 ﾠLevel	 ﾠ 49.4%  50.6%  100.0% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠCompleted?	 ﾠ 54.4%  62.9%  58.4% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠof	 ﾠTotal	 ﾠ 28.9%  29.5%  58.4% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Master	 ﾠdeg.	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠequivalent	 ﾠ
Count	 ﾠ 17  22  39 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠEdu.	 ﾠLevel	 ﾠ 43.6%  56.4%  100.0% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠCompleted?	 ﾠ 21.5%  31.4%  26.2% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠof	 ﾠTotal	 ﾠ 11.4%  14.8%  26.2% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Total	 ﾠ Count	 ﾠ 79  70  149 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠEdu.	 ﾠLevel	 ﾠ 53.0%  47.0%  100.0% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠCompleted?	 ﾠ 100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠof	 ﾠTotal	 ﾠ 53.0%  47.0%  100.0% 
*	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠPearson	 ﾠChi-ﾭ‐Square	 ﾠ
**	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠContinuity	 ﾠCorrection	 ﾠ(computed	 ﾠonly	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠ2x2	 ﾠtable)	 ﾠ
Relationship between Education Level and Dropout Rates (without the postgraduate degree group) 
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Age	 ﾠGroup	 ﾠand	 ﾠCompleted	 ﾠCrosstabulations	 ﾠ Completed?	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Value	 ﾠ df	 ﾠ Sig.	 ﾠ Missing	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ No	 ﾠ Yes	 ﾠ Total	 ﾠ
2.131*  3  .546  6  18	 ﾠto	 ﾠ27	 ﾠ Count	 ﾠ 39  36  75 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠAge	 ﾠGroup	 ﾠ 52.0%  48.0%  100.0% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠCompleted?	 ﾠ 42.9%  39.6%  41.2% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠof	 ﾠTotal	 ﾠ 21.4%  19.8%  41.2% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 28	 ﾠto	 ﾠ37	 ﾠ Count	 ﾠ 44  45  89 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠAge	 ﾠGroup	 ﾠ 49.4%  50.6%  100.0% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠCompleted?	 ﾠ 48.4%  49.5%  48.9% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠof	 ﾠTotal	 ﾠ 24.2%  24.7%  48.9% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 38	 ﾠto	 ﾠ47	 ﾠ Count	 ﾠ 8  8  16 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠAge	 ﾠGroup	 ﾠ 50.0%  50.0%  100.0% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠCompleted?	 ﾠ 8.8%  8.8%  8.8% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠof	 ﾠTotal	 ﾠ 4.4%  4.4%  8.8% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 48	 ﾠto	 ﾠ57	 ﾠ Count	 ﾠ 0  2  2 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠAge	 ﾠGroup	 ﾠ 0.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠCompleted?	 ﾠ 0.0%  2.2%  1.1% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠof	 ﾠTotal	 ﾠ 0.0%  1.1%  1.1% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Total	 ﾠ Count	 ﾠ 91  91  182 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠAge	 ﾠGroup	 ﾠ 50.0%  50.0%  100.0% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠCompleted?	 ﾠ 100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠof	 ﾠTotal	 ﾠ 50.0%  50.0%  100.0% 
*	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠPearson	 ﾠChi-ﾭ‐Square	 ﾠ
Relationship between Age Group and Dropout Rates 
 
Monthly	 ﾠIncome	 ﾠGroup	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠOMR)	 ﾠand	 ﾠCompleted	 ﾠCrosstabulations	 ﾠ Completed?	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Value	 ﾠ df	 ﾠ Sig.	 ﾠ Missing	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ No	 ﾠ Yes	 ﾠ Total	 ﾠ
5.080*  4  .279  16  Less	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ500	 ﾠ Count	 ﾠ 15  18  33 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠIncome	 ﾠGrp.	 ﾠ 45.5%  54.5%  100.0% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠCompleted?	 ﾠ 18.1%  20.2%  19.2% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠof	 ﾠTotal	 ﾠ 8.7%  10.5%  19.2% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 500	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ1,000	 ﾠ Count	 ﾠ 43  41  84 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠIncome	 ﾠGrp.	 ﾠ 51.2%  48.8%  100.0% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠCompleted?	 ﾠ 51.8%  46.1%  48.8% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠof	 ﾠTotal	 ﾠ 25.0%  23.8%  48.8% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 1,001	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ1,500	 ﾠ Count	 ﾠ 11  20  31 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠIncome	 ﾠGrp.	 ﾠ 35.5%  64.5%  100.0% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠCompleted?	 ﾠ 13.3%  22.5%  18.0% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠof	 ﾠTotal	 ﾠ 6.4%  11.6%  18.0% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 1,501	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ2,000	 ﾠ Count	 ﾠ 6  7  13 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠIncome	 ﾠGrp.	 ﾠ 46.2%  53.8%  100.0% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠCompleted?	 ﾠ 7.2%  7.9%  7.6% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠof	 ﾠTotal	 ﾠ 3.5%  4.1%  7.6% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ More	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ
2,001	 ﾠ
Count	 ﾠ 8  3  11 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠIncome	 ﾠGrp.	 ﾠ 72.7%  27.3%  100.0% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠCompleted?	 ﾠ 9.6%  3.4%  6.4% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠof	 ﾠTotal	 ﾠ 4.7%  1.7%  6.4% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Total	 ﾠ Count	 ﾠ 83  89  172 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠIncome	 ﾠGrp.	 ﾠ 48.3%  51.7%  100.0% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠCompleted?	 ﾠ 100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠof	 ﾠTotal	 ﾠ 48.3%  51.7%  100.0% 
*	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠPearson	 ﾠChi-ﾭ‐Square	 ﾠ 
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Relationship between Monthly Income and Dropout Rates 
 
Social	 ﾠRelationship	 ﾠand	 ﾠCompleted	 ﾠCrosstabulations	 ﾠ Completed?	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Value	 ﾠ df	 ﾠ Sig.	 ﾠ Missing	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ No	 ﾠ Yes	 ﾠ Total	 ﾠ
33.142*  1  .000  0  Others	 ﾠ Count	 ﾠ 84  11  95 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
%	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠCompleted	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠrequirements?	 ﾠ
88.4%  11.6%  100.0% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠIs	 ﾠFriend?	 ﾠ 65.1%  18.6%  50.5% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠof	 ﾠTotal	 ﾠ 44.7%  5.9%  50.5% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Friends	 ﾠ&	 ﾠ
Colleagues	 ﾠ Count	 ﾠ
45  48  93 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠCompleted	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠrequirements?	 ﾠ
48.4%  51.6%  100.0% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠIs	 ﾠFriend?	 ﾠ 34.9%  81.4%  49.5% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠof	 ﾠTotal	 ﾠ 23.9%  25.5%  49.5% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Total	 ﾠ Count	 ﾠ 129  59  188 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠCompleted	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠrequirements?	 ﾠ
68.6%  31.4%  100.0% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠIs	 ﾠFriend?	 ﾠ 100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠof	 ﾠTotal	 ﾠ 68.6%  31.4%  100.0% 
*	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠContinuity	 ﾠCorrection	 ﾠ(computed	 ﾠonly	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠ2x2	 ﾠtable)	 ﾠ
Relationship between Social Relationship and Dropout Rates  
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D2: Relationship between Demographic Profile of Participants and Online Banking 
Experience 
Have	 ﾠused	 ﾠonline	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠbefore?	 ﾠ Completed?	 ﾠ
Total	 ﾠ
Value	 ﾠ df	 ﾠ Sig.	 ﾠ Missing	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ No	 ﾠ(%)	 ﾠ Yes	 ﾠ(%)	 ﾠ
5.293*  1  .021  3  No	 ﾠ 52 (60.5%)  34 (39.5%)  86 
	 ﾠ Yes	 ﾠ 42 (42.4%)  57 (57.6%)  99 
Total	 ﾠ 94 (50.8%)  91 (49.2%)  185 
*	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠContinuity	 ﾠCorrection	 ﾠ(computed	 ﾠonly	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠ2x2	 ﾠtable) 
Relationship between Tasks Completion and Online Banking Experience  
Education	 ﾠLevel	 ﾠand	 ﾠOB	 ﾠExperience	 ﾠCrosstabulations	 ﾠ OB	 ﾠUser?	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Value	 ﾠ df	 ﾠ Sig.	 ﾠ Missing	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ No	 ﾠ Yes	 ﾠ Total	 ﾠ
18.406*  2  .000  2  Technical	 ﾠ/	 ﾠ
Professional	 ﾠ
Training	 ﾠ
Count	 ﾠ 14	 ﾠ 8	 ﾠ 22	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠEdu.	 ﾠLevel	 ﾠ 64%	 ﾠ 36%	 ﾠ 100%	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠOB	 ﾠUser	 ﾠ 22%	 ﾠ 9%	 ﾠ 15%	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠof	 ﾠTotal	 ﾠ 9%	 ﾠ 5%	 ﾠ 15%	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ College	 ﾠgrad.	 ﾠ
(4	 ﾠyears)	 ﾠ
Count	 ﾠ 44	 ﾠ 44	 ﾠ 88	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠEdu.	 ﾠLevel	 ﾠ 50%	 ﾠ 50%	 ﾠ 100%	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠOB	 ﾠUser	 ﾠ 69%	 ﾠ 51%	 ﾠ 59%	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠof	 ﾠTotal	 ﾠ 29%	 ﾠ 29%	 ﾠ 59%	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Master	 ﾠdeg.	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠequivalent	 ﾠ
Count	 ﾠ 6	 ﾠ 34	 ﾠ 40	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠEdu.	 ﾠLevel	 ﾠ 15%	 ﾠ 85%	 ﾠ 100%	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠOB	 ﾠUser	 ﾠ 9%	 ﾠ 40%	 ﾠ 27%	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠof	 ﾠTotal	 ﾠ 4%	 ﾠ 23%	 ﾠ 27%	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Total	 ﾠ Count	 ﾠ 64	 ﾠ 86	 ﾠ 150	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠEdu.	 ﾠLevel	 ﾠ 43%	 ﾠ 57%	 ﾠ 100%	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠOB	 ﾠUser	 ﾠ 100%	 ﾠ 100%	 ﾠ 100%	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠof	 ﾠTotal	 ﾠ 43%	 ﾠ 57%	 ﾠ 100%	 ﾠ
*	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠPearson	 ﾠChi-ﾭ‐Square	 ﾠ
Relationship between Education Level and OB Experience (without postgraduate degree group) 
Age	 ﾠGroup	 ﾠand	 ﾠOnline	 ﾠBanking	 ﾠExperience	 ﾠCrosstabulations	 ﾠ OB	 ﾠUser?	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Value	 ﾠ df	 ﾠ Sig.	 ﾠ Missing	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ No	 ﾠ Yes	 ﾠ Total	 ﾠ
10.956*  1  .001  3  18	 ﾠto	 ﾠ27	 ﾠ Count	 ﾠ 44  28  72 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠAge	 ﾠGroup	 ﾠ 61.1%  38.9%  100.0% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠOB	 ﾠUser	 ﾠ 59.5%  32.2%  44.7% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠof	 ﾠTotal	 ﾠ 27.3%  17.4%  44.7% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 28	 ﾠto	 ﾠ37	 ﾠ Count	 ﾠ 30  59  89 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠAge	 ﾠGroup	 ﾠ 33.7%  66.3%  100.0% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠOB	 ﾠUser	 ﾠ 40.5%  67.8%  55.3% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠof	 ﾠTotal	 ﾠ 18.6%  36.6%  55.3% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Total	 ﾠ Count	 ﾠ 74  87  161 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠAge	 ﾠGroup	 ﾠ 46.0%  54.0%  100.0% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠOB	 ﾠUser	 ﾠ 100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ %	 ﾠof	 ﾠTotal	 ﾠ 46.0%  54.0%  100.0% 
*	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠContinuity	 ﾠCorrection	 ﾠ(computed	 ﾠonly	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠ2x2	 ﾠtable)	 ﾠ
Relationship between Age Group and Online Banking Experience (without age groups 38 to 47 and 
48 to 57) 
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D3: Factor Analysis – Component Matrix and Screeplot 
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D4: Independent-Sample T-Test – External Variables 
	 ﾠ Online	 ﾠ
banking	 ﾠuser?	 ﾠ
N	 ﾠ Mean	 ﾠ Std.	 ﾠDeviation	 ﾠ Std.	 ﾠError	 ﾠMean	 ﾠ
Trust	 ﾠand	 ﾠRelationship	 ﾠ No	 ﾠ 88  3.50  .916  .098 
Yes	 ﾠ 100  4.02  .792  .079 
Accessibility	 ﾠ No	 ﾠ 88  3.65  1.281  .137 
Yes	 ﾠ 100  4.21  .998  .100 
Security	 ﾠ No	 ﾠ 88  3.70  1.054  .112 
Yes	 ﾠ 100  4.10  .792  .079 
Perceived	 ﾠease	 ﾠof	 ﾠuse	 ﾠ No	 ﾠ 88  3.70  1.076  .115 
Yes	 ﾠ 100  4.18  .794  .079 
Group Statistics 
 
Factors	 ﾠ
Levene's	 ﾠTest	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠEquality	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Variances	 ﾠ
t-ﾭ‐test	 ﾠfor	 ﾠEquality	 ﾠof	 ﾠMeans	 ﾠ
F	 ﾠ Sig.	 ﾠ t	 ﾠ df	 ﾠ
Sig.	 ﾠ
(2-ﾭ‐
tailed)	 ﾠ
M	 ﾠ
Diff.	 ﾠ
S.	 ﾠErr.	 ﾠ
Diff.	 ﾠ
95%	 ﾠConf.	 ﾠInter.	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDiff.	 ﾠ
Lower	 ﾠ Upper	 ﾠ
Trust	 ﾠand	 ﾠrelationship	 ﾠ
Equal	 ﾠvariances	 ﾠassumed	 ﾠ 4.323  .039  -4.198  186  .000  -.523  .125  -.769  -.277 
Equal	 ﾠvar.	 ﾠnot	 ﾠassumed	 ﾠ     -4.160  173.185  .000  -.523  .126  -.771  -.275 
Accessibility	 ﾠ
Equal	 ﾠvariances	 ﾠassumed	 ﾠ 8.413  .004  -3.314  186  .001  -.552  .166  -.880  -.223 
Equal	 ﾠvar.	 ﾠnot	 ﾠassumed	 ﾠ     -3.262  163.715  .001  -.552  .169  -.885  -.218 
Security	 ﾠ
Equal	 ﾠvariances	 ﾠassumed	 ﾠ 11.033  .001  -2.943  186  .004  -.398  .135  -.664  -.131 
Equal	 ﾠvar.	 ﾠnot	 ﾠassumed	 ﾠ     -2.891  160.227  .004  -.398  .138  -.669  -.126 
Perceived	 ﾠease	 ﾠof	 ﾠuse	 ﾠ
Equal	 ﾠvariances	 ﾠassumed	 ﾠ 12.230  .001  -3.495  186  .001  -.478  .137  -.748  -.208 
Equal	 ﾠvar.	 ﾠnot	 ﾠassumed	 ﾠ     -3.430  158.377  .001  -.478  .139  -.754  -.203 
Independent Samples Test 
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D4:  Paried-Sample  T-Test  –  Online  Users’  Preferences  on  Services  Usage  between 
Online Banking Systems with MCA and without MCA 
	 ﾠ Mean	 ﾠ N	 ﾠ Std.	 ﾠDeviation	 ﾠ Std.	 ﾠError	 ﾠMean	 ﾠ
Q	 ﾠ1	 ﾠ
With	 ﾠ 4.18  62  1.064  .135 
Without	 ﾠ 3.37  62  1.149  .146 
Q	 ﾠ2	 ﾠ
With	 ﾠ 4.21  61  1.002  .128 
Without	 ﾠ 2.79  61  1.318  .169 
Q	 ﾠ3	 ﾠ
With	 ﾠ 4.26  62  .974  .124 
Without	 ﾠ 2.82  62  1.248  .159 
Q	 ﾠ4	 ﾠ
With	 ﾠ 4.10  61  .961  .123 
Without	 ﾠ 3.25  61  1.234  .158 
Q	 ﾠ5	 ﾠ
With	 ﾠ 3.70  60  1.253  .162 
Without	 ﾠ 2.33  60  1.311  .169 
Q	 ﾠ6	 ﾠ
With	 ﾠ 4.05  60  1.171  .151 
Without	 ﾠ 2.60  60  1.210  .156 
Q	 ﾠ7	 ﾠ
With	 ﾠ 3.75  61  1.337  .171 
Without	 ﾠ 3.34  61  1.250  .160 
Q	 ﾠ8	 ﾠ
With	 ﾠ 3.95  62  1.247  .158 
Without	 ﾠ 3.44  62  1.288  .164 
Q	 ﾠ9	 ﾠ
With	 ﾠ 3.95  61  1.217  .156 
Without	 ﾠ 3.38  61  1.319  .169 
Q	 ﾠ10	 ﾠ
With	 ﾠ 3.79  61  1.280  .164 
Without	 ﾠ 2.97  61  1.224  .157 
Q	 ﾠ11	 ﾠ
With	 ﾠ 4.36  61  1.065  .136 
Without	 ﾠ 3.80  61  1.093  .140 
Q	 ﾠ12	 ﾠ
With	 ﾠ 4.11  61  1.142  .146 
Without	 ﾠ 2.89  61  1.185  .152 
Q	 ﾠ13	 ﾠ
With	 ﾠ 3.68  62  1.352  .172 
Without	 ﾠ 2.73  62  1.405  .178 
Q	 ﾠ14	 ﾠ
With	 ﾠ 3.41  59  1.403  .183 
Without	 ﾠ 2.98  59  1.383  .180 
Q	 ﾠ15	 ﾠ
With	 ﾠ 3.89  61  1.199  .153 
Without	 ﾠ 2.93  61  1.340  .172 
Q	 ﾠ16	 ﾠ
With	 ﾠ 3.36  59  1.336  .174 
Without	 ﾠ 2.59  59  1.301  .169 
Q	 ﾠ17	 ﾠ
With	 ﾠ 3.77  60  1.320  .170 
Without	 ﾠ 2.87  60  1.268  .164 
Paired	 ﾠSamples	 ﾠStatistics 
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 ﾠ
Paired	 ﾠDifferences	 ﾠ
t	 ﾠ df	 ﾠ
Sig.	 ﾠ(2-ﾭ‐
tailed)	 ﾠ Mean	 ﾠ
Std.	 ﾠ
Deviation	 ﾠ
Std.	 ﾠError	 ﾠ
Mean	 ﾠ
95%	 ﾠConfidence	 ﾠInterval	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠDifference	 ﾠ
Lower	 ﾠ Upper	 ﾠ
Q	 ﾠ1	 ﾠ .806  1.491  .189  .428  1.185  4.258  61  .000 
Q	 ﾠ2	 ﾠ 1.426  1.500  .192  1.042  1.810  7.428  60  .000 
Q	 ﾠ3	 ﾠ 1.435  1.543  .196  1.044  1.827  7.325  61  .000 
Q	 ﾠ4	 ﾠ .852  1.314  .168  .516  1.189  5.065  60  .000 
Q	 ﾠ5	 ﾠ 1.367  1.775  .229  .908  1.825  5.963  59  .000 
Q	 ﾠ6	 ﾠ 1.450  1.466  .189  1.071  1.829  7.660  59  .000 
Q	 ﾠ7	 ﾠ .410  1.564  .200  .009  .810  2.047  60  .045 
Q	 ﾠ8	 ﾠ .516  1.734  .220  .076  .957  2.343  61  .022 
Q	 ﾠ9	 ﾠ .574  1.756  .225  .124  1.023  2.553  60  .013 
Q	 ﾠ
10	 ﾠ
.820  1.607  .206  .408  1.231  3.983  60  .000 
Q	 ﾠ
11	 ﾠ
.557  1.467  .188  .182  .933  2.968  60  .004 
Q	 ﾠ
12	 ﾠ
1.230  1.359  .174  .881  1.578  7.067  60  .000 
Q	 ﾠ
13	 ﾠ
.952  1.928  .245  .462  1.441  3.886  61  .000 
Q	 ﾠ
14	 ﾠ
.424  1.868  .243  -.063  .911  1.742  58  .087 
Q	 ﾠ
15	 ﾠ
.951  1.755  .225  .501  1.400  4.231  60  .000 
Q	 ﾠ
16	 ﾠ
.763  1.794  .234  .295  1.230  3.266  58  .002 
Q	 ﾠ
17	 ﾠ
.900  1.674  .216  .467  1.333  4.164  59  .000 
Paired	 ﾠSamples	 ﾠTest 
  